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Synopsis 
Banking is a major employment sector, which has experienced phenomenal growth over 
the last decade. Following the de-regulation of the financial marketplace and the entiy of 
*new players', the industiy has suffered fiom an almost ruinous internal struggle between 
its traditional, gentlemanly ethos (Clarke and Vincent, 1989) and the enforced adoption 
of aggressive sales and marketing strategies (Knights and Tinker, 1997). My research has 
investigated the various ways that *change* (particularly strategic change consequential to 
the piecemeal adoption of'Japanese-style' systems of working and management -'HRM, 
TQM and lean production) have been met, experienced, negotiated, and to some extent 
contested, by branch-based employees woricing for Bank UK (one of the historic 'big 
four' clearing banks). 
Data was gathered through varying periods of participant observation in seven branches 
of Bank UK over two years, supplemented by group and individual interviews with 
managers and staff. A key informant was later recruited, who added both depth and a 
greater understanding of raw data. 
My thesis suggests that changing strategies (particularly those introduced in order to 
strengthen market position and expand sales opportunities) have created multiple 
paradoxes in the management and organisation of woric in Bank UK, mostly through 
issues of cosL At the same time as attempting to drive through a whole rafl of changes 
that clearly involved increasing employee participation and commitment through 
teamworking, Kaizen activity, perfomiance related pay and individual sales bids, the 
bank had been concerned to decrease operating costs in an attempt to improve key 
economic ratios. Between 1999 and 2000, Bank UK reduced staff expenditure by £72 
million by shedding 7,300 employees. This significant loss of staff created huge 
difficulties in the everyday operation of branches, resulting in growing customer 
dissatisfaction with the service on offer, at the same time that weekly individual and 
branch sales targets were introduced, which clearly demanded extended customer 
interaction. 
The composition of the workforce in Bank UK has become increasingly flexible (both 
numerically and functionally) and two-tiered. Permanent staff enjoy the traditional 
'perics' of employment, including performance related pay, whilst the growing number on 
'casual' or flexible contracts (mostly ex-permanenl staff) do not. Yet, paradoxically my 
research reveals that Bank UK's successful integration of sales and marketing strategies 
into the branch network can be generally attributed to the attitudes of its ^casual' 
workforce who appear to have made a bigger contribution in terms of sales results and 
commitment to flexible working practices than their 'permanent' colleagues, despite 
lacking the same level of recognition and reward. 
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Introduction. 
On a global scale, financial systems and banking organisations have been 
experiencing a period o f unprecedented external and internal change. Institutions 
have had to react quickly, and often uncomfortably to increasing competition, 
regulatory changes, new technologies and global economic pressures (Lewellyn, 
1994: 2). It cannot be surprising, due to the extent o f this upheaval, that the 
financial services sector has become a favourite site o f research for sociologists 
and other industrial researchers. Through a whole gamut of inter-disciplinaiy 
research foci and methods, studies have recorded and analysed the many 
consequences of change within this industrial sector. The effects of change have 
been examined from a number o f different perspectives. In particular, sociological 
research has concentrated upon assessing the impact of change in 'doing' a 
particular job (McDowell, 1997; Boaden and Dale, 1993), or the multifarious 
ways in which change in its broadest sense is, or has been, experienced by the 
organisation (Knights and Tinker, 1997; Marshall and Richardson, 1996; Burton, 
1994), management (Regini et al., 1999; Denham et al., 1997; Argyris, 1998), or 
the industry in general (Devine et al., 2000; Essinger, 1999; Fincham etal., 1994; 
Egner, 1991; Clarke and Vincent, 1989; Crompton, 1989). 
Despite the attention paid to the financial services industiy by sociologists in 
recent years, research has generally focussed on assessing the outcomes of macro 
representations of change, such as amendments to organisational structures. As a 
result the adoption of'Japanese-style'^ systems o f management and workflow, a 
crucial development, which penneates all aspects of change, remains relatively 
unexplored. 
Yet, this missing dimension clearly influences v4iether or not change is, has been, 
or will be, successfully operationalised within the organisation. It is also a crucial 
determinant in the attempts of sociologists to understand the messy nature of the 
social world and the unique relations and dynamics o f work embedded within it. It 
is surprising; therefore, in view of its obvious importance that employee 
experience of change has been so often overiooked within industrial research. Yet 
this dimension clearly transcends and influences macro representations o f change 
within industries, particularly in the financial services industry where: ". . . a 
quality social interaction is vital, whether or not it is formally part o f the 
exchange" (Filby, 1992: 23). It is also a dimension, which is clearly of greater 
significance in terms of health, career progression, job content and participation in 
the labour market than the foci of much existing research would suggest. 
' Currently, there is no universal definition of *Japanisation' or 'Japanese-style' ways of 
management and working. Generally, 'Japanisalion' is associated with successive lean 
management strategies, teamworking, increased labour flexibility, a reduction in idle time, 
increasing direct communication between management and workers, and the individualisation of 
pay(Danford, 1999: ii). 
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This is not to say that the experiences of employees have been ignored in all 
industrial research. Clearly, investigations o f change fix>m a gender perspective 
have required a focus on individual accounts o f change (Bradley, 1999; Blossfield 
and Hakim. 1997; Probert and Wilson, 1993; Cockbum, 1991; Pringle, 1988), 
although the intensities of individual experiences have often been lost within 
broad analyses and sweeping conclusions. In recent years, the 'individual 
experience' has enjoyed a brief renaissance in research concerned with assessing 
the multiple and profound changes to work and management styles, particularly 
within UK-based 'Japanese' transplants (Danford, 1999; Delbridge, 1998; Scott, 
1994). Like the early industrial ethnographers (Cavendish, 1982; Linhart, 1981; 
Beynon, 1978), these contemporary ethnographies offer detailed commentaries on 
working life in the modem manufacturing industry: 
Inserters are given three-minute 'toilet breaks' on four separate 
occasions during the working day, twice in the morning and twice in 
the afternoon. These are the only occasions when workers leave the 
line while it is in motion. 
(Delbridge, 1998:36). 
Yet, despite their potential to both illuminate and explain prevailing working 
conditions in detail, these individual experiences have often been used by 
researchers simply as evidence ofchanging management and operational styles on 
a more macro level, rather than in the pursuit of understanding 'change' from an 
individual perspective. 
This is the case with much existing research within the financial services sector. 
Often, individual voices o f respondents have been lost within attempts to explain 
'bigger' issues. This has been the difficulty in trying to retain individual voices 
and experiences within research, which has often been macro in orientation and 
concerned with gaining an understanding of the 'overall picture', rather than 
seeking to understand the impact of change from the micro perspective of the 
individual. 
My research contributes towards the closure o f this 'knowledge gap' by assessing 
employee experiences of changing bank strategies within Bank UK - one of the 
historic 'big four' UK retail banks. By focussing on experiential dimensions, my 
research revealed how the multiple contradictions of macro changes (which 1 shall 
discuss later in my thesis) both shaped and influenced the working conditions 
through which Bank UK employees met, contested and experienced their own 
working environments'. 
> My research was similar to other ^microsociologists', who are l^ ^^^^^^ 
with how work is conceived, learned, accomplished, evaluated and expenenced over time (Becker, 
1963; Roy, 1952, cited in Frenkel et al., 1999: 18). 
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Background 
It is not uncommon in social research for the personal biography o f the researcher 
to be the trigger for research interests (Danford, 1999; Holdaway, 1983; Finch, 
1983). My research is no exception. In 1985 1 commenced full-time employment 
for Bank UK on the bottom rung o f what was then a very transparent, hierarchical 
career ladder. Following my promotion to clerical grade f l ' in 1987,1 was offered 
a place on Bank UK's accelerated management trainee scheme, which promised 
to place me as an Assistant Manager within five years^. Acceleration through the 
junior ranks was expedited by the requirement only to undertake each clerical role 
for a maximum period of six months. 
During the first two years of the programme, I raced through different clerical 
jobs remaining on course with my ambitions, and in 1989, after passing the first 
stage of professional banking examinations, I was promoted to clerical grade IV 
via a ^double-jump'"', which hastened a transfer away from repetitive, branch-
based clerical duties, into the fiercely competitive (and predominately male) 
world of specialised lending and securities. I stayed in this role for over five years 
gaining a real depth o f experience whilst applying for, but not getting, an assistant 
' In the 1980s, Bank UK's clerical Jobs were graded l-IV, with grade one being the most junior, 
representing the ^processing side' of the bank. Grades two and three encompassed cashiering, 
records, standing orders, foreign and safe custody, whilst clerical grade four staff undertook 
increasingly complex work, dealing with lending and securities. 
^ Assistant Manager roles were the first managerial positions. Outside the management trainee 
scheme it was common to find men taking upwards of twelve years to achieve managerial status 
and women considerably longer. 
^ I jumped from the standardised processing nature of clerical grade II jobs to the more specialised 
roles of advances and securities, missing out grade MI roles entirely. 
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managerial post. The fieeze on the recruitment of school leavers during the early 
1990s' and the mass shedding ofjobs throughout the banking industry had created 
a very slow moving queue for promotion, with no suitably qualified stafi" 
available to fill vacancies created lower down the promotional ladder. The 
promise of the accelerated training programme became hollow. 
New technologies, which were cheaper, faster, and apparently more reliable than 
traditional lending officers in making *con^ct\ unemotional, clinical lending 
decisions, began to be introduced. Traditional banking skills, which had once 
been the symbol of a fiilly trained and skilled employee started to be rendered 
obsolete by machines. In Januaiy 1996, I and other management trainees were 
told we had become too expensive to employ. Our duties were to be undertaken 
by junior clerical grade staflf, and even cheaper agency staff who had no specialist 
corporate lending experience whatsoever, but who vvould only be expected to 
'push buttons' and not engage wholeheartedly with customers. To continue 
working for Bank UK meant accepting an involuntary 'downgrading', which 1 
was not prepared to do. I saw this as a warning signal that banking, in its 
traditional sense, was about to undergo an immense sea-change in direction, 
application and focus, despite the huge investment Bank UK had made in the 
training and development of not only my own group of management trainees, but 
its entire workforce, whatever level and job they currently undertook. I decided to 
' By the 1990s, many UK clearing banks had begun to downsize their workforces. Over 70,000 
jobs were lost between 1990 and 1995 (Heflfeman, 1996:26). 
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resign and grasp the opportunity to change career direction, by firstly pursing a 
university degree. 
During my resignation period, my local Human Resource manager asked i f I 
would consider retrairung as a cashier and retum to branch based banking. The 
offer was made not only to assist Bank UK, who had started to lose staff in vast 
numbers from its branch network', but also to give me the opportunity to earn 
money during university vacations. AVhilst I initially accepted his offer with the 
sole aim of earning money, the basing of two undergraduate research projects in 
the financial services sector^, realised the potential of the field for ftirther study. A 
change of domestic location in 1999 ensured that whilst I chose to once again use 
Bank UK as a site for doctoral research, this research was undertaken over 300 
miles away sites of earlier fieldwork. Therefore, despite being surrounded by 
familiar procedures and expectations, I had to work hard to socialise myself into 
new networks and new social groups. 1 remain aware o f the possible crificism that 
by using Bank UK as a research site, I expose the credibility of my thesis to 
possible accusations that I have done little more than produce an autobiographical 
sociology (Lofland and Lofland, cited in Coffey, 1999), yet I knew my continued 
' A detailed explanation of the driving forces behind the mass shedding of jobs will be offered 
later in my thesis. 
^ The first study sought to establish why the *glass ceiling' in respect of female promotion to 
managerial posts continued to remain a distinctive feature of the modem banking organisation, 
whilst my final year dissertation investigated the differences and similarities between the 
monotonous manufacturing woric researched by industrial sociologists such as Beynon (1978), 
Cavendish (1982), Delbridge (1998) and Pollert (1981), and the modem fmancial services 
industry. 
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association with Bank UK offered a unique opportunity to gain relatively easy 
access into the very heart of branch culture. 
Gender Issues. 
The practicalities o f researching employee experience o f change inevitably meant 
that periods of fieldwork within Bank UK's domestic branch network placed the 
majority of my staff interactions with employees who were undertaking typical 
cashiering and 'Sales Executive' (SE)' roles. Through the process of "gendering 
by association" (Cockbum, 1985, cited in Webster 1996: 58), the vast majority of 
these roles were undertaken by women, who were employed by Bank UK on a 
variety of contractual arrangements. Clearly, given the obvious 'gender 
weighting' of these roles, it has not been possible or appropriate to ignore issues 
of gender, which permeate my data. However, with 'gender' already being the 
focus of a substantial amount o f research within the financial services sector, as 
evidenced in my review of existing research, I have not used 'gender' as either a 
primary research focus, or, as a principal organising category of analysis. 
By contrast, given the geographical locality where the majority of my fieldwork 
was conducted, race and ethnicity (as conventionally defined) did not permeate 
my data to a significant extent, and it was therefore unnecessary to develop 
specific analytic categories for handling them. 
' *Sales Executives' - staff undertaking a pure sales role within Bank UK's branch netvi ork. 
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In Chapter One I explore some o f the dominant literature from existing research 
within the financial services sector, alongside other relevant industrial relations 
and management texts. 1 discuss how much o f this research appears to investigate 
issues ' in the round', establishing financial institutions as unified entities, and 
demonstrate how the moulding of research around key themes has served to 
silence individual voices and experiences. The chapter also explains how, 
following the review of literature my various analytical concepts were formulated. 
Hammersley and Atkinson (1995: 210-21 1) are keen to point out that whilst it is 
rare for ethnographic analysis to begin from a well-defined theory, analysis is 
heavily influenced by a combination of the pre-existing ideas and personal 
experiences of the ethnographer, via observation', or by borrowing and adapting 
concepts fit)m existing research. 
Having established the existence of a knowledge 'gap' in research concerned with 
the examination of'change' within the financial services industry. Chapter Two 
describes the practicalities of my attempts to redress this deficit. 1 discuss how I 
chose research methods, which I thought would generate the most appropriate, 
systematic, in-depth data from which to draw later analyses and conclusions about 
individual experiences of change. As has become an accepted practice in 
sociological research, the chapter also discusses the trials and tribulations of my 
' Lofland (1971) suggests that the ethnographer may develop analytical concepts as categories 
from a diverse and unrelated range of phenomena by general, common sense knowledge (cited in 
Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995: 211). 
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access negotiations and, due in part to my personal biography, the diiBculties I 
experienced in making a clean exit from the field. 
The second half o f the thesis comprises a trilogy o f chapters, which examine at 
the micro level how change in Bank UK has, or continues to be, experienced by 
its branch based staff Drawing extensively on data gathered through participant 
observation, field diaries and interviews, the first o f these chapters - Chapter 
Three, begins the assessment of change fiom the perspective of ' the employee'. 
The chapter reveals the extent to which increasing incidences o f tensions and 
paradoxes in revisions to management practices and ways o f woricing may be 
directly attributed to issues o f cost in Bank UK. It includes several examples from 
fieldwork, which demonstrate howcost issues appeared to impede the attempts o f 
staff to both implement and fiilly embrace new ways o f working and increasingly 
customer oriented sales and marketing incentives. In order to permit a detailed 
understanding o f cost driven changes within Bank UK's current internal structure 
and dynamics, I explain the current ordering o f both its management o f 
organisation and organisation o f management. This brief sub-chapter examines 
how issues o f 'management' and 'organisation' are practically contested 
throughout Bank UK's daily business. The 'bank' is examined at the macro level 
to determine whether its typically pyramidal, bureaucratic organisational structure 
continues to remain the most appropriate fi-amework to deliver the vast changes to 
working practices, styles of management and systems o f reward. Most 
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importantly, the chapter endeavours to answer crit icism by Collins (1998), that 
most accounts o f management leveal little about the conditions which underpin 
new operating models and the economic and political forces that have impelled 
the organisation o f management to change (1998:9). 
Chapter Four examines perhaps the biggest change to have been experienced by 
staff working in Bank U K - the organisation's wholesale shift ftom 'banking' to 
'retailing' - from ' tel l ing ' to 'selling' (Regini et al., 1999). Data illustrate the 
paradoxical nature o f Bank UK's adoption o f individualised contracts and 
performance related pay rewards at the same time it was placing increasing 
emphasis on building teams and generating a greater teamworking ethic amongst 
its staff. 
After discussing issues o f cost and the consequences o f Bank U K ' s organisational 
shift from ' te l l ing ' to 'sel l ing' in Chapters Three and Four, Chapter F ive moves 
the analysis o f change in Bank UK even fiirther towards the individual 
perspective, by focussing on the extent to which changing bank strategies have 
impacted on employee health - both physical and mental. Data is used to reveal 
the extent to which issues o f cost (generally operationalised as 'lean production' 
systems) have conspired to create working regimes, which appear to force Bank 
UK employees into working a multitude o f additional (and unpaid) hours on a 
regular basis. 
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FinaJly, my conclusion in Chapter Six brings together analyses and conclusions 
from preceding chapters. I contend that the contradictions and paradoxes revealed 
by my research appear to be unsustainable for Bank U K in the longer temi , i f it 
wishes to remain a key player in the U K retail banking industry. 
Issues o f anonymity and confidentiality have meant that it has been necessary to 
protect the integrity o f Bank UK, my field sites and identity o f respondents 
through the use o f pseudonyms throughout my thesis, h i a similar way, 
pseudonyms have also been necessary in order to disguise Bank U K ' s uniquely 
branded financial products and services, internal operating procedures and 
advertised sales and marketing incentives. Explanations o f these pseudonyms are 
contained in Appendices One to Three. 
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1. An assessment of existing research. 
The practice o f banking has continued to change over time. O f ancient or igin, the 
profession originally dealt in bull ion, supplying foreign and domestic coins o f 
correct weight and fineness, with merchant banks dealing in goods and bills o f 
exchange. The origins o f modem banking emerged during the sixteenth century, 
when London bankers issued notes o f title, dealt in foreign exchange, paid interest 
to attract depositors and loaned the balance o f coins held at interest (Essinger, 
1999: 63-54). Historically positioned as "the aristocracy o f clerical labour", 
dealing with bank accounts which were the exclusive privilege o f the wealthy, 
(Lockwood, cited in Crompton and Jones, 1984: 43), bank clerks experienced a 
'gentlemanly', unhurried work ethic: "George goes to sleep at a bank ftom ten to 
four each day, except Saturdays, when they wake him up and put him outside at 
two" (Jerome. K . Jerome, cited in Buswell, 1986: 141). However, once the 
typewriter revolutionised the production o f documents, bank clerical work quickly 
became regarded as 'woman's work ' : "Shorthand was no panacea, and d id not, as 
some had hoped, professionalise clerical work. Once i t became linked with 
typewriting and therefore feminised, men were discouraged from pursuing it for 
its own sake..." (Anderson, 1988: 6). Thus the prized white-collar appointment 
has become little more than the job o f a factory operative (Mi l l s , 1951): 
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. . . we may note the changes in the work o f the bank teller, once an 
important functionary upon whose honesty, judgement, and 
personality much o f the public operation and relations o f the bank used 
to depend. Attached to mechanical and electronic equipment, these 
employees have been transformed into check-out clerks at a money 
supermarket counter, their labor power purchased at the lowest rates i n 
the mass labor market, their activities prescribed, checked and 
controlled.. . 
(Braverman, 1974:340). 
A more recent revolution within the industry has been the contemporary 
wholesale shift towards the adoption o f an aggressive, sales orientated 
organisational philosophy, which sits uncomfortably with the traditional, 
gentlemanly image o f banking (Knights and Tinker, 1997: 13). 
All employees working within the financial services industry have experienced 
considerable changes to their work-based roles and tasks, but it is wi thin branch 
banking that the workforce has been subject to the most wide-ranging and 
profound metamorphosis. A Human Resource Manager for a top U K financial 
services company describes his typical worker as: "...a demoralised individual in 
an industry in crisis" (cited in Watkins et al., 1996: 43). Between 1990 and 1995, 
120,000 jobs were lost in the banking sector, which now employs just over 
300,000, a number which decreases by about two per cent each year (MacShane 
and Brewster, 2000: 17), leaving " . . . those who are retained . . . working three 
times as hard to cover... wi th little respite and often little care and understanding 
from their organisations." (Cox, 1996: 3). Contemporary research has 
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concentrated upon assessing the extent to which the industry has been 
revolutionised by such wholesale paradigmatic change, and the effect that 
business process re-engineering (Du Gay, 1996: 10) has had upon employees in 
terms o f motivation, health and promotional opportunity. 
In order to understand employee experience o f change in the financial services 
industry, it is necessary to understand both the context in which changes are, or 
have been occurring, and the rationale behind revisions to existing ways o f 
working. The problem with this, is, whilst sociologists may strive to gain a greater 
understanding o f the mechanics o f new management strategies, such as 
organisational change (Parker 2000), the ' f lexibil isat ion' o f the workforce (Gallic 
et al., 1998) or Heamworking' (Procter and Mueller, 2000), they gather very little 
knowledge about the extent to which the mechanics o f such strategies have, or are 
continuing to, affect the ways in which employees now experience their work. 
What remains missing fi-om much o f this type o f research is a detailed empirical 
investigation o f what change in the financial services industry has meant for 
employees. M y research has sought to close this research gap by gaining an 
understanding o f the different ways in which employees in Bank UK have 
experienced recent changes in their roles, particularly where these changes appear 
contradictory in nature. It follows the lead o f Sturdy (1992), whose research 
within a typical UK insurance company was concemed with the assessment o f 
" . . . the micro dynamics o f the practice [o f shifting work] at the point o f capitalist 
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subordination than with explicating its precise location wi th in wider capitalist 
structures" (1992: 125). In order to lay the foundation for later data analysis, the 
remainder o f this chapter now investigates the major themes to have arisen fix)m 
existing research within the financial services industry and the debates they have 
triggered. 
A detailed analysis o f existing research from wi th in the banking industry suggests 
the existence o f five key thematic priorities: the rise in the importance o f the 
consumer (Du Gay, 1996; Burton, 1994; Howcroft , 1991); gender factors 
(Woodfield,2000; McDowel l , 1997; Cockbum, 1991; Anderson, 1988); issues o f 
health (Emslie et al., 1999; Pahl, 1995; LaBier, 1986); the adoption of'Japanese-
style' methods o f working, including teamworking (Knights and McCabe, 2000; 
Mil lward et ai., 2000; Procter and Mueller, 2000; The Institute o f Management, 
1999; Danford, 1999; Thompson and Wallace, 1996; Elger and Smith, 1994; 
Scott, 1994; Hochschild, 1984) and the ftiture o f banking (Knight and Tinker, 
1997; The Economist bitelligence Unit , 1996; Lewellyn, 1994). These studies 
have also been supplemented by roll ing, large-scale research, e.g. ESRC / ACAS / 
JIWIS Workplace Industrial Relations Surveys, which have added a macro 
dimension to the debate over the ways that industrial relations within the banking 
sector are changing (Scott, 1994: 27). Each is now examined in turn. 
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The Rise in the Importance of the Consumer. 
The growth o f the financial services industry within the U K in recent years has 
been unparalleled. With the repeal o f the Truck Acts in January 1987, no longer 
could employees insist their wages be paid in cash. Many firms switched to 
electronic payment systems that required employees to have bank accounts in 
which to receive these payments, thus offering banks an unprecedented 
opportunity to expand their customer base (Burton, 1994: 12). As the majority o f 
the populace became consumers o f services offered by the industry, their 
increased participation in the banking sector led to an upsurge in the critical 
evaluation o f ways in which banking institutions treated their customers. 
In response to growing consumer interest, and in order to tackle the perermial 
problem o f financial product homogeneity, retail banks have had to quickly 
generate consistency in offering outstanding 'quality service' in order to gain 
competitive advantage within a rampant financial marketplace. Customer 
satisfaction has needed to become an explicit corporate objective (Howcrof l , 
1991: I I ) , and charging systems have had to become more transparent, heralding 
the end to obscure interest rates and clandestine fees. 
Traditionally, banks reflected their middle-class image through their solid and 
secure extemal edifices. Intemal layouts fevoured production over consumption, 
with staff occupying over ninety per cent o f available f loor space (Burton, 1994: 
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41). Conscious o f no longer being the exclusive suppliers o f banking services 
(Lewellyn, 1994: 4), the marketing strategies o f traditional banks have quickly 
moved away from being relatively low-profile sales activities, towards those o f 
crucial strategic and commercial importance. 
Historically, the role o f the traditional high street branch in mariceting banking 
products and services lacked effectiveness, and despite never being short o f 
products, banks were hopeless in using their branches as shop windows to market 
them effectively. Coordinated marketing strategies were often simply defensive 
responses comprising: " . . . 'me-too' products, pricing and promotion strategies" 
(Wilson, 1992: 405). However, faced with increasing competition from a wide 
variety o f institutions, the role o f the traditional branch network has had to be 
reconstituted from being simply paper processing centres to intensely sales 
oriented 'finance shops' (Storey et al., 1999: 132). 
In order to appeal to changing consumer expectations, banks have endeavoured to 
make their public spaces friendlier by breaking down many impenetrable barriers. 
Corporate branding designers have revamped traditionally austere branch 
interiors, making them less intimidating and more conducive to face-to-face sales 
strategies. Marketing gurus have been commissioned to obtain the optimum sales 
return per square footage o f f loor space; "Retail banks have made strenuous and 
yet singularly unsuccessfril eflbrts to project corporate identities through 
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advertising, logos, branch design, etc." (Howcroft, 1991: 13). In Bank U K , 
product literature displays had been coordinated and standardised, in order portray 
a cohesion o f style and quality, whilst the relocation o f ' b a c k o f f i ce ' functions to 
centralised processing centres created the space necessary to offer an "airport 
lounge" style o f banking, with comfortable seats, refi^shments and a toy comer 
(Kerfoot, 1992: 133). 
As a consequence o f these changes two types o f consumer relationship emerged. 
The first was that o f the more traditional bank customer, concemed w i t h quality 
o f service, high investment rates, low borrowing rates and an easily accessible 
branch network. The second was more sophisticated. Encouraged by a prevailing 
right-wing economic climate, many customers became not only consumers o f the 
traditional banking industry, but also consumers o f the stock exchange, buying 
shares in banking companies and looking for a return on their investments in the 
form o f dividends and share value. For banks, this meant that rate o f return on 
equity rather than market share became a greater priority (Storey et al., 1999: 
129). 
Traditionally, high-street banks had captured a greater market share o f the 
financial services sector than Building Societies, but with their cost / income 
ratios hovering around 45 per cent', they compared unfavourably wi th those o f 
' During the financial year ending December 2001. Bank UK*s total group cost / income ratio was 
46.9 per cent (Bank UK Results, Year Ended 31 December 2001, p.7). 
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the Bui lding Societies.' In order to improve their cost / income ratios, banks 
concentrated on reducing their labour costs, which were generally around two-
thirds o f total operating costs (Storey et al., 1999: 131). This cost difference 
reflected the range o f products supplied by the banks and their complex 
hierarchical structures (employing as they did, a wide range o f staff ranging from 
architects to cleaners) - within a classically bureaucratic corporate structure 
(Marshall and Richardson, 1996: 146). Banks became caught in the unenviable 
position o f trying to reduce their excessive cost / income ratios in the 
appeasement o f shareholders, whilst at the same time attempting to improve 
customer service through the installation o f new technologies and new ways o f 
working which were obviously going to drive up operating costs at the point o f 
deliveiy. In August 2000, Barclays Bank announced an aggressive campaign o f 
expenditure reduction, which resulted in the closure o f200 o f its smaller branches 
and a total loss throughout the bank o f 6500 jobs (10 per cent o f its workforce), 
that resulted in a saving o f £200 mi l l ion to operating costs (Waller, 1999:24). The 
result o f these cost driven tensions did little to appease growing consumer 
dissatisfaction at the services the bank was now able to offer. This clearly 
impacted on the way that remaining staff experienced changes in their move away 
from being simply 'bankers' to sophisticated retailers o f financial products. 
' During the financial year 2000 -2001, Nationwide Building Society's cost / income ratio was 
just over 10 per cent (Nationwide Building Socirty Annual Report and Accounts. 2000 - 200!, 
p.3). 
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In response to branch closures and the wholesale changes to the ways in which the 
bank / customer relationship came to be conducted, The National Association o f 
Bank and Insurance Customers (NABIC) offered practical advice to lobbyists on 
how to complain effectively. Data sheet 25, published in September 2000, 
contained a seven part action plan, which suggested writ ing to local councils / 
N4Ps and the press, whilst warning that contacting individual banks directly would 
be ftitile: 
Banks have more than their fair share o f complaints - what happens 
when you complain to the 'telephone service centre' o f your bank? 
Wel l , you can try finding the right option on the wonderftj l touch-tone-
phone menu; then you can speak to 'Mark ' (there are probably at least 
four 'Marks' in that office) who promises to investigate your problem 
and call you back. He doesn't. Y o u then have to phone again to find 
that Mark isn't there, but Sue w i l l help you. You explain your story 
again.... 
(NABIC, 2000: Data Sheet 25). 
The attempts o f banks to offer a vastly improved customer service and increase 
sales o f financial services products at the same time as t iy ing to drive down 
operating costs in order to generate greater shareholder profit appears to be 
paradoxical. The shedding o f staff as a consequence o f tighter budgetary restraints 
clearly was going to have a significant impact on customer service. Such is the 
contradiction o f introducing sales into service jobs where often: " . . . little 
consideration is given to the rise o f sales work, in which management attention to 
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re-organising fit)nt-line work becomes manifest in the introduction o f revenue-
generating sales work" (Korczynski, 2000:684-685). 
Bank employees now working in roles that require constant face-to-face 
interaction with customers have found themselves repositioned as 'Front Line 
Workers'. Their jobs are now o f strategic importance in not only generating 
revenue through selling, but also through their i l l ic i t intelligence-gathering roles 
in helping to develop a customer knowledge base for future innovations (Frenkel 
et al., 1999: 7). This type o f fixjnt-line work is cleariy people oriented. Staff are 
asked to interact constantly with customers in ways that are advantageous to the 
goals o f the organisation. In banking this type o f work means dealing wi th mass, 
customised service workflows, workflows which Frenkel et al (1999) claim are 
rarely completely routinised and where workers are usually given some degree o f 
autonomy to tailor their behaviour to different customer requirements. Later in my 
thesis however, 1 contend that my data suggest that the opposite is happening in 
Bank UK. Here, changes to the way in which potential financial products are 
introduced to customers have become increasingly routinised by the requirement 
that staff fo l low a tightly scripted interaction rather than relying on individual 
autonomy to direct sales conversations at w i l l . 
The vast majority o f front line workers are women. During the 1980s, the 
financial services sector became the most rapidly expanding employment sector 
with an annual growth rate o f 7 per cent, and eight out o f ten newly created jobs 
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were aimed specifically at women (McDowell and Court, 1994:233-234). As the 
primaiy roles o f fix)nt line workers changed fi-om dealing with 'situations' to 
dealing with people, it is hardly surprising that banks looked to draw on the social 
and personal attributes normally associated wi th women. Mariceting research 
highlighted the fact that customers favoured a: ". . .mumsy face on the reception 
desk" (Kerfoot, 1992: 144-145), and the implici t assumption o f many in retailing 
was that i t is more appropriate for customers to be served by women, who are 
perceived to be more skilled in the 'soft selling' technique (Cunan, 1988: 343-
344). This appears especially relevant in banking where there is no physical 
product to sell. The small, predominately male, mobile sales force evident in 
banking prior to the 1990s appears to have been quickly eliminated at source, wi th 
primaiy responsibility for sales now transfenred to female bank staff operating 
fixim existing bank premises (McDowel l and Court, 1994:237): 
Bank tellers, for example, are forever chatting with customers and 
remembering personal details. Since there is now little to choose 
between most major banks, the bank's human face may be crucial in 
attracting or repelling custom. 
(Wilson, 1995: 17). 
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Gender Factors. 
It is not just the rise o f the predominantly female fiDnt-line workforce that makes 
the banking industry an extremely good industrial sector fix)m which to examine 
the gender divisive ways women have been incorporated into employment As 
systems o f work and management have been altered by both technological 
advancement and organisational change, issues o f gender amply demonstrate the 
transformation o f employee experience o f work. 
The banking industry offers a dramatic and clear example o f the patriarchal 
exclusion o f women fix)m management and / or a 'career'. Accepting an 
employment contract for a UK retail bank before the 1970s meant implicit 
acceptance o f a clear demarcation between an exclusively male 'career', and 
'women only ' work and conditions o f service. Unti l 1970s Equal Opportunity 
legislation, female salary scales in Bank U K were not the same as those for male 
employees. Women performed clerical office tasks traditionally gendered 
'female' e.g. typing and cashiering, and were expected to leave upon marriage 
(Halford et al., 1997: 43). Their movement into other jobs was gradual and took 
two different forms. Firstly, new, routine jobs were specifically created for 
women. Secondly, as traditionally high status male jobs, including bookkeeping, 
and 'middle managerial' positions o f a mainly checking nature became 
increasingly divided into petty operations (Braverman, 1984) and eflfectively 
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deskilled by the introduction o f new technologies, they also became remodelled as 
'women's work ' (Crompton and Jones, 1984): 
. . . in the financial and insurance sectors the introduction o f new data-
processing technologies has enabled firms to automate the lower end 
o f clerical jobs. . . [Banks]... centralised and automated much o f their 
data processing activities and... reduced the need for middle-
management supervision by introducing computerised decision -
making with respect to loan agreements, underwriting and 'other' risk 
assessments. 
(Lapido and Wilkinson, 2001:9) . 
Webster (1996) argues that the technological deskilling o f jobs gave organisations 
the opportunity to replace skilled employees with cheaper, unskilled workers, 
who, by definition, were mainly women. As direct sex discrimination was 
removed through legislative changes, new ways o f surreptitiously 'pol ic ing ' 
promotional opportunities within the banking industry needed to be developed. 
One crucial strategy was the introduction o f part-time work. Generally, women 
who chose part-time work as a consequence o f domestic responsibilities 
experienced poor promotional prospects. Thus the banking career was able to be 
redefined as being at odds with 'women's work ' , thus appealing primarily to men, 
or unmarried women, who had the time to devote themselves single-mindedly to 
the expectations o f their bank (Halford et al., 1997: 125): 
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Eveiyday observation shows occupations to be sharply segregated into 
male jobs and female jobs. Sex segregation at work is not decreasing 
in Britain in modem times... employers are increasing the use o f part-
timing, o f temporary contracts and casual work, a process which tends 
further to distinguish men's fiom women's work. The lowest paid and 
least secure jobs continue to be gendered female 
(Cockbum, 1991:24). 
Part-time Prospects 
Despite these practices, the number o f women employed in the banking industry 
increased by 32 per cent between 1980 and 1991, against a rise o f only 20 per 
cent for men. The greatest increase o f all was a growth o f 84 per cent between 
1980 and 1991 in the numbers o f part-time women workers fix)m 29,000 to 
54,800 (Storey etal. , 1999: 136): 
Women now comprise the greater proportion o f bank employees, yet 
their numerical superiority is not reflected in the proportionate 
distribution o f gender within different bank roles. They remain over-
represented in lower clerical grades, and constitute almost 100 per cent 
o f part-time clerical workers. 
(Storey etal. , 1999: 137). 
Banks appeared keen to reinforce the fact that women offered a cheaper 
altemative to male labour - a seductive maxim within an industry where the 
reduction o f operating costs was now of paramount importance. There is no doubt 
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that the introduction of computers helped to redefine many of the traditional 
banking roles as women's work and the relationship between deskilling and 
working part-time has led analysts to routinely connect the two (Dufiy, 1997: 
171):"... of all the finance industries, the banks were the earliest to automate, and 
the most zealous in their application of Taylorist work fragmentation" (Webster, 
1996: 121). 
Later chapters will show that within Bank UK women are used to f i l l two 
principal roles. They are used as either front-line sales agents, or as flexible 
resources in the successful adoption o f a new working paradigm underpinned by a 
distinctive approach to people and organisation - Human Resource Management 
(HRM) (Mabey et aL, 1998: 1).* In my conclusion I suggest that through the 
tenets of HRM, they may even be considered to be the key agents of change. 
Feminists point to the second class conditions o f most part-time work, and argue 
what has really been developed has been the emergence of a relatively small, core 
workforce of multi-skilled workers (mainly men) who benefit from generally 
stable career paths and job security, and an expanding, peripheral workforce, 
comprised mostly of women, employed on part-time, casual, short-term contracts, 
structured to match changing business needs - maximising flexibility, whilst 
minimising the organisation's commitment to job security and career 
development (Henry and Franzway, 1993: 133). Two-fifths of the part-time 
The rtietoric underpinning HRM will be discussed in greater detail later in this chapter. 
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female workforce are in low-skilled occupations, which rarely lead to promotion 
or responsible positions (Davidson and Cooper, 1992: 3). Beechey and Perkins 
(1987) suggest that British women have little alternative choice other than to take 
on work of a part-time nature, as part-time woric has become constructed simply 
as work that women do (cited in Fraser, 1999: 100). The 'perk' o f flexibility, i.e. 
working school hours only, continues to be sold to women as an advantage, which 
mitigates the drawback of low pay, low status, little employment protection, next 
to no training and limited promotional prospects (Figes, 1994: 129-130). A 
manager of a dry-cleaners gives the following insight: 
You're not employing a woman, you are employing a mother - not 
just her sickness but her children's - [I] want clear details of who wil l 
look after children under 14 - school holidays etc. [I 'm] wary of vague 
"good neighbours" 
(cited in Curran, 1988:346). 
Through flexibility, jobs have also become 'temporised' (Greenbaum, 1994, cited 
in Webster, 1996:78). My research will show how Bank UK now uses many part-
time stafl" in order to respond to variations in trade, and to correct for persistent 
under-stafiing following its massive programme of operational-delayering, 
downsizing and the shifting of clerical tasks away from branches into dedicated 
processing and telephony centres.' Casey (1995: 41) suggests that this type o f 
human resource management reinforces the idea that banks are now little more 
' The rhetoric behind de-layering and lean production will be discussed more fully later in this 
chapter. 
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than 'virtual coiporations' - employing minimum numbers of staflF, and operating 
their branch network in a similar way to a film set, where employees are 
contracted for specific periods, and not retained during times of low productivity 
and recession: 
... they are increasingly relying on temporary staff, known as 'seat 
warmers' to handle the financial details of customer accounts and to 
work in routine processing jobs eventually destined for eradication by 
infomiation technology. 
(Webster, 1996:82). 
Part-time staff are also desirable because they also cost less for banks to employ: 
"People on fixed-term contracts are cheaper because they are not entitled to sick 
pay, pensions, mortgage subsidy, or paid public holidays" (Neathey and 
Hurstfield, 1995: 57). With banks now trying to imitate a retail-operating model, 
the movement towards progressively flexible branch opening hours has meant that 
staffing demands have become too complicated and too expensive to cover 
through the exclusive employment of permanent, fiill-time staff Most banks now 
have a 'casual' register of staff who are willing to work on an ad hoc basis. 
The consideration of women as temporary or casual workers has enabled 
employers to justify the lack of training given to women by considering it to be 
little more than an unrecoverable cost (Fraser, 1999: 80). Human Capital Theory 
has added to this debate, by suggesting that the key driver in establishing 
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individual pay scales and capital investment is the argument that women actively 
choose jobs requiring less investment in education, so expect lov^er returns. The 
key assumption remains that a working woman's wage is just a secondary income 
for the family (Cockbum, 1991:23): 
The major difference is not that men work and women don't, but most 
men do full-time work and very little else, whilst women combine 
part-time work with unpaid housekeeping. Women's actual hours o f 
work are often more than flill-time, but only a certain amount is 
recognised as 'work' and remunerated accordingly. 
(Beechey and Perkins, 1987: 2). 
Pettinger (1998) suggests that whilst firms may be keen to adopt flexible working 
arrangements to maximise and optimise or^ganisational output, the status of 
flexible workers should not be demeaned: 
To say 'they are only part-timers', 'they are only job-sharers' is 
unacceptable. If workers become known as 'only this' and 'only that' 
this will reflect how they apply themselves to work, thus profitability, 
productivity, efifectiveness and customer service will all be likely to 
sufi^ er 
(1998:74). 
With women now occupying strategic roles within the banking industry. Hakim 
(1995) challenges the dominant feminist view of part-time work as an unwilling 
choice forced on women as a result of domestic responsibilities. She claims that 
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women who prefer to give priority to non-market activities often willingly choose 
part-time work: 
In between the equalisation and marginalisation theses is a third 
approach which sets part-time and other non-standard contract workers 
within the context and sexual division of family labour, showing that 
these forms of working are not only tolerated, but enthusiastically 
appreciated by wives and secondary earners. 
(Blossfield and Hakim, 1997: 3). 
Hakim's 'preference theory' predicts that women will remain a minority within 
the veiy top echelons of society because only a tiny majority of women are woik-
centred in the way that men are, with most choosing to be financially dependent 
on men. However, Hakim claims that far fiDm being second-class citizens, a 
woman's position is in fact superior to those of men, and women are now at the 
forefi-ont of changing gender roles. Only women have the choice to remain 
dependent, in whole, or part on a male breadwinner, and even switch options over 
their life course. Men do not enjoy that option (Hakim, 2000: 278). 
Organisational sexuality. 
As well as being key agents in workforce flexibility, almost all women working in 
the banking industry, whether they be deployed in branches or in processing / 
telephony centres now principally engage in sales activities. Their new identities 
as sales agents have brought debates about the sexuality of the organisation back 
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into focus. Sociologists have long argued that sexuality has often been a 
neglected, yet crucial issue within organisational theory (Collinson and Collinson, 
1989: 91). Work organisations both construct sexuality and are constructed by and 
through sexuality (Heam and Parlcin, 1995: 7). Burrell (1984) suggests that 
management have historically been concemed to protect production by 
eliminating all manifestations of sexuality fix)m the workplace. As late as 1988, 
human resource managers were still committed to their principles ofdesexualising 
the workplace by explicitly excluding women fiDm certain jobs including selling, 
believing that sexuality was simply a distraction from the business o f selling 
(Collinson and Collinson, 1989: 92). Despite the denial of organisational 
sexuality, sexual display continues to be a fiiequent element in the definition of 
organisational job descriptions. Secretaries, receptionists and key sales personnel 
who are now predominately women are expected to sell 'sexuality' as part of their 
labour. In Chapter Five, I will discuss both the ways in which female employees 
in Bank UK were expected to ICISS ASS with male customers, whilst at the same 
time taking part in internal sales competitions, which emphasised masculinised-
sporting metaphors. 
It is not only the formal design of an organisation that determines the way it is 
gendered. A multitude of informal processes exist, which construct and reproduce 
gender relations, e.g. organisational symbols, language and practice (Deal and 
Kennedy, 1982, cited in Halford and Leonard 2001:65). Banks appear to draw on 
38 
tacit recognition that labour is an embodied quality, not a disembodied 
phenomenon, and cannot exist outside and apart from the individuals that produce 
it. What is bought by the employment of individuals is not a sex-neutral ability to 
perform a service task, but an assumed sexuality deemed appropriate for certain 
types of work (Kerfoot, 1992: 162-163). 
Thus women are now expected to work under the strain o f 'emotional labour' 
(Hochschild, 1983) which manifests itself in different forms. In Bank UK, women 
were often forced to smile and be pleasant to customers who were rude and 
abusive, without being able to verbally defend themselves. They were being asked 
to suppress their feelings in order to sustain an interaction with customers 
(Hochschild, 1983, cited in Knights and McCabe, 2002: 244). In this situation, 
they complain their frUse smiles might well be on them, but they are not of them, 
simply being an extension to their uniform and make-up (Hochschild, 1983: 8). It 
is this difference between feeling and feigning that often leads to an increase in 
personal emotional strain (BIyton and Tumbull, 1998: 82). Du Gay (1996, cited in 
Strangleman and Roberts, 1999: 51) suggests that these images o f employees are 
made up by organisations through re-imagined organisational identities. What 
management clearly desire is the ability to mould and re-mould staff into plastic 
personalities (Collins, 1998: 92). Ritzer (1996: 84) contends that what has 
emerged fit)m these practices is a fake friendliness of scripted interaction, which 
reflects the insincere camaraderie o f the "have a nice day" society, a camaraderie 
which is used to lure customers and keep them coming back. Garson (1988: 42) 
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views stilted interaction of this type as simply manufactured words that 
standardise conversations, which, by implication, standardise the real person. 
These changes suggest that is not just individual personalities that are starting to 
be controlled by new ways of working. The physical person is also being 
manipulated for the beneflt of the organisation. By definition, front line sales stafi" 
are expected to be well groomed. Organisations demand sveltness and beauty in 
subtle ways. For instance British Airways does not stock cabin crew uniforms 
over size 14 (BIyton and Tumbull, 1998: 72), and having been asked to wear 
Bank UK's corporate dress whilst undertaking field research, I found out that any 
uniform orders over size 20 were denoted as 'special orders' and were made to 
measure. With each order form needing the sanctioning signature of a (usually 
male) branch manager, the scheme perpetuated the potential for acute 
embarrassment for larger ladies (who needed to submit their actual body 
measurements to enable their uniforms to be made), and by implication suggests 
that Bank UK expects to position attractive (as constituted by size) women on its 
front line. Accompanying the voWoui of a revised style of corporate dress during 
2002 in Bank UK, all staff received a booklet entitled: "Style Guide", which 
suggested how uniforms should be worn and which was geared implicitly towards 
women: 
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Research from our customers and feedback from staff has confirmed 
the importance of projecting a professional image in our business 
dealings. To assist in achieving this we have adopted the following 
approach to your dress code... for a professional image; always keep 
make-up and jewelleiy to a discreet minimum and in keeping with a 
high standard of personal hygiene and grooming... Choose dark or 
natural coloured tights or stockings that blend with your chosen 
garments... 
(Bank UK Retail Briefing, August 2002). 
Casey (1995: 150) suggests that the whole pyschostructure of the workplace 
appears to have become a fit between practices of organisational culture and 
employee subculture, with ' f i t ' determined to be flie expectation of prevailing 
industrial conditions: 
The new corporatisation of the self is more than a process o f assault, 
discipline and defeat against which employees defend themselves. It is 
a process o f colonization in which, in its completion, assault and 
defeat are no longer recognized. (Original Italics). Overt displays o f 
employee resistance and opposition are virtually eliminated 
Corporatized selves become sufficiently repressed to effectively 
weaken and dissolve the capacity for serious criticism or dissent. TTie 
burden of greater work anxiety and a reactivated guilt (as narcissism 
gives way again to compulsiveness)... overwhelm the capacity to 
dissent. Instead criticism and disagreement are channelled into the 
production process through team processes of speaking up, 
brainstorming, problem-solving, and 'critical thinking', 
(Casey, 1995: 150/151). 
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Accompanying these major changes in both the physical and mental experience of 
working women have been unparalleled changes to managerial philosophies and 
ways of working. These appear to be the driving forces behind how and why 
employee experiences of work have changed so dramatically in recent years. 
More will be written about the key role of women who work part-time for Bank 
UK later in my thesis, whilst the remainder of this chapter will now consider the 
large and growing body of literature that examines the link between revised 
management techniques, ways of working and business performance. It will 
consider the key definitions of such practices and the ways in which they are 
determined to improve performance. A link that is all too often nebulously 
defined (Hutchinson et al., 2000). 
Full of Eastern Promise? (Japanese-style working) 
The phenomenal growth of the banking sector over the last couple of decades has 
not been without the emergence of major problems, tensions and paradoxes. 
Unprecedented competition, unleashed by market deregulation, privatisation, neo-
liberal policies and profound technological change has affected not only the way 
banking business is conducted, but also its traditional employment practices and 
systems of industrial relations (Clarke and Vincent, 1989; Knights and Tinker, 
1997; Regini et al., 1999). Traditional models of banking (patemalistic, cautious, 
bureaucratic) have been transformed into technocratic regimes concemed only 
with performance, expenditure, sales and profit (Cressey and Scott, 1992, cited in 
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Storey et al., 1999). It can be of no surprise to sociologists that such monumental 
changes to working practices and systems o f management have sought substantial 
performance improvements in terms of cost of production and quality of product. 
Three initial responses have been evidenced: 
1. The rapid adoption of new computerised processing 
systems and information technologies, bringing substantial 
consequences for the definition o f ' s k i l l ' and the continuing 
divisions between 'men's work' and 'women's work'. 
2. A significant shift away fiDm 'standard employment 
contracts', towards part-time, flexible and seasonal work, 
threatening polarisation and fi-agmentation of employee 
collectivity. 
3. A marked increase in labour market insecurity through 
a continuous process of reorganisation, and reduction o f 
staffing numbers in response to global challenges. 
(Gallic et al., 1998). 
From the 1980s onwards, the manufacturing industry in particular experienced 
increasing interest in its varying organisational cultures (Parker, 1999: 1). When 
Bill Hayden the Head o f Ford Europe returned from a iact-finding visit to Japan 
in 1980, he was visibly shocked by the productivity advantage enjoyed by the 
Japanese manufacturing sector. Here, compared to the West, factories enjoyed a 
tight labour discipline, increased output and enhanced worker flexibility. 
Attempts were made to try and explain what Hayden had experienced. There were 
two schools of thought. The first suggested that the phenomenon was little more 
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than the result o f Western stereotyping of the Japanese, who were viewed as 
inherently submissive and group-minded. Ouchi argued that aspects of Japanese 
management theory were so inseparable from Japanese culture itself, they could 
not be transplanted directly into Western organisations. The Japanese worked 
better, simply because they avoided the worst elements o f bureaucracy and 
hierarchy and achieved a high state o f consistency in their internal culture (cited 
in Sheldrake, 1996: 86-189). The second viewed management practices as 
brilliant examples of innovatory pioneering philosophies by Japanese 
corporations, constituting discrete packages of organisational techniques lifled 
fiiom their original social and economic context, adopted and applied as a general 
recipe for enhanced productivity and competitiveness (Elgerand Smith, 1994: I -
2). 
As a response to these findings and in order to compete on cost and quality in the 
same global marketplace as Japanese companies, it was clear that substantial 
revisions needed to be quickly made to traditionally Western managerial and 
organisational cultural practices. Initially, there were three major areas o f change: 
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1. The development of formal 'Company philosophies'. 
2. The establishment o f revised working methods, which would 
encourage workers to accept greater responsibility for production. 
3. The development of a new system o f remuneration intended to 
reward individual commitment and flexibility. 
(Scott, 1994: 101). 
Together, these changes offered strategic responses to the interdeterminancy of 
the effort bargain. Alongside increasingly profound changes to management style, 
they were key drivers in the emergence o f new, cost-driven ways of working. 
Over the past decade the rate o f innovation of managerial theory has been 
enormous. New buzzwords and phrases have emerged: Total Quality 
Management (TQM), Just-In-Time working (JIT) and Human Resource 
Management (HRM), each stressing competitive working practice, 
conceptualising labour as either a liability (Hart, 1993), or a resource advantage i f 
properiy utilised (Grint, 1998). Such has been their impact on production and 
profit that some industrialists have suggested that these revised ways o f working 
appear to have become the cornerstone of modem management (Sennett, 1999). 
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Linking these managerial theories is Business Process Reengineering (BPR) - a 
process designed to render organisations more flexible, efBcient and cost-
productive. Its primary aim has been the re-engineering of the structure and 
function of organisations around key processes that link production to final 
consumption (Knights and McCabe, 1998: 164). In the financial services industry, 
banks have had to adopt certain tenets of these new management styles, whilst at 
the same time trying to deal with major structural changes involving outsourcing, 
downsizing, delayering and adopting systems of lean production. By 1994,75 per 
cent of the organisations in the UK financial services sector had introduced some 
form of BPR within their organisational culture (McCabe et al, 1994, cited in 
Knights and McCabe, 1998: 167) 
The emergence of an increasingly competitive banking sector has given fiesh 
urgency for banks to reconsider techniques of management. Studies of successful 
Japanese transplants in the West have shown that Japanese organisational 
methods lead to far higher levels of productivity even without the cultural 
conditions of Japanese society (Gallic et al., 1998). Many of the organisational 
methods evident in Japanese transplants have been adopted within the UK 
banking sector, and their effect upon the intemal restructuring and general 
operational isation of banks has been so prodigious, that the claim must be able to 
be made that they have actively permeated all major facets of the banking 
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relationship - fix>m contemporary employment relations and managerial 
philosophies, to issues of gender and the rise in consumer importance. 
In trying to assess whether these changes in the contemporary banking sector have 
been able to 'add value' to the bank / consumer / staff relational triangle, it is 
necessary for banks to be pictured as modem-style 'financial factories'. 
However, i f banks are to be assessed fix)m a factory perspective then a tangible 
measurement of output is necessary, but problematical. Can output be best 
achieved by measuring the number, or value of accounts, or the volume and speed 
of processing transactions? I f problems with determining output can be overcome, 
another problem emerges - that of measuring the quality of production. By 
shifting to a productionist approach concemed only with output and quality, banks 
can no longer be treated differently to manufacturing companies, except that they 
utilise employee labour to 'produce' deposit / loan accounts, mortgages etc. 
Each o f the components o f what Elger and Smith (1994: 38) term 'disaggregated 
Japanisation', will now be examined in turn, in orderto assess how their adoption, 
either in whole or part, within Bank UK have altered employee experience of 
work. The way they are presented for the sake of clarity, may suggest that they 
exist in isolation fi^om each other, but this is not the case. Al l three are so closely 
bound together, it is very difficult to find either one system operating alone, or 
isolate definitive boundaries in their working applications. 
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Just-In-Time fJID Working. 
Just-In-Time (JFT) management philosophy focuses primarily upon the systematic 
reduction of organisational slack through the implementation of just-in-time 
working techniques. These seek to increase the fiinctional flexibility of labour and 
decentralise responsibilities within the organisation (Gallic et al., 1998). Two 
oppositional debates surrounding JIT working practices exist. 
Supporters of JIT working regimes claim that under JIT systems workers are 
required to work smarter, rather than harder. The system is also usefijl for quickly 
identifying any problems with production quality. However, opponents o f Just-In-
Time working systems claim that the philosophy is a crude capitalist tool, serving 
only to ftirther intensify work, and subordinate labour to management control 
(Delbridge, 1995). Delbridge also suggests that the requirement to work smarter 
and not harder, is merely a seductive maxim, when really the bias is towards 
horizontal enlargement and intensification o f labour, rather the encouragement of 
multi-skilled, polyvalent employees (1998: 101). JIT working also rests on the 
notion of external / intemal customers at each stage of the production process, 
with workers acting as both customers and agents of quality control, which 
Delbridge (1995) claims is nothing more than the panoptical surveillance of the 
shop floor through peer pressure. 
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Within Bank UK, quality of production is now partly monitored by 'mystery 
shoppers'. These are individuals who are paid by the bank to act the part of 
genuine customers, who visit branches with the primary aim of checking that the 
various procedures mandated by Head Office are operationalised in the correct 
manner. Traditionally concerned with banalities such as branch cleanliness, the 
displays of product brochures or the correct wearing of corporate uniform, there is 
increasing evidence that the mystery shopper roles have been expanded to involve 
the use of discrete surveillance equipment: 
It would appear through recent experiences that the mysteiy shopper 
has used discreet surveillance equipment to video meetings with 
FPCs'. UniFi^ recognise that mystery shopper can provide useful 
feedback to pinpoint training needs for individuals but believe that the 
system ofvideoing meetings is contrary to individuals privacy... In the 
meantime i f members have any experience of this matter or wish to 
register any concerns they may have please contact UniFi. 
(UniFi, I I October2001). 
JIT working systems have clearly been adopted by the banking sector in order to 
better satisfy shifting consumer demand. By considering banks as individual 
financial factories, the scientific measurement of Taylorist output principles has 
meant that accurate staffing schedules can now be produced to within fifteen-
minute periods (Webster, 1996). in theory, staff can therefore be delivered to the 
production process at the very point at which they are needed. Thus JIT working 
' Financial Planning Saff- part of the regulated sales force in the financial services industry. 
^ UniFi - Union of Insurance and Finance Industry, formerly BIFU - (Banking, Insurance and 
Finance Union). 
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has transformed the focus of thinking about branch stafBng levels fiom an annual 
headcount to the number of 'uni t man hours' needed to operate successfully: 
A bank uses part-timers because of staff costs. Otherwise you have 
people on a counter with no demand. In the past we weren't focused 
on productivity management. Now we are manning resources to work 
flow. 
(Bank, cited in Neathey and Hurstfield, 1995: 50). 
'Just-in-time' systems of work have been accompanied by the rise of a 'just-in-
time' labour force (Crompton et al., 1996: 5). The close attention paid to JIT 
staffing regimes by the banking industry clearly influenced the loss o f 70,000 
clerical jobs between 1990 and 1995 (Heffeman, 1996). Such drastic downsizing 
inevitably meant that the remaining workforce was subjected to increased 
working hours and intensification of work (Danford, 1999: 59). As I w i l l show 
later in my thesis, with branch staffing figures in Bank UK now so critically 
calculated, unexpected absences o f any nature had a devastating efi'ecl on service. 
HRM (Human Resource Management) 
Inexorably bound up with J FT systems o f staffing are revised approaches to the 
management of stafif through HRM (Human Resource Management). This is a 
distinctive approach to employment management, which seeks to achieve 
competitive advantage by the strategic deployment of a highly committed and 
capable workforce, using an array of cultural, stmctural and personnel techniques 
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(Storey, 1995: 5). The driving force behind HRM is the rtietoric that i t is the 
human capability and commitment of employees, along with the factors of 
production (JIT), which can distinguish successful organisations from the rest. In 
such a system, human resources (staff) are considered to be o f paramount 
importance, and it is through their commitment to flexible working with regard to 
both job content and working hours that their greatest value lies. Thus Storey 
(1995), suggests that employees should be treated with care and nurtured as a 
valuable company asset rather than an incidental cost of doing business. 
The past decade has seen a decline in collective bargaining as a method of pay 
determination, with many reward packages now heavily controlled by 
management (White and Dnjcker, 2000). Alongside new ways of dealing with 
staff under JIT regimes, revised reward systems have also been introduced, which 
have overturned traditional principles of pay based on stipulated periods of 
working time. 
A major factor in the move towards the individualisation ofemployment contracts 
has been the decline in nationwide trade union membership across all industries 
from 58 per cent in 1980 to 44 per cent by 1990 and 37 per cent in 1995 (Brown 
et al., 1998). The latest figures for 2000 reveal that a mere 18 per cent of the 
workforce aged between 18 and 29 are union members, compared to 44 per cent 
of that age cohort in the eariy 1980s (Taylor, 2001: 13). 
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With the adoption of a varying mix o f 'Japanese' styles of management and 
working in many industries, it is hardly surprising that a new style of 
organisational language has emerged, which defines workers as employees, 
individuals and teams, not as organised collectives with interests separate from 
those of management (Ackers et al., 1996: 5). Organisations have moved away 
from the traditional character of heavily unionised workplaces and short-term 
cash rewards. Where unions continue to have a presence within organisations, 
their main emphasis now appears to be on the furthering of the individual legal 
rights of their members (Taylor, 2001: 5). The financial semces industry is now 
little unionised with workers preferring to join the traditionally less militant staff 
associations (Gall, 1997:220). Glenday (1997: 17) suggests this is something of a 
surprise considering that many bank staff now receive few benefits, and often 
earn little more than the minimum wage, whilst being expected to possess an 
expanded range of skills and knowledge: 
Increasingly trade unions are becoming voluntary and autonomous 
institutions that have to respond in a positive manner to individual 
employee grievances... even when trade unions are able to secure 
legal recognition from companies this does not automatically ensure 
that they will be able to negotiate the wages and benefits o f those they 
claim to represent. Only an estimated third of all Britain's employees 
have their pay and conditions determined any longer through 
collective bargaining agreements. This contrasts with as many as 70 
per cent who did so back in 1984. 
(Taylor,2001: 9). 
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The advantage to the banking industry of breaking away from traditional 
structures of pay and reward has been the ability to introduce increasingly 
dispersed levels of pay both within, and between grades (Brown et al., 1998). The 
'jewel in the crown' of HRM appears to be the affiliation of individual to 
organisational performance - linking individual and corporate productivity 
(Mabey et al., 1998: 7-8). Now individual pay settlements specifically reward 
output, and are usually linked to tangible and quantifiable measures of 
performance. The criterion of performance is commonly based on extensive lists, 
which include motivation, maintenance o f quality, increased output, commitment 
and flexibility. With the banking sector already using quality of service to gain 
competitive advantage in the financial marketplace, management have begun to 
realise that it really is the woricforce that ultimately holds the key to the creation 
of a more productive and efficient bank. Thus the way in which staff are managed 
and developed can drive quality customer service, organisational flexibility and 
cost (Armstrong, 1996): 
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Employees may be encouraged by human resource management and 
by 'New Pay' ideas to question and to review pay practices and to seek 
to bring wages systems into line with business strategy and process... 
Traditional incentive schemes, overtime and premium rates — 
introduced to enable employers to buy an element o f flexibility - have 
been seen as too cumbersome and too costly. Employer interest is in 
standardisation of cost with scope for variability in working practices 
to meet business needs... The move to annualised working hours 
minimises the need for overtime payments. The growth in skills-based 
pay reflects employer interest in harnessing the capabilities and the 
loyalties of workers to the realities of technological innovation, to 
team working and to multi-skilling... Grading systems have been 
rationalised, and harmonisafion and single-status working have 
become more commonplace. 
(Drucker, 2000: 121). 
Such systems of pay may well link employee remuneration to overall 
organisational performance, but it has been suggested that these types o f reward 
systems have been the main catalysts in the rise in incidences o f employee stress -
an outcome that LaBier(l986:98) has termed "new age trauma". The relationship 
between systems of reward that place basic remuneration at risk, and the increase 
in employee mental health problems will be discussed more fl i l ly in Chapter Five. 
Human Resource Management as a technique of people management has many 
different manifestations linked to the intended purposes of its proponents (Webb, 
1995, cited in Rees, 1995: 99). As a system of management, academics and 
industrial commentators have crudely divided it into two categories- hard or sofl. 
The 'soft model' emphasises the importance of integrating Human Resource 
policies with business objectives, whilst at the same time considering employees 
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to be valuable company assets. Through their commitment, adaptability and high 
quality skills, employees become proactive, rather than passive inputs into the 
production process. As discussed earlier, deregulation and competifion have 
created huge pressures on banks to heighten flexibility and put the consumer first. 
It has therefore become the quality of service and not the provision o f easily 
replicable products, which have become key fectors in providing and maintaining 
a competitive edge within the financial services maricetplace. However, the 
continued desire to reduce operating costs has meant that the application of 
Taylorist work measurement in the restructuring of branch networks now conflicts 
with an increasing demand for branch based service provision, and the abject 
failure to quickly resolve this strategic paradox has led to poor choices in the 
redesign of organisational stnictures (Fincham et al., 1994). 
In contrast, the 'hard model' of HRM simply views any staff expenditure as 
simply another cost in the production process, alongside other assets and 
liabilities such as land and capital - merely an expense of doing business (Legge, 
1995). Hart (1993, cited in Storey, 1995:24) suggests that by treating staff simply 
as economic liabilities, HRM as a system o f personnel management is amoral, 
antisocial, unprofessional, uneconomic and ecologically destructive. By its very 
nature, it appears to want to oust the existing decent, welfare and humanist values 
of personnel management by replacing the pursuit of efficiency and justice with a 
corrupt, business-oriented mission. 
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The debate surrounding the rhetoric or reality of HRM remains unresolved. It may 
be asked the extent to which KRM diflfers in practices and behaviours from those 
associated with more traditional personnel management techniques. Is there really 
any difference between the 'soft' model of HRM and normative models of 
persormel management, oris HRM simply new wine in old bottles? (Legge, 1995: 
37). Danford (1999: 8) ponders the feasibility of an all-encompassing Japanese 
model of human resource management, when there is no single corporate culture 
within the UK. Surely acute industrial diversification must undermine notions of 
universalism and convergence: 
Changes in corporate structure and strategy create new demands o f 
employee relations managers, as well as shaping the function itself. 
Often, developments in employee relations management represent 'not 
so much a new departure with persormel, as a set of movements from 
outside it ' (Storey 1992:264). Continually seeking to reorient itself to 
these changing circumstances, employee relations management has 
been variously characterized as in crisis, in transition, and increasingly 
on the periphery of corporate decision making, which is now 
dominated by financial rather then employment considerations. 
(Millwaixl etal.,2000:50). 
Total Quality Management. 
Originating during the 1980s / 1990s as a managerial programme for use within 
the manufacturing sector, the tenets of Total Quality Management (TQM) have 
increasingly been adopted throughout the banking industry. Its three leading 
principles are: customer orientation, process orientation and continuous 
improvement (Hill and Wilkinson, 1995). The clear driving force behind the 
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adoption of TQM has been the increased focus on the importance of the consumer 
and the continuing improvement o f business processes (BPR) (Collinson et al., 
1998). TQM represents a move away from the traditional 'one person, one job ' 
way of organising production, to a system based on autonomous work groups 
responsible for organising most aspects o f their own woric (Scott, 1994:41). 
The rise in the use of teamworking has clearly been the driver behind many 
changes to working practices in the banking sector. Revised managerial 
discourses share similar assumptions in using teamworking as a method of 
ensuring human resources are effectively mobilised to achieve maximum benefit 
from new technologies or prescriptive programmes (Knights and McCabe, 2000: 
1481). The central assumption appears to be that by adopting high commitment 
work systems, management are creating the conditions for employees to become 
more involved in the organisation and identify with its overall goals (Hutchinson 
et al., 2000: 64). The work team must be the heart of the lean 'factory'. It has two 
main organisational benefits - the transfer of the maximum number of tasks and 
responsibilities to the mass of workers and an ability to trace defects to any one 
individual or team (Thompson and Wallace, 1996: 103). Industrial commentators 
may ask what exactly is new about teamworking? Surely its concept has always 
been a part of industrial life? Thompson and Wallace (2000: 105) suggest that 
what is new has been the scale and scope in the rise o f teamworking practices 
since the 1980s. Teamworicing has become linked to the restructuring of 
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production systems, but there is still no ideal or single model of teamworking that 
is readily applicable to every environment, so its concept still remains notoriously 
ambiguous (Knights and McCabe, 2000: 1482). 
It still remains difficult to define TQM, not least because it has often been used by 
employers as: ". . . a conceptual peg on which to hang a wide range of otherv^ase 
unconnected managerial innovations" (Bradley et al., 00: 154), and it is not 
always clear who is being empowered (Hales, 2000: 503). The ethos behind 
empowerment is that no one knows a job better than the person who does it; 
therefore, by allowing those who are most knowledgeable to make decisions on 
the day-to-day issues surrounding their jobs, the organisation becomes more 
efficient (Denham et al., 1997: 147). Critics argue that empowerment entails an 
integration o f tasks rather than an expansion o f discretion or increased task variety 
(Knights and McCabe, 1998: 170). 
Four models of TQM have been identified. These view TQM as either 
1,'Optimistic', entailing a genuine increase in employee skills, 2. As 
'exploitative' - acting to increase subordination o f workers for little extra reward, 
3. As 'a contingency', by seeking to empower middle managers, or 4. As 'a 
reorganisation of control' through new technologies (Rees, 1995). 
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The main feature of 'hard' , or 'exploitative' TQM is its emphasis on production 
control, eradication of defects, and the elimination and minimisation o f waste. 
Product or service excellence is achieved by assigning primary responsibility for 
quality, of woric to those at varying points on the production line, or as customer 
service agents, with the aim o f getting things right first time, every time 
(Collinsonet al., 1998:5). 
Within the banking sector, the impact o f TQM can be most readily seen in the 
dramatic re-modelling of traditional branch networks. Rising competitive and 
consumer pressures, together with the growing need for improved service 
deliveiy, have forced banks into driving through a complete overhaul of their 
traditional delivery channels, including a thorough revamping o f their public 
spaces and extending opening hours. Employees improve sales and service 
delivery through increasing involvement in BPR, where criticism and 
disagreement are channelled into the production process through speaking up, 
brainstomiing, problem solving or critical thinking (Casey, 1995: 151). 
Knights and McCabe's recent research on the effects of BPR in Multibank, found 
that in every branch, one member of staff had been designated as a quality 
sponsor. He or she ensured that the different problems identified through Kaizen 
activity' were ftilly discussed at branch level. Once a month, staff chose one issue, 
which would be taken forward by their quality sponsor to higher - level 'cluster 
Katen - continuous improvement. 
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meetings'. Their choice of issue was made easier by the necessity to calculate the 
PONC (price of non conformance) of their problem as either wasted staff time or 
resources (2000: 427-8). Yet Danford (1999) suggests despite this example of 
potentially increasing autonomy and empowerment for the massed ranks o f 
workers, the main principles driving the implementation of both Kaizen and 
quality circles, is simply their usefulness in steering rank-and-file control of 
workers towards expanded management control (1999:40): 
While Kaizen is characterized by the Company as a benign, win-vmi 
process built on the technical common sense and innovative capacity 
of workers, the ultimate goal of kaizen is to produce with the absolute 
minimum number of workers. 
(Rinehartetal., 1994: 155). 
Much existing research divides employee experience o f TQM systems into one o f 
two outcomes. The first are prescriptive texts, which assume a warm employee 
embrace of TQM systems. The second are critical studies, which 
unceremoniously equate TQM with intensified managerial control, agreeing to a 
certain extent that TQM could be effective, but suggest that poor implementation 
has undermined its potential for increased effectiveness (Coilinson et al., 1998: I ) . 
Foster and Hoggett (1999: 32) further claim that any organisational benefit in 
adopting TQM working is little more than a "sloping shoulder syndrome" - a 
simple shift in responsibility from management to lower grade staff. As decision-
making therefore becomes more decentralised then is it not the case that workers 
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are simply just undertaking tasks that had previously been the responsibility of 
supervisors and managers? (Frenkel et al., 1999: 62). 
However, despite these negative suggestions, supporters of TQM systems claim 
that Kaizen activity does help to empower workers by encouraging individual 
responsibility for work processes and outcomes. Piore and SabePs (1984) flexible 
specialisation thesis, offers an optimistic model of TQM, suggesting it is an 
upskilling model, representing as it does a clear break from Fondist mass 
production and Taylorist management practices (cited in Collinson et al., 1998: 
5). Harley contends that i f post-Fordism was the language of the 1980s, then it has 
been usurped in the 1990s by a language of'empowerment' (1999:42). 
Critics of TQM working systems hold a harsher view. Collinson et al., (1998) 
found their respondents citing an increase in the use of pre-defined targets, 
managerial pressures, reports and appraisals, which suggest that the adoption of 
TQM systems are inexorably bound up with tightening systems of control and a 
long way from the rhetoric o f greater worker empowerment and autonomy (1998; 
ii). 
What existing research does show, is that the adoption of varying TQM 
techniques have impacted more heavily on certain groups in the organisational 
hierarchy of banks. Supervisory positions have come under pressure from flatter 
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organisational stmctures and simplification of job gradings. Professional and 
skilled groups have been threatened by their exposure to a regulation of 
production and increasing expectations of quality (CoUinson et al., 1998: 9). By 
offering workers increased autonomy, layers of a seemingly deftinct stratum of 
'middle management' have been unceremoniously stripped away, in a process 
termed "corporate liposuction" (Collinson and Collinson 1995, cited in Denham 
et al., 1997: 149). Paradoxically, however, the success or otherwise o f TQM 
appears to rely on the attitudes and behaviours of this same strata o f middle 
management, who are often centrally located at the interface between 
management control systems and the shopfloor, where they are expected to 
translate new plans / policies into action. Their status within the organisational 
hierarchy means they often have little choice other than: "...attempt to tip-toe a 
fine line between exercising control and securing commitment..." (Collins, 1998: 
26). The paradoxes of this situation must make it hard for middle managers to 
embrace the concept of their own empowerment at little more than a surface level 
(Denham etal., 1997: 157-158): 
The sea change underway in the world of organizations and careers is 
rocking the foundations of our lives. It is creating psychological 
earthquakes and a topsy-turvy world in which... intelligent and hard-
working career professionals feel trapped and emotionally conflicted 
over the bind between ambition and personal values. And in which 
nearly everyone is at risk from the danger of becoming stressed-out 
from the daily impact of the New Age o f work. 
(LaBier, 1986: 133). 
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Thus, TQM systems have not only weakened middle management by stripping 
away at their control and checking roles, they have also influenced the further 
decline o f the already beleaguered Trades Unions. Many employees appear to 
have chosen to be no longer represented by a Union, believing contemporary 
employment relationships are far too complex to be encompassed by a collective 
approach (The Fabian Society, 1996:48). The sharp decline in Union membership 
within the financial services industry' has meant that bank employees are now 
facing a real threat to their representational security (Lapido and Wilkinson, 2001: 
25). With management using quality improvement teams to bypass shop stewards 
and communicate directly with shopfloor workers, there has been a definite shift 
towards unitarism, and the adoption o f an ideology directly opposed to unionism. 
McCabe (1999:676-679) condemns this situation, suggesting that the requirement 
for executives to communicate with both managers and workers smacks o f double 
standards and merely encourages spin (Denham et al., 1997: 150). Knights and 
McCabe (2001) suggest there is a contradiction between the demand for managers 
engaged in re-engineering processes to be aggressive, on the one hand and caring 
on the other. They wonder how a manger can be simultaneously an autocrat and a 
team player (2001: 626). Under these systems of empowerment, it appears that 
executives and employees are engaged in little more than shadowboxing. 
Management says it wants employees to participate more, and employees give the 
impression they are delighted to be asked to help, but it is difficult to know 
' Union membership (originally BU^U, now UNIFI) increased annually from 1965 (58,444 
membere) to 1990 (170, 101 members), then decreased substantially, mainly due to redundancies 
to 143,012 members in 1994. (Gall, 1997:225-226). 
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whether either party really means what they say. As a result Argyris (1998: 103) 
asks whether TQM can be viewed as anything other than a simple charade. 
The notion o f employees being involved in quality control systems should be 
straightforward, but existing research has revealed the existence of unsolved 
paradoxes. Variations are possible in the degree and depth o f participation, the 
form of participatory structures, and in the desired purpose or outcome o f such 
activity. Employee participation must therefore be held to be heterogeneous rather 
than unified - indeed so heterogeneous that the whole validity of the concept may 
be doubted. Conceptual confiision may also be increased through the multiplicity 
of expressions used to denote aspects o f the activity e.g. industrial democracy, 
participation, involvement etc. (BIyton and Tumbull, 1998:223). 
The debate, therefore, remains: How far can multi-skilling and task versatility 
(polyvalence) be regarded as a genuine form o f upskilling? A manager of New 
Bank (cited in Rees, 1995: 106) contends that despite the promises o f TQM, 
employee polyvalence has not happened, and the flattening o f grading structures 
has only served to strengthen already rigid job demarcations: 
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This branch is now split into a number of sections... A year ago... i f 
you had a cashier missing you'd drag someone from another 
department to help them out. We're very sectionalised now. We've got 
a cashiers department, a customer services section, a processing unit, a 
services unit, a lending section, and a technical services unit. The 
introduction of sectionalization has worked against team spirit overall. 
(Rees, 1996:106). 
Issues of Health 
For the majority of adults, non-exploitative employment brings many benefits. It 
structures daily life and provides social stimulus whilst conferring certain status 
and identity (Gooper, 1995: preface). Work influences individual development in 
two distinct ways, either by stimulating life-affirming attitudes, which support 
personal development, or generating regressive mental attitudes by oppressing 
opportunity. LaBier (1986: 7) sees this antagonism as the primary feature of 
modem madness. 
The familiar working landscape has been bulldozed by the economic evolution 
from production and manufacturing industries towards a services-based economy. 
What is not so cleariy understood is that this shift did not simply mean increased 
career opportunities within the services sector in direct proportion to the 
deterioration of prospects in declining manufacturing sectors. This second 
industrial revolution (Garson, 1988: 9) changed work organisation, management 
and rewand systems forever (La Bier, 1986: 98). A number of studies of blue, 
white and 'pink'collar woricers (Probert and Wilson, 1993), have illustrated that a 
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variety of job related factors including work related self esteem, job satisfaction, 
the physical working environment, the degree of variety and challenge in work 
and decision latitude continue to be powerful predictors of physical and 
psychological illness (Emslie et al., 1999:36). 
Problems in assessing work related health issues appear twofold. Health problems 
can present themselves as either physical, mental or a combination of the two. 
Physical illnesses are usually accompanied by obvious symptoms such as chronic 
back problems, deteriorating eyesight or repetitive strain injury (RSI). 
Interestingly, the major clearing banks have challenged the validity of RSI as an 
illness in the courts, after being sued for compensation under Health and Safety 
regulations by injured staff. Here we can see the effects of management policies 
such as HRM and JIT on employees that have necessitated treating banks as 
financial factories. Staff claimed that working in processing centres:"... was a bit 
like a production line. We only used our right hand to key in the details o f up to 
15,000 key strokes an hour" (Midland Bank employee, cited in Milne, 1998: 11). 
After weighing up the evidence that processing staff had been told to increase 
their work rate, and reduce the length of their breaks in order to improve 
productivity, the courts overturned earlier legal judgements that RSI was merely 
symptomatic of "eggshell personalities" (Cooper, 1995: 53). Judges ruled that 
staff had been physically injured by work intensification and rejected the banks' 
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argument that RSI symptoms were 'all in the mind', awarding damages of 
between £8,000 and £15,000 to each victim (BIFU,' 1998:2). 
Eyestrain is another health problem commonly associated with work 
intensification and the removal of rest periods (TUC, 1999). Despite the clear 
risks to vision associated with prolonged use o f computers, the pace o f the 
modem banking environment does not permit staff the opportunity to take 
recommended breaks fix)m the usage of such equipment. From account opening to 
cashiering, share dealing to mortgage and loan quotations, all tasks require the 
prolonged use of computers, and the constant, unregulated flow of customers 
means equipment use cannot be neatly packaged into medically compliant time 
periods. 
Issues of health are not only physical. Later chapters will fully investigate this 
issue in Bank UK. My research clearly shows that such wholesale changes to 
working practices and management techniques, (which have added to the 
increased competitiveness of the contemporary banking sector) have affected the 
mental weii being o f staff. At the organisational level, change has oflen been 
remorselessly and uncaringly driven through in the quest for market position and 
organisational survival (Cox, 1996:2). 
BIFU - Banking, Insurance and Finance Union. 
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In tandem with changes to management practices and ways of working, later 
chapters will demonstrate the revised strategies adopted by Bank UK to increase 
the sales penetration o f its products and services. These changes have ultimately 
seen branches evolving from simple processing centres into key retail outlets, 
with their activities broadly divided into three categories: 
1. Customer Identification - following up leads from other staff, cold 
calling customers and continued market and product analysis. 
2. Customer Development - direct sales activity, demonstrating, 
merchandising, providing a consultancy service, overseeing customer 
delivery channels and handling queries and complaints. 
3. Direct Selling - by face-to-face, tele - or written communications. 
(Armstrong, 1996:371). 
Specialist sales personnel, whose reward packages were set distinctively apart 
from the mass ranks of employees, have traditionally undertaken this type of 
work. They were much more likely to have a significant proportion o f their 
earnings at risk, i.e. dependent on individual performance (Armstrong, 1996: 
369). However, what appears to have happened in Bank UK during the last couple 
of years is that new management policies have altered remuneration packages to 
such an extent that all employees have been exposed to increasingly sophisticated 
systems of performance related pay. 
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There are generally two features of performance related pay reward systems. The 
first links individual pay to performance as measured by the achievement of 
specific individual objectives, and the second rewards performance in terms of 
behavioural traits e.g. problem solving, reliability, initiative and co-operation 
(Storey and Sisson, 1998: 144). When an individual is no longer able to meet the 
goals expected of him or her, then a loss of control over performance occurs. This 
can trigger stress reactions and ultimately a complete breakdown in performance. 
Jobs that are challenging can also be satisfying, yet when they become too 
demanding, they inevitably lead to rising pressure and general work overioad. 
Such pressures have been linked to a variety o f illnesses, including decreased life 
satisfaction, psychosomatic complaints, generalised anxieties, exhaustion and 
depression (Warr, 1987, cited in Burchell et al., 1999: 41). Over one hundred 
million working days (60 per cent of all absences) are lost annually in Britain 
through stress related illnesses (Revell, 1998). 
Later chapters will demonstrate the pressures that now face Bank LFK's cashiers in 
making targeted sales referrals to customer services staff, who in tum, are 
expected to close the sale, A common theme in this regard is not only do 
employees generally have little input into the levels at which targets are set, but 
these targets are often frequently moved - usually higher - before they have ever 
been satisfactorily achieved in the first instance (Baethge et al., 1999: 15). 
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The general movement tovrards the adoption of lean production systems o f work 
in the banking sector has meant that employees now face not only extended 
working hours, but new stresses arising from intensive work methods (Danford, 
1999: 59). A focus of recent industrial research has been the assessment of the 
Working Time Directive, which entered UK legislation on I"* October 1998*. 
Whilst it is uncommon for staff within the banking industiy to work in excess of 
48 hours a week, Chris Brown, a Human Resources manager with Abbey National 
claims the new legislation is: " . . . more about being more aware of the hidden 
time that people have to put in. That will mean more monitoring to ensure that our 
operations don't force people into working long hours" (cited in Coles, 1998:24). 
Despite the 48-hour cap, the fact remains that working hours are steadily 
increasing. Later chapters demonstrate how, before the introduction o f 
operationalised hours^ Bank UK appeared to entrap staff into agreeing to work an 
increasing number of Saturday shifts and then withdrawing the right of the 
individual to change their mind once written agreement was obtained. 
It is not surprising that employers have been keen to overcome difficulties with 
the implementation of the Working Time Directive by finding new ways to meet 
consumer demands whilst trying to reduce staffing costs. The twin consumer 
' Its basic rules prohibit employees within certain industries (including finance) working more 
than 48 hours per week when averaged over a 17 week period. It also gives employees 4 weeks' 
pay annual leave, a rest break of 20 minutes when working in excess of 6 hours and at least one 
free day a week (Lorenz, 1998). The right of employees to opt out of the 48-hour cap is tho-e, but 
employees who are forced to sign such agreements against their will, have grounds for a 
successful industrial tribunal (Coles, 1998). 
^ See page 248 for an explanation of'operationalised hours'. 
70 
demands of immediacy and variability have inevitably influenced the drive 
towards greater organisational flexibility. 
Flexible friends? (The Future of Banking) 
Over the last decade, the demise o f the collective, union led work contract has 
begun to undermine traditional internal labour market structures (Mackenzie, 
2000: 707). Contractual flexibility has become one of the key features of new 
systems of work. With many organisations now operating at, (or very close to), 
full capacity, their need for greater organisational flexibility has never been more 
pressing (Burchell et al., 1999: 6). Many have established flexible workforces to 
provide enhanced delivery during times of greatest need. In banking, the use o f 
flexible or 'casual' workers appears widespread. 41 percent of branches employ 
at least one individual on this type of contract (The Fabian Society, 1996: 37). 
The concept of flexibility with regard to work is open-ended and can be applied to 
a wide variety of factors embedded within employment relationships. At its most 
basic, it is a description of a change in the distribution o f labour market jobs, 
away from standard full-time permanent employee contracts, towards various 
types of non-standard employment forms (Dex and McCulloch, 1997:1). Flexible 
working is commonly used to describe the creation of work patterns based on the 
need to maximise and optimise organisational output. Within the banking industry 
greater flexible woricing has been achieved through: 
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1. A combination of patterns of work based on hours, demands, 
capability and capacity of technology. 
2. A sea change in attitudes and individual values towards work, 
especially dynamism, commitment to service and the adoption of a 
positive approach to issues of problem-solving. 
3. Increased organisational commitment to staff training and 
development, thereby enhancing the value o f all staff to the 
organisation. 
(Pettinger, 1998: I ) . 
Three types of 'f lexibili ty ' appear to have emerged: 
1. Numerical Flexibility - enabling firms to adjust their stafRng levels 
to match demands in workflow. 
2. Working Time Flexibility - the ability to change the number and 
time of hours worked on a daily or weekly basis through annualised 
contracts and flexi-working. 
3. Functional Flexibility - the ability of individuals to carry out a 
multitude of tasks in an efficient manner. 
(The Fabian Society, 1996: 36-37). 
The days of the standard 9 to 5 job appear to be over for most workers. Yet, The 
Fabian Society urges employers to exercise caution in ensuring that the tool o f 
flexibility is used in mutual benefit for both parties in increasing organisational 
effectiveness: "Flexibility for employers without flexibility for employees is one 
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of the root causes of the insecurity that bedevils many employees' lives and 
undermines job satisfection, morale and quality of life" (1996: 38): 
Flexibility is one o f the major themes describing the phase o f post-
Fordist production in the global economy... New technologies coupled 
with increasing competitive pressures characterise the new 
organisational structures of post-Fordist production... The growth o f 
subcontracting, self-employment and temporary work are types o f 
employment, which characterise this phase of production. 
(Dexand McCuIloch, 1997: 5). 
'Zero hours' contracts are a typical example of flexible working in practice. 
Termed 'portfolio working', these types of contracts now appear to be 
commonplace in the banking industry. Similar to 'on-call' employment contracts, 
(which have a longer history), employees agree to be available for work, but are 
only called into work when the employer has work for them to do. Employers 
have found these contracts appealing since they permit them the maximum 
amount of flexibility in matching their labour force to fluctuating consumer 
demand, for the minimum of cost (Dex and McCulloch, 1997: 26). They also 
serve to ensure workers remain 'fresh' throughout their shifts. This may be 
especially true of call centres, where Taylor and Bain (1999: 111) suggest that 
often employees have difficulty in maintaining the required levels of enthusiasm 
over a typical eight-hour shift. In order to mitigate this, there has been a growing 
management preference for part-time, permanent staff who are able to deliver 
optimal performances for the entire period of a [shorter] shift, and who are able to 
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work shift patterns that correspond to peaks of customer demand, fi>r example 
during afternoons, evenings and weekends. 
In light of the above, it is hardly surprising therefore, that the number o f people 
employed on non-standard work contracts has increased in Britain in recent years. 
During the mid-1990s, at least one quarter o f men and one half o f women o f 
working age held non-standard jobs. The figures amounted to over 5.5 million 
women and 3.4 million men (Dex and McCulloch, 1997: 173). 
Subcontracting is a further example of the flexibilisation of the employment 
relationship. In the banking industry the following maxim appears to apply: 
"There is a simple rule in the banks' mind with regard to subcontracting: anything 
which is not profitable and can be done on the outside should be done there" (O' 
Reilly, 1992). The subcontracting o f work is often found in three main areas: 
1. In traditionally 'non-bank' jobs e.g. catering services and security 
staff. 
2. The externalisation of 'excess work' during periods of extreme 
consumer demand e.g. the use o f outside agencies to supply 
foreign cun^ncy. 
3. The uses of technological development to subcontract jobs that can 
be done outside the traditional branch environment e.g. voucher 
processing through joint venture and consortia approaches, 
(O'Reilly, 1992: 108). 
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The subcontracting of certain services, such as voucher processing has meant that 
banks lose their responsibilities for managing this type of woric, creating a 'win-
win' situation for themselves. In choosing to subcontract certain tasks, banks no 
longer have to endure the conflictual hassles of industrial relations in the 
completion of these tasks, yet continue to retain ultimate control of work through 
the continuing threat of contract withdrawal (O'Reilly, 1992). By reassessing 
which staff are vital to business goals and which are peripheral to its core 
workforce, subcontracting shifts the costs of training and administering die 
peripheral workforce to third parties, giving banks a further opportunity to reduce 
their operating expenditure, and increase profit margins. 
Despite the attraction of subcontracting in reducing labour costs, difficulties with 
this type of contract have yet to be overcome. The quality of sub-contracted 
labour is a big issue: "One criterion for subcontracting was for simple bulk tasks 
to be undertaken away from the workplace, however one of the problems is 
maintainingquality control and reliability" (O'Reilly, 1992: 110). 
Thus, the major concerns o f organisations looking to use flexible workers is the 
potential lack of an appropriate skill base, and the problems associated with 
getting flexible employees to successfully intemalise corporate goals (The 
Institute of Management, 1999:29). When an organisation uses flexible contracts, 
it is likely they will receive limited employee commitment (MacShane and 
Brewster, 2000: 17), paradoxically reducing employee loyalty at the very time 
75 
that revised working practices call for increased individual involvement through 
business process engineering and continuous improvement (Collinson et al., 1998: 
introduction). My fieldwork has exposed the extent to which Bank UK now relies 
on 'casual' woricers to plug unfilled job vacancies and provide extra staffing cover 
during times of increased pressure on branches. As I will reveal later in my thesis, 
each of my fieldwork sites had at least one 'casual' worker on call throughout the 
year, and due to the seasonality o f footflows (located as the sites were in busy 
holiday resorts), often called upon additional 'casual' labour throughout their 
busy summer months. I will also examine why Bank UK's 'casual' workforce 
continued to demonstrate high levels of of^ganisational loyalty despite the 
secondary nature of their contractual status, and their exclusion fix)m performance 
related pay rewards. 
Piore and Sabel (1992) argue that under the rubric of flexible working, 
relationships between large and small firms have been turned on their head. 
Smaller firms have traditionally had to operate with greater degrees of flexibility, 
which have ultimately provided the dynamic conditions necessary for accelerated 
growth (cited in O'Reilly, 1992: 107). In the banking sector, this can be illustrated 
by the hostile takeover of Nat West by a smaller institution - The Royal Bank of 
Scotland. Only a decade ago it was thought despite their massive duplication of 
costs: "...the very size of Barclays and National Westminster probably exclude 
them fi-om the list of victims..." (Clarke and Vincent, 1989: 134), yet Nat West 
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was tv^ce subjected to takeover bids by smaller institutions, fending off the ".. . 
hostile takeover attack fix)m Bank of Scotland..." (Merrell, 1999: 1), which 
believed Nat West had " . . . lost its way..." and planned to " . . . sell o f f non-core 
businesses and cut £ lbn o f costs by closing Nat West's large Victorian halls and 
opening smaller, cheaper branches, eliminating duplication and unifying computer 
systems (Treanor, 1999: 27). 
The size of this chapter is testament to the fact that a substantial amount of 
research has already been undertaken within the financial services sector, which 
has provided an ongoing textual commentary on changes within the industry over 
time. It has been necessary to examine the main themes from this research in 
some detail in order to provide a greater understanding of the complexities of 
change within Bank UK, which are described in later chapters. Such a substantial 
body of research exemplifies my earlier comment that the industry has become a 
favourite site of research for sociologists over recent years. However, with the 
focus of recent research becoming more preoccupied with techniques of 
management, the polyvocality ofthe individual and collective experience (Coffey, 
1999) appears to have been lost. In order that researchers can retain an 
understanding of change, it is necessary to refocus on examining change from an 
employee perspective and assess what it is really like for financial sector 
employees to labour under 'Japanese-style' techniques of management (including 
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teamworking), engage with new technologies and successfully negotiate their 
enforced "occupational resocialisation" from "tellers to sellers" (Parker, 2000). 
The following chapter describes how my research addresses the closure of this 
knowledge gap. It explains how 1 was able to take full advantage of my insider 
status to negotiate access direcfly into the heart of Bank UK's domestic banking 
network. By deciding to 'go native' and return to the 'bankfloor', 1 was able to 
investigate how changing bank strategies were being met, experienced, and to 
certain extent, contested by branch based staflF from both individual and team 
perspectives. 
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2. The Investigative Process. 
Some of the most enduring, in-depth and powerful first hand studies ofennployee 
experiences of work can be found in the series of industrial monographs produced 
during the 1970s and 1980s (for example: Westwood, 1984; Cavendish, 1982; 
Linhart, 1981; Beynon, 1978). These rich, thick narratives graphically animate 
worker experience of labour in the prevailing industries of the period and 
document both individual and collective resistance to new ways of working. 
Because of their extended period of inquiry inside the workplace, these 
researchers were able to minutely capture the intimate, individual work 
experiences of employees - details which are so often missing from research of a 
more large-scale survey based nature: 
This choice of research method may be seen as my response to the 
self-interrogative: " I f I want to understand what it is like working 
under jrr and TQM shall I sit in my oflSce and mail out questiormaires 
or shall I go and observe it, experience it, and ask people about it first 
hand?" 
(Delbridge, 1998: 15). 
Despite their rich, thick narrations on industrial life, which revealed so much 
about individual experiences of work, ethnographic, longitudinal studies such as 
these appear to have fallen out of fashion amongst industrial researchers (Scott, 
1994: 28-29). Earlier in my thesis 1 have commented upon the unprecedented 
transformations that have taken place within the financial services industry over 
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recent years, and despite the expansion of sociological enquiry throughout this 
particular industrial sector, these types o f ethnographic studies, which have 
historically revealed so much about the complexities o f workplace dynamics have 
not been a feature. 
There are perhaps many and varied reasons which might explain why research 
has become influenced in this way. It is only recently that large-scale, rolling 
research, for example the JIWIS (Job Insecurity and Work Intensification Survey) 
funded by the Joseph Rowntree Foundation (Burchell et al., 2002), has become 
concerned with gaining an understanding of change from an individual 
perspective. Yet, even here, its aim has been tempered by a lingering precedent to 
also understand the 'big picture' (2002: introduction): 
... we embarked on a year-long survey o f the British Workforce... To 
do this we needed a methodology that would reflect the 'big picture* 
and still enable us to conduct detailed analyses of the microeconomic 
effects of job insecurity and work intensification. 
(Burchell et al., 2002: introduction). 
The practicality of my own research design was driven by an awareness that I had 
to assess which method, or methods, would generate the best data from which I 
would be able to make the most valid inferences and claims about employee 
experiences of change in Bank UK. Hammersley (1998: 62) suggests there can 
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only ever be one type of validity and that is the extent to which researchers' 
accounts can accurately represent the phenomena to which they refer. 
With the core aim of my research being the investigation of changing bank 
strategies at employee level, it was clear that I needed to 'get close' to 
respondents in similar ways to those of previous industrial ethnographers. I 
therefore decided to adopt comparable ethnographic research methods, which I 
hoped would allow me to gather the most valid and relevant data. Whilst there is 
no absolute consensus about what the term ethnography means (Hammersley and 
Atkinson, 1995), the ultimate goal of all research that utilises ethnographic 
techniques is to access and understand the dynamics of a particular culture from 
the inside. Such a research process can be understood as an attempt to read the 
social behaviour of othere semiotically - through a system of interrelated signs, 
symbols and language of social actors (Woodfield, 2000: 51-52). 
I decided that the most appropriate way to accurately represent the phenomena of 
change in Bank UK, was to retum to the 'bankfloor' for an extended period and 
use classic ethnographic research methods to record the day to day experiences of 
branch based staff, in an industry coming to terms with the collapse of 
monopolising cartels, deregulation of financial markets and improvements in 
delivery technology, rather than simply add to the multiplicity of generalist 
survey-type banking data (Emslie et al., 1999; Harley, 1999; Crompton and 
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Birkelund, 2000), or to recent studies overly concerned with techniques of 
management (Procter and Mueller, 2000; Pettinger, 1998). 
Access 
Once people come to know the researcher as a person who can be 
trusted to be discreet in handling information within the setting, and 
who will honour his or her promises of anonymity in publications, 
access may be granted that would earlier have been refused point 
blank. 
(Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995: 73). 
In contrast to most industrial ethnographers, 1 did not have to learn a trade in 
order gain access to the 'shop-floor' (Cavendish, 1982), feel it necessary to 
research covertly in an organisation where I was already a legitimate member 
(Holdaway, 1982), or base my research purely on observation (Pollert, 1981). 
Having accepted the opportunity to retrain as a cashier in Bank UK during the 
1990s, 1 found that 1 was able to trade access for usefulness, by using my ability 
to cashier as a currency of access'. 
' This was particularly apparent during interviewing sessions with staff after I had left the 6eld. 
Quite often I offered to cashier over a busy lunch period (when staffing levels were at their most 
critical), to persuade managers to allow me to interview staff during quieter morning or afternoon 
sessions. 
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Having asked Bank UK for long-term access at an early stage in my research 
design, I was approached by 'George'* (manager, West Town branch)^ in 
February 2000. He offered me the opportunity to undertake research at his branch 
if I would agree fill a long-term cashiering vacancy. Whilst I was delighted to 
receive this offer of extended access into the heart of the branch network, 1 used 
our opening exchanges to quickly assess whether West Town branch appeared a 
suitable site to generate data of sufficient volume, quality and depth by making 
enquiries about the size of the branch and the number of staff. Through George's 
honest responses I became satisfied with the potential of the site for the type of 
research I wanted to undertake. Once George had obviously established my 'semi-
insider' status to his satisfaction, his telephone manner changed fi^om being polite 
and authoritative, to relaxed and friendly. He admitted his branch was: 'T***ing 
busy", and that he found it difficult to recruit or retain staff due to its pressurised 
working environment (Research Diaiy, 16/2/00). He appeared totally unconcerned 
with the primary reason why I wanted to return to Bank UK, being more anxious 
to determine if I was experienced enough to do 'Number One' ,^ and whether I 
could be flexible enough with my hours to lock up with him at night^ . His only 
concems about my fieldwork were anonymity (on which I was able to reassure 
' See Appendix Three for respondent profiles. 
^ See Appendix Two for field site descriptions 
^ 'Number One' is the title given to the chief cashier who is given the day-to-day responsibility of 
running the counter. 
* Many of his staff had childcare commitments and had to leave at an appointed tmie, whether or 
not the cash had been put away and the branch was secure. 
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him), and the extent to which I thought my presence might impact on the day-to-
day operations of his branch. 
I was fully aware of the importance of these opening exchanges to my later 
successful socialisation in the branch network, the establishment of trust relations 
(Johnson, 1975: 50-51), and my ongoing relationship with George, who later 
assumed the roles of principal gatekeeper and key informant. At an early stage of 
my participant observation I realised that George was oflen asked to provide relief 
staff to other branches of Bank UK in the locality. By volunteering to be 
geographically flexible and offering to work in these altemative sites, I vvas able 
to legitimately enter and research in other branches, which meant not only was I 
was able to increase my number of respondents, I was also able to independently 
test early findings. Access was therefore not simply a matter of gaining 
pemiission to return to Bank UK, it remained multi-faceted and ongoing. 
The practicalities of data 2athering, 
In generating data, which 1 hoped would most accurately represent employee 
experience of change; I used a variety of classic ethnographic data gathering 
techniques, including participant observation, interviewing, the elicitation of life 
histories and the adoption of a key informant. As Brewer comments (2000: 11), 
ethnography is not a particular method of data collection but: "a certain style of 
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research distinguished by its objectives to understand the social meanings and 
activities of people in a given field or setting". Traditionally it encompasses: 
... some amount of genuinely social interaction in the field with the 
subjects of the study, some direct observation of relevant events, some 
formal and a great deal of informal interviewing, some systematic 
counting, some collection of documents and artefacts; and open-
endedness in the direction the study takes. 
(Fielding, 1995: 157). 
My principal method of data collection, like that of the industrial ethnographers 
referred to earlier, was participant observation'. In order to be in a position to 
explain events within the context in which they occurred, 1 adopted a 
quintessentially 'Chicago School - esque' ethnographic style, and went out and 
"got the seal of my pants dirty in real research" (Park, cited in Bulmer, 1984:97). 
By wearing the uniform and working alongside other branch based staff, 1 too 
endured continuous, unwarranted public rudeness and fi^equent, unpleasant male 
sexual advances as a response to the flirtatious expectations of selling^ - all 
simply part of doing business for Bank UK. 
' Gold (1958) distinguished four ideal type field roles: the complete participant, the participant-as-
observer, the observer-as-participant and the complete observer (Burgess. 1984: 80). Later in the 
chapter I discuss the overt nature of my participant observer role, but contend of the four types of 
roles identified by Gold, I was typically a participant-as-observer: *The participant-as-observer not 
only makes no secret of his investigation; he makes it known that research is his {sic) overriding 
interest." (Roy, 1970, cited in Burgess, 1984: 81). 
^ Chapter Four discusses issues of selling in greater depth, and explains the multitude of ways that 
staff were expected to engage with customers in sales banter. 
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Like the industrial ethnographers before me, I strove to integrate myself as a part 
of the social febric of all my research sites. In doing so, I adopted and 
continuously used the dual languages of both Bank UK', and the strong local 
colloquial language of the area. Both served not only to demarcate those inside 
and outside the organisational culture, but also those considered inside and 
outside local social culture. Because I did not have to unravel the complexities of 
insider lingo, I was in a position to understand what was being implied by staff 
who talked about varying aspects of change from individual or collective 
perspectives. Having previously worked for Bank UK, I was immediately placed 
in a position from which to empathise about wider aspects of change. However, it 
was impossible for me to know the extent of the impact that I had on the field 
(apart fiDm being another pair of hands during periods of acute staffing 
shortages), and to know how the conduct of my research altered the way people 
worked or thought (Scott, 1994: 38). In classic ethnographic style I cemented 
relationships with people in whose natural environment I was researching, and 
showed trust and understanding by using their language, speaking as they spoke 
and doing as they did (Brewer, 2000: 85). 
' The internal language of Bank UK is very distinctive, and the ability to use the Vight 
terminology' immediately places you as an 'insider*. Incomprehensible terminologies include: 
'long-dogs* (list of money handed out), *meat ticket' (voucher used to denote cash elements of 
credits), 'meat safe' (undercounter safe) and 'shorter' (balanced the till to the penny). 
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As a semi -'insider' to the organisation under study, problems of inference were 
to the most extent overcome. In contrast to those researching outside knowledge 
areas, 1 did not have to spend the early part of my fieldwork learning about the 
nuances of Bank UK, or trawl through noticeboards, analysing incidental details 
such as clothing, smell, noise, furniture etc. - small details that illuminate so 
much about the field under study (Parker, 2000: 236). My history with Bank UK 
meant that early days in the field were not solely concerned with the 
familiarisation of an unknown setting, and I was able to develop relationships 
with staff at a faster pace than initially expected. 
To capture 'hidden' data not apparent from the mere physical side of working, I 
also 'bitched' and gossiped in 'the ladies' - going backstage, and out of sight with 
members of the team, ridiculing both customers and senior management in a way 
that was inconsistent with the face to face treatment normally reserved for them 
(Goffman, 1959: 169). 1 also sat in various staff rooms (when time allowed) and 
joined others in the escapism of lunchtime *soaps' and dissemination of holiday 
brochures. Alongside my respondents, I endured relentless sales and service 
directives from Head Office, and subjected myself to the stresses involved in the 
achievement of individual weekly sales targets by participating in a variety of 
sales related activities, requiring a combination of both selling and flirting skills. 
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My primaiy methods of data collection - observation and interviewing, produced 
accounts containing a multiplicity of truths - some complementary, some 
contradictory, as respondents tried to make sense of their experiences. By getting 
close to respondents, I became inextricably drawn into workplace politics and 
found myself trying to sympathise with many individual respondents at vaiying 
times throughout my research. The advantage of such empathy was the amassing 
of a great deal of rich, thick material. However, the downside was that I had to 
ensure that this data (which carried a large degree of subjective emotion) did not 
begin to colour or bias analysis. 
A common criticism of ethnography is the extent to which inferences can be 
drawn fit}m a whole series of differing types of ethnographic data such as 
interviews, observation and participation. By using different methods to 
effectively corroborate findings, some form of methodological triangulation was 
necessary in order to improve the reliability of evidence generated by a single 
method (Silverman, 2000: 98-99). 
In order to capture the repetitious nature of the daily routine of work in Bank UK 
from which to begin to understand change, it was necessary for primary fieldwork 
sites to be researched on the basis of day return visits (Delamont et al., 2000: 23-
34). This meant that many of the sites were quite close in proximity and were often 
in neighbouring towns. However, aware that one major criticism of qualitative 
88 
studies is the trading of breadth for depth, I tested themes and trends emerging 
elsewhere by interviewing and observing staff over a week long period, in a branch 
of Bank UK some 300 miles distant from these primary research sites'. This not 
only helped to address criticisms of generalisability, but also offered an early 
opportunity to test preliminary findings^. The graph on the following page shows 
the periods (as counted by the number of days)^ I spent in each of my seven 
fieldwork sites'*. 
' This research was undertaken in North Town branch. See Appendbc Two for a full description. 
^ Space does not permit me to offer a detailed explanation of how access was negotiated into this 
geographically distant branch. Suffice it to say, I drew upon past working relationships to 
negotiate access into a branch of Bank UK located in central UK. 
^ For clarity 1 have not broken down the exact amount of hours spent researching in branches. If I 
was present in a branch on a particular day then I have counted it as a full day of research. 
^ Where no fieldwork was undertaken in branches during differing quarters, 'zeros' along the 
representative bars denote this. For example, during quarter two 2000, I undertook 6 days of 
research at Central Town branch, 20 days at South Town branch and 30 days al West Town 
branch. No fieldwork was undertaken at Harbour, Mine, North or Sea Town branches. 
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Fieldwork periods - at a glance 
1st Qtr 02 
4th Qtr 01 
3rd Qtr 01 
2nd Qtr 01 
2nd Qtr 00 
1st Qtr 00 
Central •Harbour DMine • North B S e a • South HWest 
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By using my unique currency of access I was able to exploit Bank UK's ongoing 
staffing crisis, to renegotiate a number of returns to the field in order to test 
emergent hypotheses. Thus, as my research progressed, data gathering moved 
fit)m an open methodology to one with a certain degree of closure. 
The basic data in this thesis are my field notes. I used a diary to capture everyday 
issues encountered in the workplace. Field notes were scribbled in an exercise 
book that i left in my locker in the ladies' toilets. Whenever I took any sort of 
break fit>m cashiering I ensured that I wrote down everything that had occurred 
during the latest session of work. It was not just a matter of recording anything 
considered out of the ordinary. Due to my previous knowledge of Bank UK 
procedures, 1 had to be increasingly reflexive, and take a step back to record 
everything, even if 1 would have nonnally considered it n^utine. 
Since my research was overt, I did not hide the fact that I was making notes, 
although if an individual did say something of a particularly sensitive nature, I 
made sure they would not be easily identifiable fi-om anything I wrote down, in 
case my notebook was lost, or read by an uninvited third party. If anything 
interesting occurred during the course of the day, and I was unable to leave the 
counter immediately to make notes, I scribbled on the reverse of anything that 
was immediately to hand - for example the reverse of cashiering stationery. 
However, I was aware of the continuous gaze of the security camera that recorded 
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all counter transactions, and sometimes I felt very uneasy putfing scribbled notes 
in my pocket - to the camera it may have looked as though I was doing something 
else. I therefore tried not to make too many notes whilst participating as a cashier, 
but relied upon extensive note making at other times. These notes were then fiilly 
transcribed every night in order to construct a longitudinal diary of my own, and 
others' experiences. As well as generating substantive notes about what occurred 
in the field, I also kept a set of methodological fieldnotes, which consisted of 
personal reflections on my activities in the field to aid reflexivity (Burgess, 1984: 
172). 
If I wanted to obtain a specific response to a particular event, for example, the 
introduction of specific sales oriented questions', [ made sure that respondents 
knew that I would be recording their responses in some manner, by always 
starting this type of questioning with: "For research purposes, can you tell me 
what you think to / about..." This was a deliberate tactic to occasionally remind 
colleagues that 1 was an active researcher for, despite my ongoing openness about 
my role, the dichotomy between overt and covert stances is not as straightforward 
as it is often held to be (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995: 47), and I think 
colleagues often forgot 1 was actively researching: 
' One week the cashiers were expected to open all their dialogue with customers with: "We are 
reviewing the services we provide to see if we can save them money. When would you like to 
book an appointment to see...r* (Research Diary, 8/8/00). 
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Even overt approaches have problems. Even overt has an inescapable 
covertness. Short of wearing a sign, ethnographers cannot signal v^en 
they are collecting data. In reality, overt and covert shade into each 
other - so most research combines 'delicate combinations' of overt 
and covert roles.' 
(1995: 159). 
Along with fieldnotes, data was gathered by a series of semi-structured interviews 
with branch staff during 2000 / 2001. The aim of these interviews was to 'get 
inside' the thoughts of individual respondents and tease out their experiences of 
change. Due to the excellent woricing relationships I had already established in the 
field, I did not think it necessary to ask respondents to complete preliminary 
interview questionnaires. Having been an integral part of their working lives for 
over five months, I decided that I had probably ieamt enough about their 
backgrounds during the course of normal, everyday conversation. A pre-test 
questionnaire could have fomialised what were fluid and dynamic relationships, 
and there seemed little point in adopting such a tool, if there was any suggestion 
of it leading to: "... scrappy research based on under-analysed data and an 
imprecise or theoretically indigestible research problem" (Silverman, 2000:99). 
Respondents were selected either by a personal request fi-om me to take part, e.g. 
new entrants, recently retired managers etc., or by the eagerness of others to talk. I 
made participation easier by arranging to interview in branches during working 
hours. Managers were not concerned about the practicalities of my interviews as 
long as their branches remained operationally effective and I understood that staff 
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could be called away at short notice to cover unexpected demands. In certain 
branches where staflSng levels were so critical and it was impossible to interview 
staff during normal working hours, I drew upon the camaraderie I had built up 
during fieldwork to interview staff during their lunch hours, which most were 
happy to agree to. Unfortunately, this meant that these interviews were somewhat 
restricted by time. However, by having to ensure that interviewing was completed 
within a specific period, I found that these respondents often 'got straight to the 
point', and did not prolong either our opening exchanges or later conversations. 
Interviews took place in private areas where the chances of distuibance were 
minimal - mainly in staff rooms or infrequently used manager's offices. I always 
made sure I reiterated my commitment to confidentiality at the start of each 
interview, and on every occasion reminded respondents that they were fi^e to 
terminate their interviews at any time. The interviews were tape-recorded and 
subsequently transcribed, with recordings destroyed after transcription. 
Respondents did not appear to mind being taped with regard to their actual 
interviews, and appeared more concerned with how they would sound on the 
recording (due to their strong regional accents), than about the sensitivity of their 
replies. 
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I used a series of skeletal, yet fundamental questions to tease out individual 
experiences of working practices in Bank UK. These questions had been 
formulated through a combination of an earlier analytical review of literature and 
deductively from my first intensive period of fieldwork during 2000. These initial 
questions did not really represent an agenda as such, but an aide memoire, which I 
used to ensure that similar topics were covered in all interviews (BuiTgess, 1995: 
108). By way of introduction I always asked respondents to describe their current 
roles within the organisation and the extent of change (if any), they had 
experienced over the past twelve months. If change had been a feature I explored 
the extent to which it had been successftilly implemented. Likewise, I always 
asked respondents if they found it possible to complete their work within their 
contracted day, or whether unpaid, excess hours had become a feature. The nature 
of individual responses meant that my second level of questioning was more 
personal, and drew on earlier answers for structure and orientation. After asking 
my core questions, I always gave respondents the opportunity to say anything at 
all they wanted about their jobs, or the way Bank UK was run in general. I also 
asked them to offer suggestions for improving their roles and predict the future 
for Bank UK ten years from now. This tactic proved extremely useful in 
generating passionate, unrehearsed answers.' Despite agreeing to undertake 
interviews, staff were certainly more relaxed once they thought the formal part of 
' Whilst responses to earlier questions were also unrehearsed, I sometimes felt that replies were 
often stilted and did not represent the true feelings of respondents, who may have expressed quite 
forceful opinions to me in private on earlier occasions. At no time did I ask if respondents were 
thinking of resigning, or asked why the still stayed in a job they may have haled. This may have 
increased tensions in the workplace, which may have resulted in the closure of access. 
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the interview was over. I often went to make them a cup of tea at this juncture, 
and due to the positioning of the kitchen appliances to the staff room ftimiture, 
this often meant I had my back to them. I gathered more personal 'straight fiiom 
the heart' data during these few minutes than 1 often did during the course of the 
more formal interview itself Perhaps respondents felt less threatened once I had 
walked away, which to them obviously signalled the end of the formal interview 
stage. These findings mirrored those of Hobson (1978: 80-81, cited in Oakley, 
1981), who commented: "When the interview ends, we talk and the women ask 
me questions... these questions often reflect areas where they have experienced 
ambivalent feelings about their own replies". 
Data collection and analysis were always approached as a seamless action. 
Analysis helped bring a semblance of onJer to the data, and shaped the 
organisation of four bursting A4 lever arch files into patterns, categories and 
descriptive units, whilst looking for relationships between them (Brewer, 2000: 
105). Analysis was undertaken sequentially, beginning as data was still being 
gathered. In between periods of observation I stepped back fi*om my data in order 
to reflect on its meaning. Hammersley and Atkinson (1995: 205) suggest such 
analysis occurs both formally and informally. Formally it takes shape in notes and 
memoranda; infonnally it is embodied in the ethnographer's ideas and hunches. In 
these ways data analysis feeds into research design and data collection. This 
iterative process is central to the 'grounded theorizing' approach (Glaser and 
Strauss, 1967) in which theory is developed out of data analysis, and where 
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subsequent data collection is guided by the emergent theory (Hammersley and 
Atkinson, 1995:205). A simplified model of this involves these three inter-related 
stages: 
• an initial attempt to develop categories which illuminate the data. 
• an attempt to 'saturate' these categories with many appropriate 
cases in order to demonstrate their relevance. 
• developing these categories into more general analytic frameworks 
with relevance outside the setting. 
(Silverman, 2000: 144). 
In essence, this is how my research was ordered and my analysis later developed. 
My own employment background within the financial services industry and the 
basing of two undergraduate projects in Bank U K suggested the potential of the 
field for further study. Concepts for future research were assisted by an increasing 
familiarisation with existing industrial monographs (mainly based within the 
manufacturing sector)', which exposed similarities with the revisions I had 
experienced in the ordering and organisation of work in Bank UK For example, I 
had increasingly found myself sympathising with Linhart (1981) who revealed 
how time had become a precious commodity which compelled employees to work 
through their breaks to catch up if they were falling behind (1981: 50), with 
Cavendish (1982) who had experienced increasing working pace intensit>': "There 
E.g. Delbridge (1998). Westwood (1984), Cavendish (1982), Linhart (198), Beynon (1978). 
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was no time to slow down or do anything at 'nonmal' pace. It took me ages to 
relax after work." and with Delbridge (1998: 143) whose research revealed even 
in 'Japanese' transplants: "The whole day was fraught with an almost constant 
need for fire-fighting just to keep things running". 
Whilst the retail banking industry may not have been specifically 'Japanised' in 
the same way as the manufacturing industry, many of its new working systems, 
e.g. the growth of teamworking and an increasingly numerically and fiinctionally 
flexible workforce certainly appear to have their origins in systems of work akin 
to those considered Japanese in orientation. I developed these concepts into early 
categories for research, which drew upon my own experience of work in Bank 
UK and the key themes apparent fix)m my investigation of existing research: the 
rise in the importance of the consumer, issues of health, the adoption of 
'Japanese' methods of working and the fliture of banking. My fieldwork then 
saturated the categories with appropriate cases to demonstrate their relevance and 
develop them into more general analytic fiumeworks, which I have used as the 
basis of enquiry in Chapters Three, Four and Five. 
The ordering and storage of vast quantities of differing types of data (interview 
transcripts fieldnotes, memoranda, observations etc.) were assisted by the use of 
NUDIST software, which was useflil in searching for commonalities, in the fonn 
of links between them. In no sense was the software used to drive analysis. 
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Ethical Issues. 
In accordance with the British Sociological Association's guidelines on harm, 
privacy and informed consent, which assert: ".. . as far as possible sociological 
research should be based upon the freely given informed consent of those studied" 
(BSA, 1992: 704), 1 was respectful of the need to be open and honest with staff 
about my research activities. This was a key to maintaining a professional and 
social camaraderie, which allowed ongoing discussions of issues and work related 
problems in an 'office banter' style in my day to day interactions with staff. The 
practicalities of undertaking ethnographic research within a large organisation 
such as Bank UK, vnih shifting personnel dictated that informed consent be 
obtained on a daily basis through ongoing openness about my role. A higher 
ethical level was provided by Bank UK's own duty of confidentiality, (adherence 
to which was mandatoiy, with violations being punishable by expulsion from the 
organisation and possible prosecution). 
Given the sensitive nature of the data collected, it has been necessary to ensure 
the anonymity of respondents and locations of field work in all reports of research. 
Names and locations of work have been changed, but as fer as possible 
respondents' ages and backgrounds remain true. It has also been necessary to 
slightly amend some of Bank UK's internal terminology to keep the identity of 
the organisation secret. 
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Withdrawal from the field. 
In common with all social research 1 eventually had to exit the field. The timing 
of my withdrawal was not detemiined by closure of access, but by constraints 
imposed on doctoral research in completing data analysis and starting the process 
of producing written reports. However, my exit turned out to be the hardest part of 
the continuum of access negotiations. Exit has two meanings in social research 
(Berg, 1998: 153, cited in Brewer, 2000: 101): the physical removal fiom the i5eld 
and the emotional disengagement from the relationships established there - the 
former being mechanical and simple and the latter more diflficult. Whilst I needed 
to withdraw in order to undertake detailed data analysis and commence writing 
up, I also wanted to leave the door ajar for later return, in case further access was 
required: 
Most ethnographers... must organize leaving the field, and this is not 
always a straightforward matter. Like all other aspects of field 
relations it usually has to be negotiated. Indeed sometimes participants 
are reluctant to let the researcher go 
(Hammersley and Atkinson, 1995: 121). 
Knowing that staffing levels in Bank U K were critical, I was able to exit the field, 
yet by offering to help when branches found themselves needing extra staff, I was 
able to leave my access fluid and ongoing. During 2001 I negotiated an ongoing 
weekly return to the field by agreeing to cover an unfilled cashiering position at 
South Town branch on a one-day a week basis. This continued until November 
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2001 when branch managers were stripped of their individual autonomy to 
employ 'casual' help due to cost, (a focus of the following chapter), which 
rendered occasional return visits to the field more difficult. However, by mostly 
returning to the field when extra help was required in branches, I clearly 
experienced working situations which were perhaps busier than most, and I had to 
be careful to ensure that data gathered here was not affected by a biased picture of 
working intensity directly resultant from staff absences. During June 2002,1 was 
asked to return to Bank U K for three months to undertake what was described as 
"backfill", which entailed covering cashiering jobs during periods of acute staff 
shortages. This allowed me to return to the field for one day a week during the 
final stages of my writing up and offered an unexpected opportunity to ensure my 
final analyses accurately represented the realities of day-to-day working in Bank 
UK. 
Aware of the criticism that: "Qualitative researchers, they say, face a 
'representational crisis', since research texts can no longer be assumed capable of 
capturing lived experience in the way once thought possible..." (Scale, 1999:2), I 
would have welcomed the opportunity to incorporate other ethnographic research 
methods within my investigation. However, the use of photographs (Bolton et al., 
2001; Wolkowitz, 2001), video (Price 2001) or audio recordings (MacDonald and 
Syrad, 2001) would have rendered Bank UK and my field sites too easily 
identifiable, thus breaking earlier promises of anonymity. 
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Having explained the background to my research and the methods I have used to 
generate my data, the remainder of my thesis comprises a trilogy of chapters, 
which assess employee experiences of change. The first of these examines how 
issues of cost appeared to constrain the successfijl implementation of revised 
working strategies in Bank UK. 
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3. Leaning (on) the selling culture? Issues of *cost* 
in Bank UK. 
This chapter does not simply overview the profound changes to working practices 
in Bank U K as evidenced in my fieldwork and subsequent data analysis. Nor is it 
overly concerned with offering a detailed understanding of the ways in which the 
application of new, technologically driven delivery channels have facilitated the 
centralisation and automation of a whole series of seemingly mundane processing 
roles. (This is not to say that the importance of technological advancement will be 
ignored, for it certainly appears to have been the key driver in the physical and 
often geographical separation of 'fiont' and 'back office' work). What it does 
offer is a discussion of the multiple dimensions of cost issues in Bank U K , which 
have inductively emerged from fieldwork analysis. 
Bank UK's expectation of its employees has clearly become more complex over 
the last decade. Branch based jobs often appear at face value to have become 
narrower in scope, increasingly routinised and less skilled', yet these same front-
line roles now require individuals not only to retain their more traditional banking 
competences of numeracy and accuracy, but also become increasingly familiar 
' There has been a considerable sociological debate about the concept of 'skilP. Labour 
economists see skill as the property of an individual, and composed of education, training and 
competence (Phillips and Taylor, 1980, cited in Francis and Penn, 1994: 223). Industrial 
sociologists regard skill as an aspect of jobs themselves, derived from imperatives of industrial 
and technological organisation, without much attention given to the relation between the skill of 
Jobs and the skill of the individual (Braverman, 1974). 
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with a wide range of complex banking products. Indeed Bank U K now demands 
the active marketisation of its financial products through the evolution of'fix)nt 
line' branch roles, e.g. cashiering and customer services into aggressive sales 
functions, where stafiF are expected to continuously meet stretching weekly sales 
targets. As an ever-increasing proportion of their salaries become linked with both 
individual and national sales achievement, both remuneration and the expectation 
of a secure 'job' have become progressively more at risk. 
Despite the influence of the five key thematic priorities in shaping much existing 
research within the financial service sector (see Chapter Two), my research 
suggests that one common theme appears to transcend them all - 'change'. The 
concept of change is not fixed for it has many meanings. The Oxford English 
Dictionary's definition gives many examples of its different usage: take or use 
another instead, give up, get rid of, make different, exchange, go from one to 
another, arrive at a fi^sh phase or change from one system or situation to another 
etc. Change has been a continuous feature of the banking industry for many years, 
but the past decade has witnessed a whole gamut of revolutionary transformations 
not only to the traditional branch network, but in ways of working, the dramatic 
downsizing of workforces, the adoption of an aggressive sales ethos, and a shift 
towards the temporisation of employment contracts. 
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hi order to try and understand why these changes have occurred, sociologists and 
other industrial researchers have become drawn into debates surrounding the 
organisation and management of work (Ritzer, 1996; Brown, 1997; Danford, 
I999;BurcheII et al., 2001). As discussed in Chapter One, organisations have had 
to adopt new ways of woricing in order to continue to grow their businesses within 
increasingly competitive marketplaces. To ensure survival, it has been necessary 
to change attitudes towards both work organisation and profit generation. 
Whatever their main concern, the overarching aim of these revisions has been a 
tangible improvement to both organisational and individual output in terms of 
cost of production and quality of product. 
Concerns about product quality and profit maximisation have become associated 
with discourses surrounding Japanese-style working practices - distinctive 
systems of working, which have become firmly embedded within most 
organisational cultures. It remains an unanswered question within management 
theory whether organisations have looked to the specific philosophies embedded 
within Japanese-style methods of working, e.g. tight labour discipline, increased 
output and enhanced worker flexibility, to solve theircontempora/y organisational 
requirements, or whether new modus operandi merely resemble forms of Japanese 
working through systems which have simply been termed "disaggregated 
Japanisation" (Elger and Smith, 1994: 38). 
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hi this chapter 1 have used data fix)m my fieldwork to illustrate the various 
challenges that Bank UK's branch based staff have met in the unprecedented 
amount of change to their more traditional ways of working. For clarity I have 
chosen to appraise these challenges as though they were concrete examples of a 
particular style of working, e.g. T Q M , H R M , JIT etc., but remain unconvinced 
whether new ways of working have been specifically adopted as 'Just-in-Time' 
working etc. by the management of Bank U K , or whether the practical 
applications of JIT merely resemble ways of working now considered 'Japanese' 
in orientation. In other words have 'Japanese' methods of worker management 
actively spawned these new ways of working or have new ways of working 
merely been labelled in this fashion for convenience? 
My data suggest that multiple examples of'Japanese-style' working practices can 
be found within Bank UK. However, rather than refer to every example in a 
superficial and monotonous fashion, I have chosen to concentrate upon analysing 
how the increasing adoption of, and preoccupation with, lean production systems, 
i.e. cost, within the organisation suggests an engagement with management 
philosophies which have been specifically employed to reduce cost, improve 
business performance and increase shareholder profit. However, before launching 
into this discussion I feel that it is necessary to explain via a brief sub-chapter, 
what is happening now in terms of management philosophy and organisational 
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management in Bank U K in order to provide a general background setting fit)m 
which cost driven changes may be better understood. 
• The Management of Organisation and the Organisation of 
Management. 
Over the years, *the organisation' had become synonymous with a strict 
bureaucratic regime. It offered workers clearly visible career ladders and life-long 
employment within a pyramidal, albeit patemalistic organisational structure. 
However, increasing competitive pressures and the facilitation of new, cost-driven 
ways of working brought inevitable changes to its management and organisational 
fiumework (Collins, 1998). Such changes have involved outsourcing, downsizing, 
delayering and lean production (Sennett, 1999), and the organisation has found 
itself transformed fi-om a neat, ordered structure into a kaleidoscopic mass of 
fission and fiision (Pahl, 1995:3). 
Twenty years ago banks were similar bureaucratic institutions offering lifetime 
employment, structured careers and patemalistic, welfare-oriented personnel 
policies (Storey et al., 1999: 129). Somewhat slowly they have responded to 
deregulation, privatisation, technological change and increasing levels of 
competition within newly deregulated global financial markets, which have 
necessitated their complete structural and organisational overhaul into highly 
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flexible organisations (Bathe et al., 1999: 3), oflFering an archipelago of related 
services (Sennett, 1999:23). 
The re-engineering of the banking organisation has resulted in a move away from 
a vertical axis concerned with divisions of production and internal bureaucracy, to 
a horizontal axis servicing the needs of its customers (Grint, 1998: 304-5). Face 
to face customer service is now operated through a leaner branch network, where 
individual teams (branches) have supposedly been given greater operational 
autonomy through the rhetoric of Total Quality Management (TQM) - a style of 
management which facilitates greater employee empowerment through problem 
solving and individual responsibility for improving goods and services (Harley, 
1999:43): 
Empowerment has been promoted by most as a policy, which will 
contribute to a new kind of organisation where both employees and 
employers work together to produce profits while all benefit from a 
better quality working life. The ethos behind empowerment is that no 
one knows a job better than the person who does it... by allowing 
those who are most knowledgeable to make decisions on the day-to-
day issues surrounding their jobs, the organization becomes more 
efficient. 
(Denham etal., 1997: 147). 
Team working has become the key buzzword, and group norms represent 
collective solutions to daily routines. A team is defined as: "A small number of 
people with complementary skills who are committed to a common purpose and 
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performance goals... for which they hold themselves mutually accountable" 
(Katzenbach and Smith, 1993, cited in Armstrong, 1996: 300). Team norms go 
beyond the instructions of management. They engender a way of working and 
internally police time wasting, scrounging and cheating (Argyle, 1989: 120-1). 
They also reinforce team intentions to pursue a common purpose irrespective of 
the individual agendas of constituent members (Armstrong, 1996: 300). Despite 
their aura of solidarity, bureaucracy within teams still exists. A leader is still 
needed and however he or she is chosen, will continue to have the most influence 
in decisions about issues such as rate of work, allocation of work, and methods of 
working (Argyle, 1989: 139). 
In Bank U K the notion of employee empowerment can be seen in practical terms 
through the introduction of daily 'scrum' activity (Kaizeny prior to opening 
branches to the public at 9.00am. These scrums sought to engage all staff in the 
discussion of operational problems, successes and best practices. However, with 
Just-in-Time working delivering staff to the production process at the very point 
at which they are needed, many were not present in branches for scrum activity at 
8.45am. Thus the potential for those staff employed on a variety of part-time 
working arrangements to become empowered through Kaizen activity appeared 
non-existent: 
' 'Scrum* is not employed here in a traditional sense. Staff do not link arms in a closed circle, but 
sit on chairs or lean on the edge of desks listening to what their manager has to say. See Appendix 
One for a fuller description. 
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I'm a part-time cashier, covering core hours... Mondays and Fridays I 
do 9.45 till 4.45, Tuesdays I do 12.45 till 3.45, and Thursdays I do 
11.30 till 2.30. They have just changed this week, and now I have 
Wednesdays off. 
(Wanda, Cashier, West Town branch, 5/12/00). 
Despite such daily scrum activity and a longer scrum session once a week when 
branches remain closed until 9.30am, data suggest that far Grom being 
empowering, this incentive simply represented an opportunity for both regional 
and boardroom level directives to be cascaded to staff under a myth of 
empowerment (Harley, 1999), and most mornings it is just too much of a rush to 
undertake scrum activity as prescribed. It is not uncommon for cashiers to be 
unlocking the fills and getting ready for opening whilst listening to what was 
going on at some distance fix)m the actual proceedings: 
Morning started with another 5 minutes sales meeting - meaning that 
we could not get our opening procedures completed property and on 
time. George said that these meetings would now be called scrums. 
There were many derisory comments: "Does that mean I have to feel 
you up every morning George?" Jane and I were doing the night safes 
whilst he was talking and because we weren't actually looking at him 
he asked: "Is anyone listening"? "Yes" "Good, just checking" 
(Research Diary, 26/6/00). 
The adoption of Total Quality Management (TQM) has meant that employees 
have had to adopt a customer ethos with regard to their colleagues 'downstream', 
who are now expected to create a fuss if the internal servicing they receive is not 
up to scratch (Danford, 1999:33). However, such changes to the management and 
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organisation of Bank U K have not been contested in a vacuum. Managers have 
become key facilitators of change, and their own reorganisation has been central 
to the overall ambitions of Bank UK. 
• Management Philosophv in Bank UK. 
... managers are seen as agents of senior management who must 
introduce new policies to a cynical workforce while facing fears o f 
redundancy and loss of power. The success or otherwise of 
empowerment relies on line (middle) management attitudes and 
behaviour. They are located at 'the interface of the management 
control system' and shopfloor- translating plans / policies into action 
(Denham et al., 1997: 147-148). 
There is a considerable body of literature, which has examined how the concept of 
'a manager' has changed over time (Millward et al., 2000; Mason, 2000; 
Pettinger, 1998). Feminists have also contributed to this debate through an 
appraisal of managerial opportunities for women, whom they claimed have tried 
to achieve some semblance of satisfaction from a reduction in promotional 
opportunities, notwithstanding the rhetoric of equal opportunity legislation 
(Halford et al., 1997; Davidson and Cooper, 1992; Cockbum, 1991). Unfettered 
equality of opportunity continues to be elusive. Where women have entered jobs 
with a strong history of gendering, they have found that men, fearful of a 
contagious effeminacy have left occupations as fast as women have entered them 
- a phenomenon described by Probert and Wilson (1993: 11), as "tupping". Apart 
from the fortnight I was granted access into Sea Town branch, where tw^ o women 
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job-shared the managerial position on a week-in, week-out basis, the main bulk of 
my research was undertaken in branches where a male manager was in situ, thus 
the following discussion of the organisation of management in Bank U K positions 
a male manager as 'the norm'. 
One major problem feeing Bank U K in attempting to deliver revised managerial 
philosophies is that there is no fixed definition of 'a manager', or bank-wide 
agreement as to their level of autonomy or their fieedom to challenge various 
Head OflBce initiatives. Whilst the persona of 'bank manager' has changed 
considerably over the last decade, public perception of their role appears to vary. 
Paradoxically, "... they do not have as much status as they used to. In a 
community the accountant, the solicitor and the bank manager were all looked up 
to." (Lionel, Manager, South Town branch, 25/10/00), however: 
If you talk to anyone down the pub, they all think you go and play golf 
3 times a week, you have a 3-hour lunch break every day and you 
finish work at 3.30pm! That's the old way of thinking, but I am here at 
least 10 hours a day eveiy week in the unit, then doing work at home, 
and I'm only paid for 35 hours a week... the people who have got to 
be branch managers don't tend to look at the clock and at 5pm go 
home! They just do what they have to do to improve the fijncfionality 
of the branch, achieve targets, improve morale, or whatever to be 
successful. 
(Barry, Manager, North Town branch, 15/2/01). 
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By its very nature, 'management' does not fit comfortably with the notion of 
Taylorist measured work systems demanded of modem workplace: 
. . . how do you measure the output of a manager? It is just too 
embarrassing to hook them up to bells, buzzers and keyboards. How 
can we check a managerial eflHciency when a manager's product is 
usually intangible? I f the job of a secretary can be enumerated and 
monitored then the Company must be able to standardise the 
mysterious job of managing. 
(Gareon, 1988: 176). 
In its pursuit to become increasingly retail oriented, Bank LTK has been able to 
introduce some tangible measurement of managerial contribution by the 
imposition of weekly bi^ anch sales targets. Managers are now not only expected to 
be the central figureheads in driving through change in Bank UK, but also must 
consistently inspire their branches to meet sales targets set by Head OflBce. These 
roles appear to be contradictory. On one hand they have had conferred on them 
the responsibility of ensuring that performance management - a means o f getting 
better results from both the organisation, teams and individuals (Armstrong, 1996: 
260) is rolled out across the network, yet the way in which performance 
management is expected to be managed has become increasingly prescribed by 
Head Office, with managers exposed to a plethora of checking regimes to ensure 
they are delivering in the correct manner'. 
' During my research, it became increasingly common for clerical staff to be randomly telephoned 
in their branches by representatives of Regional Management to check that new incentives and 
sales dialogues had been cascaded in a 'correct manner*. 
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Throughout my research, the way in which managers were subjected to ongoing 
scrutiny became more intense. Weekly sales targets (based on a points system for 
every product sold) were rolled out across Bank U K . Individual branch 
achievements had to be telephoned through to regional management every Friday 
afternoon. Managers fiom branches who had not met their weekly target for 
whatever reason (slow footflow', unexpected absences of staff etc.) were 
subjected to a humiliating telephone conversation with regional management the 
following Monday where they were expected to outline their plans to make up 
any shortfall during the forthcoming week: 
You might have done 260 per cent for the past ten weeks, but the 
minute your branch drops below 130 per cent, you have to join a 
telephone conference call on Monday to have a bollocking fiom 
regional management that is far from motivational. 
(George, Manager, South Town branch, 2/6/01). 
Desperate to avoid the "ritual humiliation of the Monday moming slagging off', 
(Tim, Manager, West Town branch, 1/6/01), it appeared to be a common practice 
for managers to surreptitiously 'sandbag figures' i.e. hold any surplus points over 
to the following week to ensure consistent results, and mitigate unforeseen 
disasters. Such fiddling and manipulation of results indicated that managers still 
manage to retain some discretionary autonomy over work organisation (Mars, 
' Footflow = number of customers entering the branch during a given timescale i.e. per day / per 
week etc. 
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1994; Knights and McCabe, 2000: 421), despite their strong denials to the 
contrary: 
1 haven't done that [hold over surplus points], but I would be very 
surprised if branches didn't do that, and I can think of one branch that 
did not hit target in the third quarter, but had a fantastic week in the 
fourth quarter. I deliberately looked to see how that had come about, 
and yes! I am sure that was happening. 
(Lionel, Manager, South Town branch, 25/10/00). 
During the first half of 2001, South Town branch achieved the prestige of being 
the best performing branch in the geographical region of my research. Three of its 
staff were honoured by their inclusion in Bank UK's "achievers week", held in a 
5-star hotel in a fashionable Italian resort'. During the week they were absent in 
Italy, George (South Town's Manager) had to operate the branch with just himself 
and two other staff. Clearly it was all they could do to "fire-fight" the situation 
(Delbridge, 1998: 143), and despite their best efforts they did not achieve their 
expected sales targets. It was not enough that South Town branch had been the 
best performing branch in the region - it had to stay that way, and George had to 
undergo the humiliation of "a bolIockJng fi-om regional office" despite his 
operational difficulties: 
' Due to the need for South Town to continue to be flilly operational only 3 'achievers' places had 
been allocated to the branch despite having a staff establishment in excess of 5.5, and stafThad 
been asked to decide amongst themselves who the attendees should be. 
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You have no opportunity to put your side ofthe argument you just have 
to listen. In the end I put the phone down on my desk and went to do 
some photocopying, and kept making sure that he [regional manager] 
was still talking. 
(George, 2/6/01). 
In order to spur their staff into accepting the new sales culture, branch managers 
were increasingly expected to spend a greater proportion of their day identifying 
and closing sales opportunities at the expense oftheir more traditional sanctioning 
and checking duties. They were expected to make a radical shift from archetypal 
Western specialised expert, to a much more Japanese-style generalist ( L a Bier, 
1986: 222). Their primary role transformation from "prescriber and technical 
expert" to that of "a coach" (Denham et al., 1997: 148), had cleariy been 
unsettling: 
The job that the bank wants me to do and the job I want to do are two 
completely different things. The job that the bank wants me to do is 
that of sales and service manager. The job 1 would like to do is to 
retain the old ways of working with customers... The job of a 
manager... I think it changes over time, and it can change within the 
time such as a shorter period of a month... You are now an integral 
member of the workforce, so you spend a lot of time on the till, and a 
lot of time on the front desk, a lot of time seeing customers... when I 
am on the till I get people who are surprised to see me on there... but 
there is nobody else. 
(George, Manager, West Town branch, 5/12/00). 
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In order to fully understand the effects of changing bank strategies fiom a 
managerial perspective, I asked George' to take on the role of key informant. As it 
transpired, his monologue of how he had personally experienced the continuous 
reorganisation of his managerial duties during 2000 was truly astonishing. To 
gather data of such depth was only possible through careful and skilfully 
negotiated questioning, which uncovered the driving forces behind his seemingly 
random acts, e.g. antagonising his workforce by allocating jobs to staff who 
clearly did not want to do them. What follows is a precis of his experiences of 
occupying a managerial role in Bank U K during 2000. 
In December 1999, George had been managing Bank UK's South Town^ branch 
for over 3 years. Under his leadership the branch had soon earned itself the 
reputation of being one of the best performing branches in its geographical region, 
offering excellent customer service and achieving high yield sales under a retail 
regime, which at the time was very much secondary to Bank U K ' s traditional 
banking culture. Under the auspices of ensuring that they had the right man [sic] 
in the right job, all Bank UK's branch managers were forced to re-apply for their 
own jobs at the end of 1999. This Head Office initiative also meant that as 
existing managerial appointments were terminated, new terms and conditions 
See Appendix Three for individual profiles. 
See Appendix Two for a fuller description of field sites. 
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could be imposed - namely increasing the percentage of individual salaiy that was 
to be subject to performance, i.e. - at risk (Armstrong, 1996: 6)'. 
George thought himself'Very lucky" that, aged 43, he was not "one of the ones 
chosen to go on the surplus list"^ and was in fact offered what was a semi-
promotion, to become the manager of West Town branch, which had a larger staff 
establishment and customer base. Despite increasing his responsibilities, George 
was retained on his existing managerial grade and salaiy. However, he faced his 
biggest hurdle at the start of his newtenureship when he was asked to dismiss two 
long-serving members of staff at West Town - Bob and Kathleen. Bob, (50) was 
"queuing up for his brown envelope", but Kathleen (45), who was the "branch 
queen bee", did not want to go. She "had been in the branch so long that she knew 
all the customers and all the procedures". Her problem was that "she did not want 
to have anything to do with the new selling culture". George had also been 
instructed to scrutinise all staff contracts, and identify where cost savings could 
be made. In response to his submission, he was asked to oversee "substantial 
changes to part-timers' hours to fit in with branch footflow". Unbeknown to him, 
he asked Wanda to reduce her hours the same week that her husband was made 
' A more detailed examination of these new contracts is offered in later chapters. 
^ Whilst not being made redundant per se, to be placed on the 'surplus list' was tantamount to 
being dismissed. Staff saw the as scheme blatantly placing surplus staff in branches which were 
usually some distance from where they lived, to do a job that was beneath their current grading, in 
the hope that they would soon become disenchanted and leave Bank UK of their own volition, 
without the need for expensive redundancy payments. Some might say these actions bordered 
upon constructive dismissal. 
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redundant, which "only added to the bubbling staff discontent, which really is still 
going on twelve months later '^ (George, 4/6/01). 
His staffing problems were further compounded by the fact that that West Town 
branch experienced a very heavy footflow, and suffered from a long-standing 
problem of being unable to recruit or retain staflf of the right calibre, due to its 
extremely pressurised working environment. 
Into this unhappy working environment George had been expected to introduce 
and engender a new sales oriented banking philosophy. A philosophy reliant upon 
the fostering of excellent relationships between customers, management and staff. 
George attributed the loss of Kathleen as a pivotal factor in his failure to engender 
good staff / customer relationships at this crucial time. Customers appeared 
extremely concerned that a familiar face on the counter was suddenly missing. 
Other staff, who had been adversely affected by changes to their working hours, 
appeared only too happy to gleeftilly inform customers that Kathleen had been 
sacked. "A scenario which was fer from true, but which obviously suited them to 
say it" (George, 2/6/01). 
I asked George why he appeared to have done so little to stem this cycle of 
discontent from spiralling out of control. Why had he not insisted that the main 
protagonists be split up and sent to other branches in the region, and replaced with 
staff who were willing to embrace the new sales philosophy and teamworking 
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mentality? It appeared that "a gentleman's agreemenf existed between branch 
managers, and if "a branch ain't broke don't fix it" - i.e. high performing 
branches would not expected to transfer better performing staff into low 
performing branches in order to boost their performance as " . . . the bank could 
end up with all branches not performing" (George, 5/6/01). George was keen to 
attribute many of the failures of West Town branch to the mental attitudes of his 
part-time cashiers whom he saw as occupying a pivotal role at the interface 
between Bank U K and its customers. Single, and childless himself, George 
obviously could not comprehend the attitude of his cashiers towards their work: 
They appear to have lost all their personal aspirafions now that they 
have had their children. Whilst their families are obviously very 
important to them, I am scared that they appear to have become the 
most important factor over-riding everything else - there is no happy 
medium. They are not interested in doing anything else other then 
cashiering and won't take the opportunity to do anything else even if I 
hand it to them on a plate. 
(George, 2/6/01). 
George found that he was how having to spend most of his working day dealing 
with staffing issues rather than with selling. Recognising the substanfial 
underperformance of certain members of his staff he had approached Lesley 
(Area Manager) with a view to commencing fonmal warning procedures. She had 
reftjsed to sanction his request, commenting that the bank was: "leaking staff like 
a sieve at the moment and needed staff, however poor their performance might 
be", leaving George to surmise: "we needed their bums on seats more than their 
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bums appeared to need the seats"(George, 2/6/01). What had happened to 
George's increased empowerment here? It is clear from this data that for George: 
decentralization does not necessarily entail increased autonomy for 
workplace managers. Corporations have evolved forms of central 
control within which devolved managerial powers operate with a 
view to maintaining what has been described as 'the co-existence of 
firm central direction and maximum individual autonomy' (Peters and 
Waterman 1982: 318). . . . controls severely the limit the power of 
local managers to act unilaterally, even in highly decentralized 
management structures (Purcell and Gray 1986; Marginson et al. 
1993). This has led some to conclude that 'much of the 
decentralization that has taken place in an "illusion". Things may 
appear to "happen" at local level, but they are not decided there' 
(Stoiyand Sisson 1993). 
(Millwaixl etal.,2000: 78). 
At the end of our interview sessions, George revealed that due to the feilure of 
West Town branch to achieve its targets during 2000, he had been subjected to 
formal warning procedures and placed on written report for non-performance. He 
was quite philosophical about the fact that only managers, and not clerical staff 
were managed by the "fear factor", which he viewed as "bullying", despite the 
claims of Bank U K memoranda, which outlined the group's policy on dignity at 
work: "Bank U K Group regards bullying and harassment of any kind and every 
kind as wholly unacceptable" (Bank U K Head Office Memo: 'Fairness, 
consistency and clarity for all', June 2001). 
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Branch managers were re-shuffled again in December 2000, and George was 
clearly delighted to have been asked to return to South Town branch: "to the team 
that I had spent a couple of years hand-picking and selecting" (5/6/01). Under his 
leadership, which was no different to the style I witnessed at West Town, South 
Town branch continued to thrive, and much to George's obvious delight achieved 
the status of best performing branch in the region for the six-months ending June 
2001. 
George attributed much of South Town's success to its uniqueness*. Its two full-
time, and four part-time staff worked together as a harmonious team, and, having 
tasted sales success in 2000, were doubly encouraged to succeed again. At South 
Town, he did not need to manage in the traditional sense (take charge, take 
control etc.). His working day was no longer controlled by managing his team, but 
by listening to his staff who always appeared to have suggestions for improving 
service and increasing selling opportunities. 
This sub-chapter has examined changing bank strategies at the level of the 
management of organisation, and the organisation of management in Bank UK. It 
has endeavoured to answer criticism by Collins (1998) that most accounts of 
' George could not expand on what he meant by this, other than the fact that all staff at South 
Town were eager and willing to embrace new ways of working. On his return, he had clearly set 
out how many part-time hours were available, and his staff had decided amongst themselves who 
would work what hours and when. He was happy for them to do this as he knew that they could all 
work to a very high standard, and by arranging hours to suit each other he hoped there would be 
fewer problems with childcare. A Katened team in operation? 
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management tell little about the nature of management, the conditions 
underpinning the adoption of certain management models or the macro and 
micro-political forces that have caused the organisation of management to rapidly 
change (1998:9). 
The flattening of Bank UK's organisational hierarchy and the subsequent 
devolution of power to branch managers appeared to be a sham, with managers 
seemingly more controlled than ever. Managers appeared to be no longer 
'managers', merely facilitators - consummate bureaucrats, having little autonomy 
over what needs to be done and simply following rules (Ritzer, 1996: 109): 
You have very little control over the environment in a branch, it's 
basically you ticking boxes and following procedure and .. . the 
problems of being a manager is that you are not just a manager, you 
are a member of staff, and you have to constantly chose 'do 1 go on the 
till?', 'Do I answer this enquiry'?, 'Do I get on with my branch 
training plan'? And those sorts of issues are slightly more managerial. 
(Eric, Manager, Harbour Town branch, 25/10/00). 
The successftil adoption of lean production techniques may depend upon staff co-
operation and teamworking - but the actual experience of managers' in Bank U K 
is of work intensification, stress, fear and insecurity - the continuation of 
antagonistic working relations inherited fi-om conventional Taylorist work 
organisation (Danford, 1999: 185): 
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The rhetoric may be one of 'worker empowerment', 'employee 
participation' and 'involvement', but the prime objective remains the 
more efficient production . . . . And more effective management control. 
Employees are charged with greater responsibility, but this does not 
imply worker control or autonomous teamworking, still less industrial 
democracy. 
(Blyton and Tumbull, 1998: 220). 
Despite the rhetoric of greater managerial autonomy, data analysis suggest that 
'branch management' has become an 'empty' role, devoid of all major 
responsibilities, yet it is clearly crucial to the successful implementation of a 
selling culture throughout Bank UK. Now that the background has been laid, the 
remainder of this chapter concentrates on assessing how employees of Bank U K 
have met, contested and experienced the new sales culture. 
The Selling Culture. 
One of the biggest problems to fece Bank UK over recent years has clearly been 
operational cost. As cost / income ratios' have become primary economic 
indicators of the financial health of an organisation, the bank has come under 
substantial market, economic and shareholder pressures to reduce operating costs. 
Issues of cost have therefore permeated throughout all levels of the bank, from the 
' The cost income ratio is a classic economic indicator, which shows the cost per unit of income 
(generally expressed in £ in the UK) that is spent on staff related business expenses in generating 
that unit of profit, and has become an increasingly important economic indicator of organisational 
performance. In June 2000. Bank UK's cost income ratio had reduced from 60 per cent the 
previous year to 55.7 per cent This reduction had primarily been achieved through a reduction of 
4000 in staif numbers, and a subsequent reduction in staff costs of £24 million. 
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maintenance of its massive branch infi^structure to decisions about whether or not 
an individual branch can afford to pay a part-time cashier to work for an 
additional 30 minutes on a busier than expected day: 
... at the end of the day staff wages are paid fiDm income and profits 
and you only get profits if you increase income or decrease costs. But I 
think costs are as low as possible in the branches. There is no over-
staffing... So the only way you can maintain profits is by improving 
income and you can only do that by improving the service... 
(Heniy, Retired Manager, 6/2/01). 
In order to rationalise cost and improve its primary economic indicators, staffing 
levels throughout Bank U K were reassessed during 2000, by new work-
measurement systems (which simply entailed cashiers marking down how many 
customers they each served throughout the day). From these figures, it was 
suggested that individual branches could determine when the deployment of 
additional staff were necessary in order to maintain / improve internal service 
standards'. However, branch managers did not like, or even trust this system of 
matching staffing levels to branch footflow. By concentrating too hard on a 
system built around determining average workloads, and one, which gave only a 
fleeting acknowledgement of the existence of non-customer contact tasks, total 
workload was seemingly being ignored: 
' Internal service standards included the undertaking that all customers would be served within 
three minutes of entering the branch. 
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... who were the sole arbiters to say how long it takes to do a certain 
piece of work? I mean not us. So every customer that comes in with a 
query, then that can be anything between five minutes to two hours or 
longer. And you can't gel any time for that. You know if you make an 
enquiry, work measurement analysts might say 'We allow a figure ofx 
amount', but they don't... It's a system called S T A F F ' where tasks 
that have historically been, are allocated a time over the course of a 
week. So you have a baseline figure for the basic tasks the branch do, 
and then you add all your variables into that... There will come a time 
when that baseline input is out of date. So you have a situation where a 
visit fix)m Area Manager Operations, he's asking you to implement a 
new system... and your first question to him is where will it appear on 
my baseline S T A F F figures? 
(George, Manager, West Town branch, 5/12/00). 
My data suggest that the effects of reduced staffing levels on both the 
maintenance and improvement of branch based customer service and banking 
delivery has cleariy been the biggest single issue of cost reduction for Bank UK. 
Maintaining adequate levels of customer service has not been the only problem to 
confix)nt Bank U K in its desire to reduce operating costs. The uneconomic 
completion ofclerical paperwork, previously undertaken on an individual basis by 
each branch has been progressively redeployed to new data processing centres, 
where advanced technological delivery channels have sought to improve 
operational effectiveness and reduce costs. However, throughout my fieldwork, 
ongoing improvements to Bank UK's internal computer systems meant that a 
large proportion of processing work had been almost surreptitiously drip-fed back 
to branches, allowing the number of data processing centres to be ftirther 
rationalised and associated costs reduced: 
Pseudonym used to protect the identity ofBank UK. 
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You know you can actually do standing orders now at the point of 
sale, ^ e to face with a customer... the effort it takes to cancel a 
standing order or direct debit is minimal on the screen compared to 
how we used to have to fill in a data processing form, which then had 
to be transferred on screen. 
(Eric, Manager, Harbour Town branch, 18/10/00). 
The responsibility for this type of clerical processing e.g. standing order 
cancellations, maintenance of account data etc. continued to 'yo-yo' back and 
forth between branches and processing centres throughout the duration of my 
fieldwork. Yet, with the continuing decline in branch staffing numbers, the return 
of data keying tasks to branches caused additional problems in trying to maintain / 
improve face-to-face customer service within falling branch establishments, based 
as they had been on staffing requirements in an idealistic paper / processing-free 
branch environment: 
There's just so much in the way of processing. They say that they've 
taken away all the jobs fix)m the branch staff to fiiee them to deal with 
customers face to face, but it's a farce - they haven't! Whilst I know 
that a lot of processing is coming back because of increased 
technology and it's just as quick to perhaps cancel a standing order on 
the computer screen than send it up to be processed. So in some ways I 
can understand why things are coming back... but it's impossible to do 
it in the time that you've got. You can't go away fiom your desk when 
a customer is there and that's why I always have to process at the end 
of the day so I can get through my work. 
(Nina, Sales Executive, Harbour Town branch, 18/10/00). 
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The maxim: reduced staff costs = increased operational effectiveness / profit 
appears seductive for organisations wishing to see this situation concretely 
reflected within their balance sheets. However, in reality, data suggests this 
outcome is lar fiom simple. My research has shown that as a result of its desire to 
reduce operating costs, staflBng levels within Bank U K ' s domestic retail branches 
had now become so critical that unexpected absences had a devastating effect on 
operational effectiveness: 
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Needed to operate South Town branch with only two staff today, as 
Claire and Pam were absent on annual leave. Sam received a telephone 
call from her son's school at 9.30am to say that he was sick and 
needed to go home. She did not know what to do, as she has no family 
in the area and her childminder would not look after children who 
were i l l . She knew that her departure would mean South Town branch 
would only be left with two staff, but George told her she had little 
alternative than to go, but asked her to balance and restock the ATM* 
before she went (neither he nor I knew how to do it). She started the 
task, but received two further telephone calls from her son's school 
asking her to huny up, so she just quickly filled it up with money in 
order to keep it operational, but did not balance it. After her departure 
George and I had no time to take a break. George rushed out during a 
quiet period and bought us both sandwiches, but they remained 
untouched until we closed at 4.30pm. All we could do was cashier. We 
could not operate the customer services desk in the banking hall, and 
were powerless to stop customers coming in and waiting by an empty 
desk looking around for someone to serve them. When we got rid o f 
the counter queue we shouted across the banking hall from behind the 
cashiering screens to ask i f we could help them. Two requests were for 
account opening, but as George could not leave me alone on the 
counter, or out of sight (for security reasons) while he took them into a 
private interview room, he could do nothing other than hand out 
brochures and make appointments for them to return at a later date. It 
was such a rush to get all the tasks done that could not be held over 
until the next day, i.e. balancing the t i l l , remitting foreign exchanges, 
ordering bullion, sending cheques off for processing etc. At 4.30, 
George told me that his head had been spinning all day and 
acknowledged that how we had been expected to operate the branch 
today was "stupid". 
(Research Diary 15/3/01). 
It later transpired that Sea Town branch (located 15 miles away) had also had to 
operate with two staff on the same day - again due to unexpected absences. 
George leamt that regional management had contemplated closing Sea Town 
branch (the smaller unit) and asking their staff to help him out at South Town. A 
ATM = Automated Teller Machine. 
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decision such as this would have been unprecedented within Bank UK, and 
regional sanction to temporarily close Sea Town was not given, despite the very 
real problems with staffing levels. When UniFi* later challenged Bank UK to 
comment on the situation, the bank replied: 
Clearly the bank is committed to ensuring that it is effectively 
resourced to satisfy its business objectives and capacity management 
has been introduced to enable this to be done more effectively. We 
track the information at both local and national level. We do not see 
any issues emerging at present rate... 
(UniFi bulletin, April 2001). 
It was clear from my fieldwork that Bank UK appeared to be struggling to operate 
its branches efficiently with decreasing staffing numbers, and appeared to be 
caught in a paradox of trying to improve / maintain customer service whilst 
remaining wary of the impact of increased staffing expenditure on cost / income 
ratios. To try and overcome this problem, a 'casual', or 'zero-hours'^ contract 
register was inaugurated, which not only offered individuals the opportunity to 
work a combination of hours or days which suited them, but one which Bank UK 
hoped it would be able to use in order to plug ever increasing gaps in branch 
establishments. Advertisements for 'casual' staff appeared via posters in banking 
halls, and within regional newspapers: 
* National Banking and Finance Union. 
^ "Zero-hours contracts are a relatively new form of non-standard contract, although they are 
similar to on-call employment contracts... In a zero-hours contract, the employee agrees to be 
available for work, but is only called to work when the employer has work for them to do" (Dex 
and McCulIoch, 1997:26). 
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We are looking for ex-members of staff who wish to work on a 
temporary casual basis but who do not wish to undertake a permanent 
position. I f you know of somebody who would like the opportunity to 
combine work, femily, leisure, retain their skills and experience whilst 
earning competitive rates of pay why not telephone... 
(Bank UK internal recruitment poster, August 2000)*. 
By using 'casual' workers who attracted lower rates of hourly pay, (despite 
undertaking exactly the same tasks as their permanent colleagues). Bank UK was 
not only able to maintain and improve customer service without incurring a huge 
rise in salary costs, it was able to do so without having to absorb any additional 
costs arising from the financial benefits associated v^th permanent fiill or part-
time positions e.g. employer-led pension and National Insurance contributions, 
holiday and maternity pay etc., thus restricting any worsening of its cost / income 
ratio. The huge disparity between the hourly rates of 'casual' and permanent 
cashiers became increasingly evident as my field work progressed: 
Kylie ['casual' cashier. West Town branch] was moaning that she had 
not had a pay rise since last summer and felt that Bank UK was 'taking 
advantage' of her, especially when she had been expected to cover the 
late till last week and be responsible for the 'late t i l l ' keys. She only 
wants to be paid fairiy for the extra responsibilities being placed on 
her, yet currently is only paid £4.20 per hour. 
(Research Diary, 8/8/00). 
More will be written about Bank UK's specific recrxiitment of ex-staff to fill these roles in later 
chapters. 
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... I 'm in an awkward situation because I'm getting paid so well for 
what 1 do* and the amount of hours I do. I don't get any Working 
Family tax credit. So really I'm worse ofiFthan somebody who can get 
Working Family tax and still work. I'd be better ofiF i f they'd cut my 
wages by £2.00 per hour and I could claim Working Family tax 
(laughs). I would be better off. 
(Wanda, pait-time cashier, West Town branch, 12/12/00). 
Cost, therefore, remained an issue even within a system that sought to promote 
greater numerical and functional employee flexibility. In November 2001, Bank 
UK's branch managers were told there had been a considerable overspend on 
general staffing costs throughout the year, and in order to reduce costs now, they 
would not receive sanction to retain any 'casual' staff currently being used .^ 
When asked why this should be the case, particularly in branches where 'casual' 
employees were covering unfilled full-time positions on a long-term basis: " I 
mean on some days we are just running on agency^..." (Jean, Union 
Representative, North Town branch, 15/2/01), managers were simply told that the 
Bank wanted to reduce its headcount of staff for its year-end figures. The 
employment of 'casual' staff was therefore vetoed, despite protestations fi-om 
branch managers that the injunction left certain branches catastrophically short of 
staff during what was generally regarded the busiest period of the year 
(Christmas). George informed me he queried the philosophy behind this ruling 
during a meeting with regional management in November 2001, and questioned 
' Due to the many years of her part-time work for Bank UK, Wanda received an hourly rate of 
£7.25. 
^ Bank UK*s casual staff worked to contracts with just one week's notice by either parly. 
^ By 'agency* - Jean meant 'casual' contract workers. 
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whether the cost of a further two months 'casual' staff salaries could really reduce 
Bank UK's cost / income ratio sufficiently enough to make this exercise 
worthwhile. He had further pointed out that any 'casual' hours woriced in 
December would not be paid until January in any event, and would therefore 
show in the following year's financial accounts (Research Diary, 6/12/01). I f 
Bank UK was really committed to offering what it called "High Square"* service 
to its customers, how could this possibly be operationalised by reducing staff 
numbers even further? 
Paradoxically, at the same time Bank UK introduced its nationwide veto on the 
employment of'casual' workers, it chose to roll out an enhancement to its High 
Square Service in the fomi of a new customer oriented initiative called Service 
Options: "The Service Options process is a simple yet very effective process 
which will help build relationships with customers and make sure we are 
providing the best possible service at all times" (Bank UK internal memorandum, 
November 2001). The scheme sought to introduce customers to a different 
number of options that could make their banking easier. Simple in its execution, 
the process entailed a member of staff basing themselves in the banking hall 
either talking to customers as they entered, or walking the queue^ suggesting ways 
' High Square Service refers to internal standards introduced during September 2000, aimed at 
improving service delivery through all channels of Bank UK. 
^ Walking the queue - walking down the line of waiting customers asking them why they had 
come to the branch, establishing the type of transactions they are waiting for and suggesting ways 
to mitigate their queuing (usually through the use of some technologically advanced delivery 
channel). 
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that service options may reduce the time customers needed to spend in the bank. 
Staff were specifically instructed to 'sell' the benefits of rapid deposit facilities' 
or suggest that customers could save queuing time by opting to pay regular bills 
by direct debit, or withdraw their requirement of cash fiom automated cash 
machines: "Let the customer know that the cash machine can be used to carry out 
various transactions without the need to wait in the branch... Offer to provide the 
customer with a demonstration of the cash machine." (Bank UK internal 
memorandum, November 2001). 
Not only did the scheme seek to encourage customers to maximise the use of new 
technologies, the way Service Options was expected to be sold at branch level, 
encouraged the ideology that automated delivery channels had been singularly 
developed with the sole intention of helping customers obtain a better service, and 
should be seriously considered as a viable alternative to the seemingly dated 
method of branch based banking delivery. Claims such as these masked the main 
philosophy behind Bank UK's movement towards 'selling' automation — issues of 
cost, which, under the guise of Service Options had been packaged under the 
rubric of increasing customer satisfaction. By enthusiastically encouraging the 
regular use of automated banking facilities, it appeared that Bank UK hoped 
branch footflow would decline by sufficient numbers to warrant another 
' Developed to help customers to deposit a non-cash credit without waiting, it entailed depositing 
the items together with a credit slip into a secure 'letter box* located in the banking hall. 
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significant reduction in staffing levels, and consequentially a further decline in 
operating costs. 
The timing of the Service Options rollout meant that managers were expected to 
release a member of staff fit)m their normal duties to undertake this roving 
banking hal! role, at the same time that the employment of 'casual 'staff had been 
vetoed. In small branches, which appeared to continuously operate without any 
spare staflSng capacity, the scheme became operationally impossible to execute. 
Less than three weeks after being told that Bank UK had vetoed 'casual' contract 
workers, George telephoned to enquire i f I could help him out the following day 
at South Town branch. The overall effectiveness of the branch was apparently 
suffering due to him being unable to requisition any staffing cover for those 
absent on annual leave, and he had been given "a verbal kick in the nuts" by 
regional management for not engaging with the Service Option incentive. With 
his second cashiering position usually filled by a variety of staff on 'casual' 
contracts, whom he was now unable to call upon', George had found himself 
spending most of the day cashiering, leaving no time for completing the various 
selling and administration functions, which were an integral part of his managerial 
duties. I asked what had happened to the veto and whether it had been withdrawn. 
He replied: " f f 1 have to spend another day on that f***ing till I will get so far 
behind Tli see my arse coming forward... if'Jezza' [regional manager] wants to 
' The termination period of a *casual' contract in Bank UK was one week notice by either party, so 
it had been relatively easy to terminate 'casual* contracts when the overspend became apparent 
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ring up and bollock me, then Vm just in the mood for him." (Research Diary, 
5/12/01). 
Not only had Bank UK's veto on the employment of'casual' staff affected the 
successful implementation of its new customer incentive scheme, the resulting 
reduction in stafQng numbers appeared to have lowered the morale of remaining 
staff: 
... we've had only three staff working on Thursdays. George asked us 
to work our lunch hours. He said he would pay us. I don't mind 
working over on occasions, but when he's of f on his three-month 
holiday' next year we are going to have to do it all the time. I've told 
him that I'm not prepared to do it and that he had better start making 
arrangements for cover. He just tells us that we have cover as we now 
have Christine^ but that's stupid. I pointed out that he is away, so she 
is effectively covering for him, and we used to have lunchtime cover 
before Bob left last year, and we don't have that anymore. Next 
Thursday we are going to be just as bad. I 'm of f for three days, so 
that leaves George, Christine and Pam. I know that Pam has asked for 
the afternoon of f to watch her son's nativity play, but he couldn't let 
her. Do you know what she is having to do? She has made a private 
arrangement to pay Claire to cover for her for a few hours so that she 
can go. George said he didn't want to know about any private 
arrangements, but so long as he had bums on seats he didn't mind, 
h's all right for Claire; she only works mornings four days a week so 
she has time to attend these sorts of things. What a state the bank is in 
i f it can't let staff go to see school plays. It's not as though Pam 
doesn't do enough unpaid overtime anyway. 
(Sam, chief cashier, South Town branch, 6/12/01). 
' Having saved holiday entitlement under Bank UK*s *save your holiday' scheme, George was 
taking extended leave during the first three months of 2002. His absence was going to be covered 
by existing branch staff; no covering manager was to be employed. 
^ New Entrant who started in July 2001, and expected to cover for staff holidays. 
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Herein lies the paradox which faces Bank UK in its desire to both embrace the 
philosophy of lean production systems whilst remaining committed to issues of 
total quality management and improved customer satisfaction. Staffing levels at 
South Town branch had now become so critical due to the exclusion of'casual' 
workers, that typical workflows could not be satisfactorily maintained, yet George 
had been faced with little option other than to close his customer enquiry desk 
(despite it being regarded the primaiy sales point), in order to release a member o f 
staff to operationalise the Service Option incentive. Other managers were equally 
vocal in their derision of the scheme: 
... they [Bank UK] are managing customer demand to deliver financial 
services ON THE CHEAPEST POSSIBLE BASIS. It's a bloody 
shame. I'm sure there is opportunity out there, and in a minute 
somebody will break rank, stop following each other and decide they 
are going to do something different and mop it all up. 
(Eric, Manager, Harbour Town branch, 18/10/00). 
Even when staffing levels were not affected by unexpected absences, it was often 
impossible for branches to maintain expected standards of service within their 
allocated staffing establishments: 
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We always seem to be working flat out at the moment. There is never 
any time to catch up on bits and pieces... today for example we have 
got no Rachel in, so there's no extra cover on the counter, and I 
haven't really got time to do all the number one* bits and pieces. I'm 
just trying to do them in between serving customers, and then they 
don't get done properly, then sometime you've got to catch up with 
everything, and when you're short of staff, which we seem to be most 
of the time, you just haven't got time to do it, and you've got to do all 
the sales things. 
(Jane, Chief Cashier, West Town branch, 12/12/00). 
Despite the many problems associated with cost issues, my fieldwork revealed 
that many managers still faced difficulties in trying to offer any criticism of 
strategies that did not appear to work satisfactorily from a branch perspective: 
... any comment that criticises the structure of things is seen as 
negative, and bounced back at you saying 'You're the manager, 
manage the situation, it doesn't exist in other branches, so you must be 
doing something wrong'. And i f you say that it is particular to the staff 
or the customer base or another issue they say 'Want to change your 
staff do you? Why are your customers different to anywhere else?' 
They prefer to see things the same everywhere, A Harbour Town 
customer is the same as a Bristol customer, is the same as a London 
customer, and we bloody know that isn't true. 
(Eric, Manager, Harbour Town branch, 18/10/00). 
Other cost saving initiatives in Bank UK impacted directly on the physical 
working environment. Office radiators became smaller (supposedly in order to 
complement the corporate branding of offices), and were able to be controlled by 
individual thermostatic valves. Branches were no longer heated prior to staff 
' Number One is the terminology used for the chief cashier who is expected to manage the counter 
and make sure it remains operationally effective throughout the day. 
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entry, which meant time had to be spent turning the radiators on manually every 
morning (and off eveiy evening). To discourage idle time in staff rooms, radiator 
use in these areas became restricted to oflHcial break times only. In South Town 
branch, staff were reminded to turn of f radiators as they exited the staff room, via 
a warning poster attached to the back of the staff room door: "Have you turned of f 
the radiator?" Written in biro underneath, was a reminder from George: "There 
are TWO" (original capitals) (Research Diary 18/7/00). With lunch hours 
throughout Bank UK generally taken on a three hour shift system: 1 !.30am-
12.30pm, 12.30pm -1.30pm, and 1.30pm to 2.30pm, those on the first lunch break 
had to resign themselves to sitting in their coats until staff rooms warmed up. 
Other cost-driven premises issues were uncovered during my research. In South 
Town branch it was impossible to get hot water fiom the taps in the ladies toilets. 
The water healer had broken and staff had been told that the age of the appliance 
made it too costly to repair. They had been asked to wait until more money for 
premises upkeep was available before it could be replaced. I f women needed hot 
water then George had agreed that female staff could use his [male] toilet, where 
hot water could still be drawn (research diary 18/7/00). This was not an isolated 
incident. The very same scenario was found in Sea Town branch. Again female 
staff were resigned to using the male toilet, as their own water heater had been 
condemned as unsafe early in 2000 by one of Bank UK's internal safety engineers 
during his annual check of all electrical appliances (Research Diaiy, 18/8/00). 
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It was not just interior staff areas that had started to suffer from a lack of proper 
maintenance. In October 2001, George received a letter from the local council 
which complained that the exterior paintwork of South Town branch was 
seemingly not of the standard demanded of a Grade n listed building. The council 
also expressed disappointment that a broken exterior stair rail had not been 
replaced since they had agreed its temporary removal on safety grounds earlier in 
the year. On contacting Bank UK's premises department, which dealt with all 
branch structural issues, George had been shocked to be instructed to simply:"... 
buy some paint and touch up the worst bits yourself to get the council of f our 
backs for the time being" (Research Diaiy, 22/10/01). 
Despite the increasing reliance on new technologies to deliver banking services 
on a cheaper basis, the much-heralded upgrading o f Bank UK's cashiering 
hardware and software during 2001 was accompanied by almost paralysing 
budget restraints. Apart from the replacement of standard hardware such as visual 
display screens, processor and voucher swipe units, the upgraded system of 
cashiering required the elimination of 'pool' tills*. This meant that every 
cashiering position needed to be capable of supporting an individual's 
requirement of notes and coin in order to be operationally effective. Under the 
pool system, bags of individual coin denominations had been spread along the 
three till positions at South Town branch. 'Silver' was kept in one t i l l , 'bronze' in 
' Pool Tills - every cashier shared the same till. Whilst they may have had individual till positions, 
their money was combined with other till holdings at the end of the day. No blame for cash errors 
could therefore be apportioned to one member of staff in isolation. 
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another etc. It did not matter which cashier used them, as all cashiers were party 
to the pool t i l l . Now, it was necessary for t i l l holdings to be individualised by new 
ways of working, which demanded that cashiers took individual responsibility for 
their own tills. Under these revised systems (resembling the rubric o f Total 
Quality Management), Bank UK secured the ability to monitor individual cash 
differences, and include accuracy as a performance indicator within individualised 
pay awards'. 
The main upgrade to the cashiering software gave cashiers the ability to 
electronically access Bank UK's database from their t i l l positions, which meant 
they no longer had to leave the counter to gain access via a back office computer 
This was a massive improvement on the existing ways o f working. The new 
software not only enabled swift access to a variety o f databases, it also saved the 
cashier's time in not having to leave the counter on a regular basis. Its piece de 
resistance however, was its ability to electronically flag sales opportunities during 
routine cashiering operations. Undertaking a simple request for a balance flagged 
on screen whether the customer had upgraded their account to 'Jack High'^ etc., 
thus providing the cashier with sophisticated electronic sales prompts. 
' More will be written about the decline of colleaive pay bargaining, and the rise of individualised 
pay awards in later chapters. 
^Name of product changed to protect the identity of Bank UK. 
141 
Outwardly the new system appeared to be a major improvement on systems 
installed almost a decade ago. The avant-garde flat computer screens looked 
professional to customers, who expressed increasing satisfaction with the 
improved functionality of the system, used as they were to cashiers having to 
leave the counter to cany out what were simple service requests, e.g. obtain a 
balance, foreign exchange rate etc.: 
... I think that it is ridiculous that to do a transfer or something you 
have to go into the back*. People think it is strange when you are like; 
"I 'm Just nipping o f f ' and they are like: 'Svhere have you gone" 
(laughs). So 1 mean it would be a lot quicker as well, and wil l cut 
down on queuing times and stuff. I mean i f they have to wait there by 
the time we have gone out to the back, find out what the password is 
for today, and log onto this, and then go to the printer... So yes, it cuts 
down on unnecessary time... 
(Lauren, cashier. West Town branch, 5/12/00). 
From the ideology of TQM, the new CSALES^ system certainly appeared to 
improve transactional delivery within Bank UK. However, underpinning the 
outward appearance of technological enhancement and service improvement were 
growing staff fiustrations with the tardiness of its electronic responses, which 
flagged sales opportunities before finishing financial transactions. This often 
meant that cashiers had started dealing with the next customer in the queue, 
' Small room behind the cashiers at West Town branch that housed 'back office' computers. 
^ Name of the new cashiering dehvery system, which has been changed to protect the identity of 
Bank UK. 
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before the machine had finished electronically processing the paperwoik o f the 
previous. 
Whilst the actual dynamics of cashiering were not changed by the installation of 
the new CSALES system, the way cashiers were expected to process transactions 
did alter significantly. Staff were familiarised with the revised systems through 
compulsory attendance at a locally held learning workshop. Catering for no more 
than six attendees at any one time, training sessions for my field site branches 
took place in the regional training rooms located above Central Town branch. 
Staff were expected to attend these sessions approximately three weeks before the 
CSALES system was installed in their own branches. On a nationwide basis, over 
12,000 staff had needed to be trained (Bank UK staff magazine, December 
2001:4). I managed to attend one o f these training sessions in August 2001, and 
whilst [ had surmised that smaller units might only be able to release one member 
of staff at a time, I was amazed to discover that I was the only attendee on that 
particular day. Chrissie, my designated trainer admitted that whilst the general 
idea had been to have multiple attendees, stafiing levels in the network had made 
this impossible to execute on a practical basis, and despite the increased cost to 
Bank UK, her contract had been extended a further four months until December 
2001, when the final branches would be transferred onto the new system. 
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Two rooms had been set aside for the exercise. The first housed easy chairs and a 
beverage vending machine (on fi^e vend). Here, Chrissie explained the rationale 
behind the implementation of CSALES and explored my own proficiency with 
introducing sales dialogue during common cashiering transactions. After a break 
for coffee, we moved through into the second room. This had been fitted with six, 
completely operational CSALES systems located around Chrissie's training unit. 
Together we worked through a workbook that contained dummy vouchers 
pertaining to twenty common cashiering transactions. Not only was I being 
trained to process the vouchers efficiently, I was expected to verbally interact 
with Chrissie during each transaction, and introduce sales relevant to the scenarios 
portrayed in the workbook'. 
All transactions, whether cash based or not, now had to be processed through the 
CSALES unit^. Where cash formed part of a transaction (whether a deposit or 
withdrawal), CSALES automatically printed (via a dedicated laser printer for each 
cashier), a cash ticket, which cashiers had historically raised themselves. Whilst 
cleariy timesaving, the electronically generated vouchers were identical in shape, 
size and colour, making swift identification practically impossible. This was a real 
problem during multiple transactions (where several cash tickets were generated), 
or when a customer requested a transactional receipt (which were also identical to 
the cash tickets). More lime had to be spent identifying and sorting vouchers, 
' One scenario suggested that Mr ^ had deposited a cheque for £60,000. By asking questions 1 was 
xpected to find out that he had recently retired (the cheque represented his g^olden handshake') expected 
and then offer a meeting to discuss savings, investments and insurance 
^ On Bank UK's existing system only cash transactions were recorded. 
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whereas the existing system used stationery o f differing sizes and colours, \ ^ i c h 
made this task simple. I asked what would happen i f the new sofhvare failed, once 
all the pre-CSALES stationery had been obsoleted, which would render cashiers 
unable to raise cash tickets either manually or electronically. Chrissie explained 
that the new system had extra workload capacity, which should prevent system 
overload on busy days, but: "In the unlikely event they [CSALES unit] lose 
contact with the central database, you will need to return to manual cashiering 
methods. For that reason existing stationery will not be removed from branches, 
and will continue to be available for reorder" (Research Diary, 29/8/01). I was 
unsure whether this was an indication of doubt in the ability of the new system to 
cope under extreme pressures, or simply Bank UK making contingency plans, 
which would enable it to offer a continuous counter service in the event o f a 
primaty system failure. 
By electronically recording all transactions, CSALES also removed the need for 
cashiers to laboriously make manual recordings of branch footflow. This gave 
Bank UK the opportunity to obtain a more accurate work measurement of 
cashiering transactions and staff its counters accordingly. It also removed any 
suggestion of branches 'doctoring' figures in order to substantiate requests for 
extra staff. 
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I re-entered the field and participated as a cashier during October 2001 in order to 
gain first-hand experience of the new system. I quickly encountered increasing 
staff fioistration with the apparent paradox of trying to deliver a quality service at 
the same time that any additional branch expenditure considered necessary to 
establish and operationalise CSALES had been vetoed. I asked Sam (chief 
cashier, South Town) whether the CSALES system had offered any improvement. 
She replied: " It's f***ing crap! It takes so much longer to do anything..." and 
gestured to large cardboard boxes behind her till position: 
These usually held the bits and pieces relating to my days work for 
over a fortnight and now I'm lucky i f they hold the paperwork relating 
to three days work. This new system generates so much paper. See this 
tick list [waved A4 size sheet o f paper with multiple questions] I have 
to do all these checks every night. They didn't tell us this on training 
day! 
(Research Diaiy, 9/10/00). 
1 asked i f she was managing to leave on time now that individual tills could be 
balanced during the working day: 
I'm still not managing to put the cash away and leave on time; it was 
all a con. i still can't balance during the day. You know we are 
supposed to, but we have too few staff to do it. How can we take 
somebody away to balance during opening hours? 
(Research Diary, 9/10/00). 
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I was surprised to leam that staffing levels had not been increased, particularly 
when the CSALES system accurately measured footflows. However, Sam 
informed me that after operating the new system for only six weeks, Bank UK 
had decided that the need to process all transactions had apparently increased the 
amount of customer waiting time to such an extent that the requirement to 
electronically record non-cash transactions had been withdrawn. Sam suggested 
that maybe the bank had been so astonished by actual levels of branch workload, 
it had decided to ditch the system before it became all too apparent that it needed 
to substantially increase its staffing levels. This suggests that on the one hand the 
electronic monitoring system had become a sophisticated surveillance tool that 
allowed a backwards flow of information, yet, on the other, where its findings 
gave those who were being surveyed (i.e. branches) the evidence that extra 
resources (staff) were needed it was quickly withdrawn. Thus the sustainability o f 
certain strategies appeared to depend on cohesion at the level of practice rather 
than at the level of individual rights. 
Somewhat paradoxically, whilst the new CSALES system expected cashiers to 
operate individual tills and take greater responsibility for cash handling, Bank UK 
decided that daily reconciliation o f reserve cash was no longer necessary' - a 
situation which actually increased opportunities for theft, as losses would not be 
apparent until cash holding figures were produced during the next working day. 
'Reserve cash' was held in secure areas under control of two keyholders. 
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The requirement for staff to hold individual tills appeared fine in theory, but my 
fieldworic showed the practical implications of this had turned out to be far from 
satisfectory. The counter layout of South Town branch had only enough space to 
accommodate three CSALES systems, yet i f every possible combination o f staff 
attendees were to be responsible for their own t i l l , there would need to be six 
functional cashiering positions. Bank UK's response to this problem had been that 
every time a change of cashier was necessaiy e.g. following the departure o f part-
timers, it should be a simple operation to merely switch cash holdings and 'log' 
the CSALES computer onto another individual's t i l l . Practically this was not so 
straightforward. For instance when Claire (Soudi Tov^'s part-time cashier) 
departed at Ipm every day she locked her cash in the second till position and took 
the key home with her. Under the rubric of increased teamworking as demanded 
by TQM systems she should have placed her cash holding in a locked tin and 
removed it to the safe, thus leaving her t i l l position free for others to use in her 
absence. Yet other staff were generally not available to enable her cash to be 
removed to the safe under the dual handling rule', and George could not ask 
Claire to wait until somebody was free as he was vetoed to pay her overtime. A 
scenario that suggested 'cost' in terms of overtime payments had clearly become 
'at odds' with Bank UK's attempts to improve service and delivery. 
' Whenever cash was removed to the safe, for security reasons it always had to be carried out by 
two members of staff. 
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Instead of wholeheartedly embracing its new CSALES systems and ensuring it 
could be used for maximum impact. Bank UK had cleariy been reluctant to 
authorise any additional branch expenditure in making sure that CSALES could 
be properly accommodated within individual branches. The veto on additional 
branch expenditure had meant that no costly alterations to premises had been 
authorised. This meant that the CSALES hardware had to be placed within 
existing counter spaces, despite causing operational difficulties and raising health 
concerns amongst staff: 
There is not enough space on the counter workstations for screen, 
printer, voucher swiper and two voucher boxes. The seating position is 
now very awkward. As it remains necessary to interact with customers 
it was impractical for the computer screen to be placed directly in front 
of the cashier as this would block sight of the customer using the t i l l . 
To overcome this, all screens have been positioned to the right of the 
individual cashier workstations (despite Claire being lef\-handed), 
which means that all cashiers have to constantly twist to the right on 
their stools, and although footrests are in place they add to the 
uncomfortable stance now created. I f you sit for a long time your left 
leg goes numb, so I have to keep getting up and walking around 
between customers. 
(Research Diary, 18/10/01). 
Sam (chief cashier, South Town branch) had also raised concerns over health and 
safety issues regarding the new workspaces: 
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I have had to start tv^sting myself all day and I get a sore knee. George 
has brought Health and Safety' in to have a look, but their only 
workable solution was to cut a horseshoe shape in the counter top 
directly in fit>nt o f where I sit, which meant whizzing back in my chair 
every time I wanted to go into a drawer, and that would hurt my back. 
They are yet to come up with a workable solution that doesn't cost too 
much. 
(Research Diary, 22/10/01). 
Staff had been challenged to make the implementation of CSALES a success 
without incurring additional branch expenditure. With only three operational 
cashiering positions, yet with six staff now responsible for their OWTI tills, staff at 
South Tov^ were asked to devise ways of making CSALES working systems 
operational whilst keeping to the expenditure veto. There was much consternation 
over where individual cash holdings could be kept when they were not needed. 
With the till drawers under the counter being fixed workstations it meant that the 
simple solution of having six mobile, lockable tills, which could be wheeled in 
and out of position when changeovers o f cashiering staff were needed, was 
quickly overturned by regional management due to the expenditure involved in 
removing the immobile tills, and purchasing six mobile units. It had also been 
difficult to solve the dilemma of finding a secure storage space for every 
individual holding of coin. In desperation George had suggested that maybe the 
staff lockers situated in the ladies toilets could be used to store individual coin 
holdings, with notes being stored in the safe under dual control. This appeared to 
be an absolutely ludicrous solution to problems caused by Bank UK's reluctance 
Bank UK's internal health and safety team, not independent outside consultants. 
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to spend money to make systems work properly. Staff joked that i f the press 
found out what was proposed, the publicity would not be very favourable and 
could actively undermine the professional image Bank UK was trying to cultivate 
through the installation of advanced technologies. 
After much negotiation, George was eventually given sanction by regional 
management for South Town branch to operate one pool t i l l as long as it was only 
used by himself and his 'casual' staff, and balanced before the departure o f any 
till sharers. The 'one ti l l , per staff member' still applied to his permanent full-time 
staff. This partial relaxation of procedures meant that it was now necessary for 
South Town branch to have only four operational cashiering positions. Full-time 
staff were now able to store their cash in the three permanent counter positions 
and did not to have to be constantly moving their cash holdings into storage units. 
An old lockable tin box had been found in the safe to house the pool till cash, so 
South Town had managed to solve the problems of CSALES operationalisation 
without recourse to additional expenditure. Yet, Claire (part-time cashier) 
remained reluctant to empty the money from her till position on her departure in 
order to allow others who were party to the pool t i l l to cashier in her space. This 
meant that the tin box which housed the pool till monies had to be dragged across 
the floor' to the Claire's vacant cashiering position, and the pool till cashiers had 
to constantly bend down to floor level to receive or dispense cash, which not only 
The combination of cash and coin made it far too heavy to lift. 
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breached health and safety guidelines surrounding the manual handling of cash', 
but looked absolutely unprofessional to customers, who saw cashiers scrabbling 
about at floor level in order to serve them. When I asked George (Manager) why 
Claire's reluctance to embrace teamworking in a more positive manner had been 
allowed to cause these problems, he admitted he was reluctant to '\ipset her": 
There is never anybody around who is party to the pool t i l l when 
Claire leaves, to switch the tills with her, and by ^swapping' the cash it 
would cause problems with key control. I f she waited until a pool till 
sharer was able to take over key control this may mean having to pay 
Claire overtime, which I am vetoed to do. 
(George, 18/10/01). 
When questioned about the problems arising fi'om the practical deliveiy o f the 
new system. Bank UK insisted: 
The new CSALES system has been a very positive move and gives us 
a great opportunity to provide the best service to our customer. Al l the 
changes have been going on behind the scenes, so as fer as our 
customers are concerned, it's business as usual. 
(Bank UK, internal staflFmagazine. December 2001:4). 
Despite its ongoing problems with harmonising expenditure on improving product 
quality or service suggested through brainstorming (Kaizen) activity, Bank UK 
still continued to support the idea of Kaizen in a wholehearted manner. In order to 
make the philosophy of service / product improvement more accessible for 
The Manual Handling Operations Regulations 1992. (Pearson, 2001: 59). 
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employees the organisation appeared to have chosen to dumb down / modify the 
language of its daily Kaizen activity, which became commonly referred to as 'a 
scrum* 
Branch managers were expected to have *a scrum' every day prior to opening at 
9.00am. By bringing all staff together it permitted managers to cascade 
information throughout the branch network. It also created an opportunity for 
branch staff to undertake product specific role-plays, and practice the use of 
scripted sales dialogue in order to familiarise themselves vwth both product 
knowledge and the specific sales wording Bank UK wished to see adopted. For 
example, one scrum session dealt with mortgages, and staff were asked to practice 
asking the following question: "When did Bank UK last review your mortgage"? 
(Research Diary, 8/1J/OI). It was also suggested that staff might find it easier to 
begin the process of selling by simply appealing to the perceived greed of 
customers: "We may be able to save you money, make you money and improve 
the products and services you have" (Research Diary, 23/8/00). 
The content of these daily scrums varied widely. Yet they could only be held once 
all pre-opening formalities had been completed, and as most staff were contracted 
to begin work at 8.45am, managers were of^en little time to undertake anything of 
a lengthy nature. During my fieldwork, scrums often comprised branch managers 
' Pseudonym. See Appendix One, page 285 for an explanation. 
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reiterafing how sales had gone that week and what remedial work, i f any, would 
be necessary to get branches back on track in order to achieve their targets: 
'Scrum' before we opened. Peggy hammered on her desk with a metal 
letter slitter to get the attention of staff and to call them to the meeting. 
She was concemed to tell us that West Town had experienced a good 
sales achievement last week and wanted us to keep up the momentum 
whilst it was there. Later that morning she stood within eyesight of the 
cashiers (but out o f public sight) shaking the letter opener above her 
head shouting "Jack High', Jack High" to remind us to approach 
customers. 
(Research Diary, 18/6/00). 
During 2000, it became a feature of scrum activity for individual staff to be asked 
to bid on a daily basis for the number of sales of a particular product they felt they 
could achieve during that day. Each branch had been told to purchase a large, 
wipe-clean white board to list individual names and achievements^. There 
appeared to be linle enthusiasm fiom staff in deciding their sales potential. My 
research suggested that staff simply appeared to shout out a figure they thought 
would not be too difficult to achieve, and which would at least show they were 
making an effort to sell: 
' Pseudonym for Bank UK's premier current account, 
^his expenditure was not subject to veto. 
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Scrum session spent trying to balance the cashbook and find all the 
mistakes fix)m yesterday, which had been compounded by not having 
time to reply to the bullion remittance message. George was still 
banging on about sales and we each had to bid in with how many 
personal loan flyers we would get completed on the counter for him to 
follow up later. Lauren bid for 5, George 2 and myself 2, but not one 
of us had any time to do any selling after we opened. When Bob' 
arrived at 11.00am, George told him that we were getting personal 
loan flyers completed today. Bob laughed and said: "What will you do 
i f I don't? Sack me?" 
(Research Diary, 3/1/01). 
As my fieldwork progressed, it became clear scrum activity became an 
increasingly important element of Bank UK's commitment towards the 
furtherance of TQM philosophies of work organisation. Every Wednesday 
morning all retail banking branches opened 30 minutes later than usual for 
extended scrum activity. Although more will be written about the content o f such 
sessions in the next chapter, these extended meetings gave branch managers more 
time to cascade information, agree sales targets and practice sales dialogue with 
staff. Sometimes these sessions were simply used by Bank UK to broadcast 
training and information programmes through its internal television station -
Bank UK TV: 
' Ex- assistant manager who had accepted early retirement in 1999. He had remained a personal 
fiiend of George, who, out of desperation had persuaded Bob to help him out when staffing levels 
at West Town branch reached crisis point. 
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Watched three TV programmes this morning. The first was about 
'Share Save' - a scheme that allowed eligible staff to save a 
percentage of their salary to buy Bank UK shares at a discounted rate 
after 5 years. It did not say which members o f staff would be eligible, 
but made a great deal about savings being tax free and by buying 
shares in the group each of us would feel a greater sense o f individual 
responsibility. The second gave practical suggestions for the manual 
handling of heavy loads and 3 examples were offered: handling coin, 
lifting voucher storage boxes and movement o f office equipment such 
as photocopiers. It was veiy sex stereotyped, portraying female 
cashiers wearing ridiculously high heels and tight skirts whilst trying 
to lift coin, and the key message of the video appeared to be the 
encouragement of women to wear 'sensible clothes' for their job. The 
final broadcast was more serious in tone and urged all staff to wear 
their radio attack alarms and agree a word or sentence, which in the 
event of them being held hostage, would immediately alert their 
partner they were under threat. Again, the broadcast portrayed female 
staff as 'victims', who were 'saved' from personal attack in the 
banking hall by their radio alarms, which alerted a heroic male 
colleague to come and release them from their fate. 
(Research Diary, 19/7/00). 
On infiiequent occasions, branches unexpectedly found themselves playing host to 
a senior member of the regional management team, who made unscheduled 
branch visits in order to check that managers were using the extended scrum lime 
as directed. 
As my fieldwork progressed it became apparent that 'scrums' had clearly become 
the prime intermediary site for the integration of 'Japanese-style' working 
practices in Bank UK's retail branch network. Yet paradoxically, Bank UK's 
obsession with reducing operating costs had meant it now relied upon a greater 
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number of functionally and numerically flexible employees - 'just in time' 
workers, who were absent from many scrum sessions, starting work as they did at 
various times throughout the day. As the majority of non-attendees were 
inevitably cashiers, their absences served to widen existing divisions between 
staff, despite Bank UK's desire to engender an increased teamwork ethic'. 
Interviews with staff suggested whilst they appeared to understand, albeit 
reluctantly, that cutting their numbers was necessary to reduce costs and compete 
successfully in the new financial services marketplace, many felt that the 
reduction in staffing levels had been too severe and had become a real hindrance 
to Bank UK's ambitions to improve / maintain customer service and increase 
sales opportunities: 
I would say bring in at least, or be as bold as to say bring in two extra 
members of staff,.. It's probably a very far-fetched idea because as far 
as the cost / income ratio is concerned it would be foolhardy to even 
suggest it. We need to be given more staffto get the queues down... 
(Nina, Sales Executive, Harbour Town branch, 18/10/00). 
It appeared to be a united consensus amongst staff that regional managers should 
be invited to work in struggling branches for an extended period in order to 
experience for themselves the difficulties their staff now faced in reconciling 
More will be written about the move towards a part-time workforce in later chapters. 
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systems of lean production, whilst at the same time being expected to improve 
customer service and increase sales opportunities: 
I think I would get some of the bigger people... the ones that are 
controlling the staff, on the shopfloor to work for two weeks, and I 
think that's the most important thing. They should be shown what is 
going on. They are throwing money at this Japanese system. OK come 
and work it! Come and show us that it works effectively and we will 
take it on board. 
(Jean, Union Representative, North Town branch, 15/2/01). 
Staff were also concemed that Bank UK's increasing obsession with cost 
reduction could herald the end of the traditional branch network. Many thought 
that the archetypal domestic banking branch might disappear altogether: 
I think that we will get more and more streamlined... 1 don't think it 
[the branch network] will ever disappear completely, obviously more 
cutbacks will mean shutting down more branches, but people will 
always want a face. We are already down to just three staff in a 
branch, and an enquiries desk for basics, but I think they [Bank UK] 
will still have branches open, but how flilly staffed will be another 
question. 
(Wanda, part-time cashier. West Town branch, 5/12/00). 
Accompanying its tangible cuts in branch based expenditure; Bank UK had 
managed to further reduce operating costs by withdrawing staff subsidies for 
extemal training courses. Despite its movement towards quarterly reporting and 
appraisal systems that required employees to critically examine their own 
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performances and identify areas to improve individual contribution, staff efforts 
to overcome any identified shortfells in performance were often rejected on issues 
of immediate cost, instead of being judged on possible future benefits to the bank: 
... they [Bank UK] had this qualification pledge and initially i f you 
wanted computer skills they would fiind it. A year or so ago they 
finished the scheme and actually took PC skills off, which was 
amazing because a lot of people are not familiar with this new 
technology. It's only what the next person has supported them with; 
otherwise they wouldn't have a grasp about using a computer at all. 
It's so time consuming and finstrating for other people I'm sure, 
especially when you are showing somebody how to do the same task 
day in and day out... 
(Jean, Union Representative, North Town branch, 15/2/01). 
Despite these tangible examples of Bank UK's overriding obsession with 
reducing branch based operating costs, as my research progressed it became clear 
that other spending avenues had not been subjected to similar restrictions. 
Analysis of my data suggest that cost in its various forms was without doubt the 
primary concern of Bank UK, however, where sales penetration was at issue, cost 
quickly became of secondary importance. The final part of this chapter now 
examines the difficulties which faced Bank UK in trying to increase income 
through sales, whilst at the same time wanting to drive down costs and reduce 
operating expenditure. 
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During 2001, Bank UK's total group expenditure on advertising topped £100 
million, a figure that made it one of the top five advertisers in the UK, and 
comfortably the largest in the field of financial services. With the group including 
a distinctive car insurance operation and an equally femiliar personal loan 
company, over 400,000 television commercials featuring different divisions of 
Bank UK's organisational group were broadcast throughout the UK during 2001. 
As a result it was claimed every adult in the UK saw, on average, 350 
commercials from some part of the group (Bank UK intemal staff magazine, 
December 2001: 6)'. These intense marketing campaigns were spearheaded by a 
quartet of idiosyncratic advertisements, which informed the public that Bank UK 
offered a distinctive alternative to sweeping branch closures and archaic fee 
structures. 
Intemal branch advertising reflected these nationwide campaigns, with posters 
and leaflets changed on a month-by-monlh basis. The cost of these materials must 
have been enormous. At least six, metre square, glossy posters adorned the walls 
of every branch, which were in turn endorsed by accompanying leaflets placed in 
key locations throughout the banking hall e.g. on tables and by the side o f every 
cashiering position. Yet, despite their cost, at the end of campaigns these 
advertising materials were simply discarded with other recyclable paper waste. 
Source not included in bibliography. This would compromise the anonymity of Bank UK. 
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Advertising expenditure was not the only cost o f sales, tangible though i t was. 
The actual cost of selling took many indirect, yet equally powerful fonns. Indirect 
costs of sales achievement were led by the ongoing reduction in staff numbers, 
which often meant that vital face-to-fece customer contact roles remained 
unfilled. During 2001, Bank UK addressed this problem by rolling out an internal 
campaign to place a dedicated 'seller' in each o f its branches. Termed 'Sales 
Executives' (SEs), these staff would be primarily responsible for ensuring that 
branches achieved their sales targets*. 
Out o f step with Bank UK's traditional job hierarchies, SEs were not determined 
to undertake work of a specific internal grading. Instead the positions were open 
to all staff irrespective o f their current responsibilities and grade. I f accepted for 
training, SEs remained on their current grade and salaiy, and were simply offered 
an incentive of a quarterly bonus (£200), i f they reached or exceeded agreed sales 
targets. By recruiting fi-om within its existing body o f staff, Bank UK clearly 
saved additional expenditure associated with the extemal advertising and training 
of raw recmits, whilst its decision not to allocate a specific grading to the role o f 
SEs, saved the costs of promoting individuals to higher grades. Higher salaries 
would have increased employer National Insurance and pension contributions^, 
which in tum, would have impacted on final salary packages. With Sales 
' Sales expectations were unique to every branch. More will be written about their calculation in 
the following chapter. Suffice it to say, every branch was expected to achieve sales of J : number of 
core banking products every week. 
^ Bank UK offered a non-contributory final salary pension scheme to permanent full or part-time 
employees. 
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Executives being drawn fix>m all levels o f its workforce, general banking 
knowledge and experience of maintaining good customer relationships were 
clearly an issue of the selection process. Yet, some new entrants were also given 
the opportunity to apply for an SE position and receive intensive training to 
enable them to function in the role. This had the effect of polarising the SE 
workforce - whilst some Sales Executives have over twenty years service, others 
have barely six weeks, yet all were expected to perform at the same level: 
We've got a new girl - Deanne, who is lovely and she's trying really 
hard. She has NO banking experience. She has just been brought in. 
She has been given SIX WEEKS training, which involved somebody 
sitting with her for a week and now she is just sitting on the enquiries 
desk, and in six weeks time she is going to be told that she is a fiilly 
fledged Sales Executive and away she goes! Now it's no feult of hers, 
and I'm not criticising her in any way because she is doing really well, 
but in six weeks how can you learn all the products? But the bank has 
taken her on. They have taken her on, and they've taken her on, on the 
minimum salary that they can pay her, so what does that say to you? 
(Leah, Sales Executive, North Town branch, 15/2/01). 
Costs may have been lessened by ways SEs were appointed; yet this method of 
recruitment created huge disparities in remunerative packages between 
individuals in the same role. For example, at North Town branch, Mary, retaining 
her Assistant Manager status and salary benefits earned over £18,000 per annum 
(net of bonus), and enjoyed funded private healthcare, plus an extra five days 
holiday entitlement. In contrast, Fiona (a Grade 7 Clerical Officer)' undertaking 
This was two grades lower than an Assistant Manager position. 
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an identical role at South Town branch received £11,000 (net of bonus), with no 
healthcare or bonus holidays. Accompanying these remunerative disparities, SEs 
also experienced hidden costs to their individual career progression. With their 
roles being of indetemiinate status, where did promotional opportunities exist? 
By creating the specific selling role o f SEs, it was clear that Bank UK had placed 
increasing emphasis on the message that all staff were expected to be " . . . no 
longer bankers, but retailers" (Jeremy, Area Manager, 20/7/00). Once a year the 
bank hosted a series of sales events to drive home this key message to staff. These 
evening meetings were held in local venues and were clearly not subject to the 
same paralysing budget restraints as operating costs. 
Over the duration of my research 1 attended two such events. The most recent was 
held on a Thursday evening during October 2001, where over 300 staff attended 
the event, which was held in a prestigious hotel, located almost midpoint within 
the geographical region of my fieldwork. Mindful that some staff had to endure a 
journey of over 60 miles, the meeting began at 7.30pm. No overtime was payable, 
but a finger buffet and ftee bar had been arranged. At 7.15pm staff were ushered 
away from the bar area into a chapel attached to the hotel (which was clearly used 
for civil wedding ceremonies), and which was obviously the largest venue the 
hotel could offer. Regional managers had rearranged the seating into three rows 
around a fish-shaped stage. At each end of the stage were giant video screens. 
Loud rock music played. Staff attempted to fill up the seats fixjm the back for fear 
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of being 'picked on' later in the proceedings, but were ushered to fill up fix)m the 
front. On each chair had been placed a reporter's notebook, a Bank UK branded 
pen and a small Italian flag on a stick', which staff were expected to wave 
enthusiastically at various times throughout the evening. 
To the left of one of the video screens was the mock pulpit, which served the 
mock chapel from which various Bank UK directors preached their visions for the 
bank over the next twelve months. Staff were expected to reply to loaded 
questions in a manner reminiscent of audience participation at children's 
pantomimes: "...he [sales director] talked to staff as though they were complete 
idiots and would hang onto his every word. Did he think that because the majority 
of his staff were women they had low IQ's?" (Research Diary, 18/10/01). 
The reason for the fish shaped stage was revealed at the end of the event. Jeremy 
[regional manager] returned to the stage dressed in yellow oilskins and rubber 
boots and tried to say a few words in the local dialect whilst laughing. Staff were 
not impressed by these antics and thought Jeremy was trying to parody their 
heritage, of which they were veiy proud. He invited staff to watch what he 
described as "a motivational video", which had been filmed in a Boston fish 
market in the USA. Here, a team of eight workers at a fish stall were seen arriving 
for work at Sam, embracing team-building exercises to motivate themselves for 
* A promotion for the 2002 achievers' prizes, which included an all expenses paid weekoid in 
Rome. 
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work on such cold, early mornings. Once the market was open to the public these 
workers entered into light-hearted banter with their customers, who, after 
selecting items for purchase were treated to their fish being comically thrown 
fix)m the edge of the stall to the middle, where they were wrapped in an 
entertaining manner. The key message o f the video was that the stallholders were 
there to have fun, and by engaging in this manner with customers, they always 
sold their catches, and this was what Bank UK now wanted to see in branches -
outward signs of enthusiasm for the job, the Bank and its products. "We are not 
dealing in banking anymore, but with people and service" (Jeremy, Regional 
Manager, 18/10/01). Little was said about the fact that the subjects of the film 
were low social class, ethnic minority Americans who actually spoke very little. It 
was not until the end of the film that it was revealed (during which Jeremy started 
talking again), tliat the stallholders had to sell all their catch to receive payment 
for their day's work, (maybe this was why they appeared to tried to push 
themselves to succeed), Jeremy ended the evening by suggesting that Bank UK 
staff should visualise themselves as "mountain goats", slowly but surely finding 
their way up a steep incline to the top, where success, in the form of the sweetest 
grass would meet them. 
After the serious business of the evening, the fi^e bar reopened. Waitresses 
circulated around the chapel with trays laden with opened bottles of beer, lager, 
vodka mixers and 'alchopops'. The very thought of getting something free from 
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Bank UK meant that staff often took two bottles at a time and drank both 
hands. To overcome the costs of individual travel expense claims, the Bank had 
also arranged mini bus transport to and fiDm key regional towns, and this added to 
the creation of a party atmosphere. There were groans when the taxis arrived as 
scheduled at 10.30pm. With drinks still available on their departure, handfuls of 
bottles were loaded into the taxis and the party spirit continued on the way home. 
The expense of this meeting must have been huge. Not only in the direct costs 
associated with the hiring of the venue, but also fix)m the slick electronic wizardry 
accompanying the presentation, which had clearly been customised for the 
particular geographical region of Bank UK in which it was shovwi. Was this 
expenditure really necessary? I f this level of fiinding was available, why hadn't 
Bank UK used it to fill staff vacancies, or deal with outstanding premises issues 
such as deteriorating branch exteriors and broken water heaters? Could this be 
determined to be a tangible example of the paradox in which Bank UK had found 
itself, in trying to reduce the costs associated with the maintenance of its more 
traditional banking service, whilst clearly determined to increase sales whatever 
the price? 
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The 'cost' ofskilL 
During my research. Bank UK moved inexorably towards the casualisation of 
employment contracts' and the automafing of lending decisions through new 
technological deliveiy channels (which allowed clinical, unemotional lending 
decisions to be made on a cheaper basis). Well qualified and long-serving staff 
often expressed dismay that senior lending roles were being filled by inexpensive 
agency staff who no longer needed any banking experience to make independent 
judgements, merely some basic level of computer skill to input financial data. 
Fieldwork revealed the enormous swell of resentment being felt by senior staff 
who believed their traditional banking skills were no longer valued: 
...so it's [lending decision] been given to some CASUAL worker 
who's probably been in the bank about two months, to make a decision 
on. ... They decline things because they have such limited experience 
and they don't see the overall picture... and there have been occasions 
where things have got heated. Between them and the computer they 
are saying no, and they haven't got the experience to see the full 
picture... They [Bank UK] don't want the experience. What the bank 
seems to want at the moment is cheap labour...! could have trained my 
cat with its Httle paws to go hammering across the keyboard, it doesn't 
take any degree of intelligence or problem solving or thinking about it 
because you key the information in, and wham! - the answer comes 
out. 
(Leah, Sales Executive, North Town branch, 15/2/01). 
More will be written about this in following chapters. 
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Other jobs within Bank UK also appeared subjected to a certain amount o f de-
skilling. No longer did branch managers appear to command the same respect 
within the organisation. As managerial positions had become little more than 
facilitatory and supervisory, breadth and depth o f banking experience were no 
longer primary requirements. Younger, less experienced employees filled vacant 
branch manager positions as the network was slimmed down through 
reorganisation. A move, which enabled substantial cost savings to be made in 
respect of managerial salaries: 
When you think what the branch manager was eaming back in say, 
1994, to what the manager is eaming now it is completely different. 
Having said that of course, the bank would say that it depends as to 
what you assess that manager has to control. He had to control a larger 
number of staff. In the branches now he is controlling say 5 or 6 
people, whereas in a lot of branches they were controlling 24-30, or 
even more than that. Also they were controlling their own budgets, 
property, and looking after the control of intemal accounts... You can 
see that the word 'control' comes into it an awful lot... 
(Henry, retired manager. Mine Town branch, 6/2/01). 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the effects of the adoption of lean production systems 
in Bank UK as issues o f tangible costs to the Company, e.g. staffing levels and 
premises maintenance. Research has identified that a paradoxical view o f cost 
exists within the organisation, with not all expenditure subjected to the same 
budget restraints. Moreover, whilst not all costs are tangible, it remains very 
difficult to effectively identify and measure intangible costs. In my analysis I have 
referred to intangible costs in terms of hidden costs to the Bank. These costs may 
be represented by the replacement of long-serving, highly skilled, yet expensive, 
(in terms o f salary costs) employees, by a less skilled but cheaper workforce, who 
may not have the appropriate experience to offer quality service, but who can 
simply push buttons at a computer keyboard. It has been very difficult to ascertain 
exactly how much business ( i f any) is being lost by Bank UK in employing less 
experienced staff, but with the selling of banking products reliant on a good staff/ 
customer relationships, the presence of an increasing number of inexperienced 
staff is arguably an important factor. 
At what cost to Bank UK's reputation and professionalism has been the highly 
visible deterioration in the maintenance of many of its high street premises? A 
shabby exterior cannot create the professional image the organisation appears so 
desperate to portray. 
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The biggest paradox of cost is no doubt that which is found between issues o f cost 
and issues of sales. In attempting to make sense of my data, it has often been 
difficult to assess which appears to be the most important to Bank UK - sales or 
cost. The two appear to stand in direct opposition to each other, each vying for top 
spot within the organisation. The following chapter now moves on to assess how 
staff within Bank UK have tried come to temis with the organisational shift 
tov^ds retailing, when at the same time issues of cost have meant their own 
numbers have been substantially reduced: 
... there just isn't enough time to sell... The best time to sell is to take 
people into a private room and give them personal attention... but half 
the time I have no backup so I just can't invite the customers into a 
private room because there's usually nobody I can ask to cover the 
desk anyway, so it's got to be dealt with in the public space and either 
you get a bit uncomfortable because of the queue developing or the 
customer starts to get a bit uncomfortable so they say " I ' l l talk to you 
again when it's a bit quieter", so I think it's just impossible to balance 
it so that you can really increase good sales. 
(Nina, Sales Executive, Harbour Town branch, 18/10/00). 
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4. ^^ We are like bloody circus animals - give us a 
bun and we wiU Derform \^ 
Selling the principle of retailing in Bank UK, 
... everything has become geared towards sales. We know that the 
bank doesn't look at itself as a bank anymore, but as a retail 
outlet. 
(Nina, Sales Executive, Harbour Town branch, 18/10/00). 
In this, the second of a series of three inter-related chapters concerned with 
'change' within Bank UK, I draw upon field work and respondent interviews to 
examine how cashiers, sales executives and branch managers have met, contested 
and negotiated perhaps the biggest single change to their branch-based roles, tasks 
and expectations - that of sales. 
Prior to 1986, the high-street banks offered customers a relatively narrow range of 
financial products, for example the archetypal personal loan, savings account and 
credit card, all o f which were designed to complement the typically mundane 
bank account traditionally serving as the hook on which to hang other services 
(Kerfoot, 1992: 134). By promoting the idea that purchasing a basket o f financial 
services fiom a single organisation was cheaper for the consumer, banks were 
able to make it difficult for the quality of their products to be independently 
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judged (Heffeman, 1996: 24). The provision of mortgages, insurances and other 
longer-term investments were controlled by different sectors of the banking 
industiy, each with their own distinct set of customers, marketing systems and 
regulatoiy bodies (Knights and Tinker, 1997:2-3). From an economic sense each 
was an enterprise - offering goods and services which could not be performed in 
other ways, or by other organisations (Lewellyn, 1994:4). 
During the mid-1980s the 'cosy cartel' of the 'big four' retail banks (Gregory and 
O'Reilly, 1996:223) was shattered by two major legislative changes. After a long 
period of relative stability, the Financial Services Act 1986 and the Building 
Societies Act 1986 resulted in the liberalisation of the products and services that 
the financial services industry was now allowed to offer (Parker, 1999: 163). The 
legislation not only served to blur the boundaries between existing product 
providers, but also threw open the entire marketplace to fi^sh competition. The 
definition of what constituted a bank became less clear-cut (Lewellyn, 1994: 15-
16). Building Societies and new financial providers, e.g. supermarkets and high 
street stores were given the opportunity to offer financial products alongside their 
merchandise and compete directly on both cost and convenience with the high 
street banks (Fincham et al., 1994: 36). 
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In response to this increasing competition, traditional banks were forced into 
making profound changes to the way they carried out their business. Banking 
branches were transformed fix)m being simply conveniently situated, passive, 
processing intermediaries, into cutthroat, aggressive, meuket driven retailing sites: 
... before deregulation you had a nice, comfy cartel of the 'Big Four', 
who were making great, abnost obscene levels of profit 'thank you', 
all the punters were happy. They were getting top-flight service. 
Deregulation comes along, more people flood into the market, higher 
cost constraints. The only way to maintain profit levels other than 
maintaining your income is by cutting costs, so that is what they [Bank 
UK] have done. 
(George, Manager, West Town branch, 5/12/00). 
The necessity for banks to provide expertise in an extensive range of financial 
products catering for a large number of consumers was a new concept (Burton, 
1994: 46). It was questioned whether existing branch staff would be able to make 
the seamless transition fit)m banker to retailer. Historically, banks had not 
strategically looked to recmit specialist sales personnel - a move reflected in the 
content of their typical remuneration packages, which offered a regular salary, 
career structure and profit sharing - in sharp contrast to those generally associated 
with commissioned sales personnel where a high degree of their salary was 'at 
risk' (Burton, 1994: 53). For branch-based staff in Bank UK, change with regard 
to sales appeared to arrive suddenly and without warning: 
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You know, I joined the bank to be a banker and all of a sudden they 
changed my job description and said i f you don't sell you are in the 
wrong job. It was almost as though the rug was pulled out fiiom under 
us... 1 didn't join the bank to sell. Having said that, i f there is 
something really good that would benefit somebody then I would sell 
it, but I can't stitch people up! 1 can't do that! They said in the 
meetings the other day we've got to be dirty, and 1 can't do that. 
(Leah, Sales Executive, North Town branch, 15/2/01). 
. . . I 'm not a salesman and I can't get into this... The product of the 
week is Jack High', and everyone who walks through the door has got 
to have one i f we can get them to accept it. I f we can't do it on a 
banking basis then we've got to sell it to them on the basis that they 
can save 10 per cent on a fiidge / fieezer next week, ff I am forced to 
do that, then I feel like a little bloke in a sheepskin coat tiying to flog a 
motor-a horrible, nasty little job. 
(Eric, Manager, Harbour Town branch, 18/10/00). 
Interviews carried out during the course o f my research indicated that staff felt 
Bank UK's sudden shift towards the establishment of retailing as its main 
organisational priority had occurred too quickly, and with scant regard for 
offering any sort of training for their new roles. Analysis of responses suggested 
staff felt extremely bitter that their annual cost of living rise was now dependent 
upon the achievement o f a certain level o f sales, without having received 
coaching, or the opportunity to practise the art of selling^: "There really isn't 
really anything different than somebody who works in a shop... but I need 
' Pseudonym for Bank UK's premier currem account One if its benefits was a *home shopping' 
service, which guaranteed at least 10% discount on the purchase of * wh ite goods'. 
^ More will be writtai about the linking of salary to sales achievement later in the chapter. 
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product knowledge. 1 need to know what I am talking about" (Maureen, Sales 
Executive, West Town branch, 5/12/00): 
. . . I mean I've been on a half-day lead generation course, which the 
scenarios they give you just don't happen. You just don't get Fred 
Bloggs coming and saying "How about a pension? I want to save £100 
a month" - you just don't get that! 
(Wanda, cashier, West Town branch, 12/12/00). 
[On joining the bank six months earlier]... there is an absolute lack of 
training. I know they say you don't need to know everything about a 
product to be able to sell it, but I don't think that's a very good outlook 
to have, because i f customers do tum around and ask a question you 
can't help them at all. Then it's just like (pause) cold selling. "Buy 
this, but 1 can't tell you anything about i t"! How am F expected to 
idenfify what is good for them, i f 1 don't know anything about each 
thing. How am I meant to know i f it is good for them or not? 
(Lauren, Cashier, West Town branch, 5/12/00). 
Training, and its associated issue of skill were often talked about during 
fieldwork, within both formal interview sessions and in the course of everyday 
office banter. Long-serving, experienced staff felt their traditional banking skills 
(accuracy, numeracy and the ability to make reasoned decisions), had been 
undermined by the increasing emphasis Bank UK now placed on retailing. Selling 
necessitated greater training pnDvision, and the opportunity to develop the skills 
commonly associated with a retailing role, e.g. good interpersonal abilities, 
teamworking, and the acceptance of flexibility (as both a numerical flexibility 
175 
with regard to working hours, and a functional flexibility in accepting a multi-
tasking role vWthin the organisation). 
Staff appeared confused by their new roles, which they saw as contradictory. 
Bank UK no longer expected them to be specialists in their more traditional 
banking roles such as lending or cashiering, but to embrace new roles as sales 
personnel. Yet, because Bank UK's core business remained driven by financial 
transactions, staff simply had to retain their more traditional banking 
proficiencies. During a typical working hour they might be expected to cashier, 
open a business account, deal with a deceased customer and change foreign 
cun^ncy, whilst at the same time remaining vigilant for every opportunity to sell 
Bank UK's financial products. 
Staff appeared to view 'selling' as a skill. A distinctive, irmate ability, which 
individuals either had or had not: 
... it's a definite skill and to a certain extent you've either got that sort 
of skill inbuilt in your personality. I mean you can develop it and you 
can practise it, and in time encourage it, but on a whole I still think 
you are bom with that type of skill. With the ability to talk to 
customers really well and not be too pushy, but just to be assertive 
enough to sell at the end of the day... 
(Nina, Sales Executive, Harbour Town branch, 18/10/00). 
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During 2000, Bank UK obviously decided that increasing the level of its sales 
penetration was now of such strategic importance to its long-term growth, it 
offered its staff an opportunity to develop their selling skills, through the 
provision of an intensive, 3-day sales training course for all branch based staff 
who were formally mandated to attend. These intemally provided courses were 
held throughout the UK at local training venues. As part of my participatory 
cashiering role, George (Manager, West Tov^ branch), offered me the 
opportunity to attend such a course. This not only allowed me to undertake an 
unexpected, and probably unprecedented piece o f research right at the heart of 
Bank UK's new sales oriented organisational culture, it also gave me the 
opportunity to gain a greater insight into the philosophy underpinning much of 
Bank UK's sales rhetoric. 
Mastering the art of selling. 
My sales course was held during July 2000 in an "enterprise centre", located 
within an industrial estate almost central to the geographical area of my 
fieldwork. Bank UK had hired the building on a long-term let, complete with 
furnishings and equipment. There were eight delegates (including myself), all of 
whom were female, and during introductions it became clear that five o f them 
were employed on *casuar contracts and were therefore not eligible to receive 
any sales related bonus payments, despite being expected to spot and close sales 
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in the manner now expected by the bank. Mindful of the ethical considerations of 
doing sociological research, I remained open and honest about my cun^nt role 
within Bank UK and introduced myself as a researcher first, and a cashier second. 
I stressed to the floor that I was a legitimate staff member at the present time, 
undertaking a genuine cashiering role at West Town branch and was not attending 
the course as *a plant'. 
The early part of the course constituted a reminder of the history o f Bank UK, 
which finished with a detailed explanation as to why the bank needed its staff to 
evolve into retailers, rather than simply remaining 'bankers'. Increasing 
competition from a wide range of sources meant Bank UK needed to respond 
aggressively to threats to its dominance as a key financial services provider. 
However, not surprisingly, the main quest of the course was to offer staff an 
opportunity to practise the identification, dialogue and closure o f sales, whilst 
overcoming potential consumer objections. What follows is a description of the 
way this training was delivered. 
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The key training objectives of the course were to help staff contribute to Bank 
UK's desire to increase its overall group income by £500 million eveiy year by: 
1. Explaining the importance of customer service and sales in 
achieving the overall aim of Bank UK. 
2. Demonstrating appropriate interpersonal skills when managing 
sales dialogue. 
3. Helping staff make effective sales presentations. 
4. Helping staff professionally refuse requests (when credit cannot be 
extended) and overcome objections (to sales). 
5. Demonstrating the importance to consumer confidence of good 
administration and after sales contact. 
(Research Diaiy, 11/7/00). 
Training sessions were practical rather than theoretical. Over two days were spent 
practising and improving sales dialogue, whilst demonstrating working solutions 
to common staff complaints they did not have enough time to sell in increasingly 
busy branches. 
The consensus of the group appeared to be a reluctance to approach customers 
with semi - scripted sales dialogue when faced with queues. Bank UK's old 
mantra of "serve the queue and get rid of it at all costs" appeared to still be 
embedded too deeply in staff psyche. To overcome this reluctance, delegates were 
instructed to act out a common retail-shopping scenario where a typical offer 
might be: "Buy Two, Get a Third Free". A customer had supposedly approached a 
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supermarket checkout with only two items relating to the offer. Hany (course 
facilitator)*, suggested that however long the queue may be, or indeed become, it 
would be in the best interests of the customer (and the goodwill of the store) for 
the cashier to point out that a third article would be free, and i f the customer 
wanted to take-up the offer, it may be prudent to offer to get the product for them, 
i.e. leave a busy till position. He asked how often we, as consumers, had met that 
scenario and asked us to comment how we felt about it. General agreement 
appeared to be that it was fairly common event, and nobody reaJIy minded waiting 
in the queue, as they would have been grateful to have had the offer pointed out to 
them i f they too had missed it. Harry asked i f there was really any difference 
between this scenario and a cashier asking a customer i f they had a credit card / or 
had booked for a financial MOT even i f the customer had a long queue behind 
them. 
Despite the extremely good illustration of the point Harry was trying to make, 
staff felt that customers did not necessarily enter a bank with the purpose of 
buying something, and at least in the shopping scenario it was clear what the 
customer was buying and, more importantly, that they wanted to buy. The shop 
assistant was not asking them to buy something ihey did not want, or had not 
asked for. Harry appeared unable to understand exactly what our objections were, 
and 1 tried to animate our concerns by referring to the experience o f buying shoes. 
' Harry was a staff member of Bank UK who had been an interna) course facilitator for over 5 
years. He appeared to be about 30 years old. As changing emphasis was placed on different 
elements of the bank / customer relationship, he had rewritten his courses to reflect these shifts. 
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We might want a pair of shoes, but commonly detest being asked i f we want to 
buy waterproof polish, shoehorns etc. at the same time. Wasn't this the same as 
asking a customer who might be simply paying a bill, i f they wanted a mortgage / 
car loan etc.? Harry dismissed our criticisms by asking us to remember that Bank 
UK wanted staff to move away from the idea they were simply bankers, and we 
[staff] needed to remember we were now retailers o f financial services and 
products too. (Research Diaiy, 11/7/00). 
To overcome what Harry termed the "pervading mentality of staff shyness'* in 
simply asking customers i f they were interested in a financial product (as 
illustrated in the practical activity detailed above), we were instructed to 
undertake role plays' at the fix)nt o f the group. Participants were given a sheet 
containing six photographs of what were determined to be typical Bank UK 
customers- three male and three female. The pictures were stereotypically 
gendered. All the womien were portrayed with children / pregnant/ with shopping 
bags, whilst the men were suited and carried newspapers, briefcases and filofaxes. 
Harry asked two delegates at a time to act out what he called "opening sales 
conversations" based on characteristics thought to be portrayed by the 
photographs. The group decided appropriate dialogue might consist: 
' Harry preferred to refer lo role-plays as *non-threatening job situations' (Researdi Diary, 
12/7/01). 
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1. You look busy... (possibly able to sell [offer] telephone / internet 
banking), for the men. 
2. You have obviously been shopping, have you bought anything 
nice? (possibly to sell [offer] a personal loan / credit card), for the 
women. 
Harry suggested that it might be appropriate to have a couple o f opening 
questions in mind, in case the first fell flat, and suggested the use of 'open' 
questions, e.g. "What kind of day are you having", to quickly engage the 
customer in dialogue, followed by what Bank UK called "high gain" questions, 
for example: "What does your fixed rate mortgage cost you in increased payments 
per month"? (Research Diary, 12/7/00): 
In a sales situation, asking questions is like spending money. You must 
tiy to get a high retum from your questions because you have only a 
limited amount of time in which to ask them... High gain questions 
require clients to become engaged mentally, because they ask for high-
value information that cannot be found quickly... Clients cannot 
"coast" while answering these questions. In simple terms, high-gain 
questions require clients to think [original italics] before responding. 
(Bank UK Learning Organisation' Handout dated 17/3/99). 
The afternoon of the final day was spent entirely in role-play. Pairs of delegates 
took turns to act out common sales scenarios in order to become more 
comfortable with injecting sales dialogue into typical staff / customer 
conversations. The pairings were scattered throughout the room, and the groups 
seated furthest away fix)m Harry, (who moved around the room, listening and 
' Bank UK Learning Organisation was the formal name for Bank UK*s internal training division. 
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suggesting improvements), quickly got bored, and spent time swapping cynicisms 
about what Bank UK now expected from them in terms of sales achievement, and 
horror stories about awkward, complaining customers for whom it was thought 
staff had become: "verbal punch bags" (Research Diary, 13/7/00). 
The embarrassment of selling. 
Back in the branches and away from the sterile environment of sales courses, 
practising the art of selling became an integral part of daily scrum activity. With 
product specific campaigns now being changed on a month-by-month basis. Bank 
UK cleariy hoped that by demanding that its staff pracrise semi-scripted dialogue 
in non-threatening situations on a regular basis, they would become more 
confident using them with customers: 
George informed us that he had been instructed to set up 'sales power 
hours', where staff were expected to concentrate on just one product 
every day. Today he had been instructed to concentrate on mortgages. 
We were asked to approach customers with: "When did Bank UK last 
review your mortgage"? He asked us to stand in a circle and practise 
the phrase with each other, going round in the circle four times. 
(Research Diary, 8/1 I/O 1). 
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Had to practise 'hostage selling'' this moming. George and Sam 
showed us what to do. Sam sat in her till position and George played 
the part of the customer. The scenario comprised: during the course of 
carrying out a financial transaction, CSALES had flagged to Sam that 
George had not yet upgraded his account to Jack High. She was 
expected to say: "I 'm sorry we don't appear to have upgraded your 
account to Jack High. I ' l l just go and get somebody to do that now for 
you". After finishing the dialogue, and without giving George a chance 
to protest, she was expected to break eye contact, and keeping hold o f 
his chequebook instruct a sales executive to go out to George and get 
the product sold. I asked George what would happen in the real world, 
when the cashier may have carried out the scripted dialogue as 
required, yet no sales executives were available to see the customer 
straight away. He just looked at me and told me not to be "so 
negative". 
(Research Diaiy, 6/12/01). 
Staff viewed these "...pantomime fiascos..." as ". . . bloody sing-songs... I f they 
taught my 9-year old daughter like this, I would be up at school complaining." 
(Sam, chief cashier. South Town branch, 22/10/01). Further repugnance was also 
shov^ towards sales incentives that caused staff*to feel they were being ridiculed 
through the actions they were expected to carry out. One such campaign involved 
the marketing of Bank UK's Jack High account in December 2000. During the 
month all Jack High sales were converted into sales points and at the end of the 
campaign, the branch achieving the highest points would win a staffs day out at the 
races (entrance only, no travelling expenses). Extra points could be awarded for 
exceeding individual branch targets by ever increasing percentages. Immediately 
' 'Hostage Selling' is a pseudonym for Bank UK's sales initiative, which sought to keep the 
customer in a branch until they have met a Sales Executive. The common ploy was for a cashier to 
retain their cheque book/ credit card etc. (or whatever had been handed over for a financial 
transaction) and give the item to a nominated SE. By doing this, it was hoped the S E would be 
able to engage in sales dialogue, spot a selling opportunity and close a sale. 
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of no interest to staff in the majority of my field sites, located as they were over 
130 miles away from the nearest racecourse, staff were further disheartened by 
the news that one cashier at a time was expected to wear a jockey's cap with the 
aim of encouraging customers to enquire why. I f the wearer managed to 
successfully introduce Jack High into the conversation and sell the product, they 
were absolved from any further cap wearing duties that day, and the cap had to be 
passed along the cashiers until the new wearer managed to sell the product, and so 
on: 
These sorts of things make you say: " I can't be bothered with this". If 
they say something like at the start of the day, "just get me four 
accounts"... well I mean I know we've got to do it, but it's when we 
have these SILLY little competitions and games that I think: "What 
are we? Children or adults"? 
(Jane, chief cashier, West Town branch, 12/12/00). 
On other occasions, inflated party balloons* were used visibly to portray expected 
targets. In July 2001, branch managers were instructed: 
Do balloon 'scrum' next week ... reverse psychology ... instead o f 
putting names on the wall [traditionally used to denote achievers], we 
all start with names on balloons, and when a pension interview is 
booked, we pop the balloon, and the winning member of staff wins a 
bottle of wine. 
(Bank UK, Internal Managerial Memorandum dated 11/7/01). 
The cost of their purchase was agreed at regional management level. 
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To help staff introduce specific banking products into the course o f their 
conversations with customers, branch interiors were sometimes bedecked in one 
colour throughout, in order to make customers ask why, thereby creating the 
opportunity to mention, explain and sell the product at the focus of the current 
campaign. During November 2001, Bank UK wanted staff to make an extra effort 
to sell Jack High accounts, and in order to help draw customers' attention to the 
product, regional management demanded that one particular Friday be designated 
an 'everything gold day''. At South Town branch, gold crepe paper was fastened 
over the walls of the banking hall and gold balloons were strung from the cornice. 
However, staff had collectively reftised to work in all gold attire: "I've only got 
one gold thing. That's my evening dress, and i f George thinks I'm wearing that to 
work, he can f**k off!" (Sam, chief cashier, I6/11/01), As a compromise they 
agreed to sew lengths o f gold tinsel onto their unifomi jackets and wear gold 
bowties. George had not had time to sew his tinsel onto his jacket the night 
before, so stapled it in place first thing, whilst sarcastically joking: " I ' l l probably 
get reprimanded for gross misconduct by defacing my bank uniform" (Research 
Diary, 16/11/01). 
Unfortunately this sales incentive backfired on two counts. Despite earlier staff 
misgivings that it had been scheduled to run on a nationwide children's appeal 
day. Bank UK had insisted that it went ahead, and as predicted, customers thought 
' Gold being the colour Bank UK wanted consumers to associate widi the 'Jack High' product. 
The rhetoric appeared to be gold = the best. 
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staff were simply dressing up to take part in the charity day. Others commented: 
"Aren't you a bit early in decorating the branch for Christmas"? (Research Diary, 
16/11/01). The veiy nature of the charity day meant that during opening hours, all 
the cashiers were extremely busy counting piles o f loose coins from buckets and 
other collecting tins, so had little time to explain why the banking hall had been 
decorated, or sell Jack High as mandated. In any event, customers were simply 
not interested in buying or listening to sales patter, busy as they were with charity 
events. 
A few weeks later when it was time to put Christmas decorations up in the 
banking hall, South Town's staff were told that advertising space now had to take 
priority over the festivities. An intemal memo dealing specifically with branch 
Christmas decoration stated: "We do not wish to detract fix)m the perception that 
we are a serious, professional sales organisation" (Research Diary, 13/12/01): 
Put up the Christmas decorations. Claire and I just decorated a fake 3ft 
tabletop tree with lights and ornaments and managed to put up one 
swag of tinsel in the banking hall. New instructions meant we were not 
allowed to cover any part of sales posters or promotional literature. 
Mindful of the long-held mandate to ensure decorations did not cause 
problems with security equipment that was all we could practically 
manage. 
(Research Diary, 13/12/01). 
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Other data demonstrate that Bank UK was beginning to seriously undermine its 
professionalism through some of its more bizarre teamworking incentives. In May 
2002 I queued as a customer in Harbour Town branch. Facing the queue on the 
walls were what appeared to be pictures fiom a children's colouring competition. 
Computer generated, blank faces had been printed onto A4 sheets o f white paper. 
I could see that features had been added, along with hair. Each face appeared to 
have a different expression, for example portraying anger, sadness, satisfection or 
friendliness. When I got nearer I was absolutely amazed to find the display was 
headed: "Staff By Staff', and what the pictures represented were staff caricatures 
of each other experiencing different moods. On reaching the counter I asked Sally 
(Assistant Manager) what had been happening. She just laughed, saying: "You 
will be pleased to know that that the bank has not become any more professional 
since you left and has actively been dumbing down."(Research Diaiy, 7/5/02). 
She informed me that staff had been asked to add features and expressions to the 
blank feces with wax crayon and colouring pencils during recent scum sessions, 
and explained that the idea behind the posters had been a desire to cement 
teamworking activity by group consensus of individual personalities. Where staff 
had been portrayed as angiy or demotivated, they were expected to change their 
attitudes towards work, and ftirther personality appraisal via artwork would take 
place later in the year. 
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The sexuality of selling. 
Analysis of sales related activities in Bank UK suggest both the language and 
deliveiy of sales within branches was often heavily masculinised and sexualised. 
It was common for typically masculine sporting and combative metaphors to 
pervade throughout sales campaigns. Many consisted of'knockout cups', Meague 
tables' and 'levels o f penetration'. Branches were encouraged to think of 
themselves in terms of a series of footballing metaphors. Their customer bases 
constituted the pitch, which could be split into three distinctive arenas - defence 
(cashiers, who were deemed to be defending the more traditional banking role), 
midfield - new technologies which made sales identification easier and created a 
link between the more traditional cashiering defensive role, and the 'upfit)nt' roles 
of the Sales Executives, (who added value and gained points): 
In the event of a tie-break [number of Jack High accounts sold during 
one particular sales week], there will be a 'virtual reality' penalty 
shoot out. You will ringx at Harbour Town branch (telephone number) 
who will (on your instructions, i.e. left, right, direct at 
goalie...whatever) take a shot at goal with a soft football Jeremy' has 
brought in, and Jeremy will attempt to save it. It will be a sudden death 
penalty with the first branch scoring winning.... At half time (i.e. 
Wednesdays weekly) ring or e-mail me to let me know your half time 
scores and what you, as 'Jack High' coach, are planning to do for the 
rest of the game to ensure a win! 
(Intemal Management Memorandum enfitled "Jack High 
Champions League 2001", dated 15/11/01). 
Jeremy - Regional Manager. 
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Other marketing campaigns appeared specifically sexualised, albeit in non-
threatening or discriminatoiy ways. As a concession to the common cashiering 
complaint that even i f staff managed to introduce and explain the benefits of a 
particular product to a customer, it was common to find that Sales Executives 
were unavailable to close the sale, 'gossip' boxes were introduced throughout the 
branch network in November 2000. Essentially any old box the branch could find 
was placed close to the cashiers vfho were expected to record 'gossip' (sales 
opportunities), which were later passed to Sales Executives to follow up. A 
customer might mention they were thinking o f moving house (mortgages, home 
and contents insurance, life insurance, increased overdraft facilities), changing 
their car (personal loan, motor insurance) booking a foreign holiday (holiday 
insurance, foreign exchange, personal loan), expecting a baby (persona! loan, 
improved life assurance, infant savings account, possible house move) etc. Were 
Bank UK suggesting that its mainly female cashiers were considered suitable to 
undertake this exercise by an implicit assumption that all women, by virtue o f 
their sex, were biologically predisposed to gossip, and that an increasing interest 
in the private lives of customers was just women chatting, as women are known to 
do (Frenkel et al., 1999: 7), rather than illicitly gathering intelligence for Bank 
UK? 
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On the counter a plastic ice-cream container had been placed out of 
customer sight. It had a hand-written sticker maiked 'Gossip Box' 
stuck to it. I asked Jane what it was for. She said it was for the cashiers 
to record any gossip they heard fi^m customers that might be able to 
be turned into a lead or sale i f the cashiers felt uncomfortable, or did 
not have the time to broach the subject there and then. She said that it 
had been there for 2 days and as yet nothing had been put in it. 
(Research Diaiy, 12/12/00). 
Other sales initiatives used direct sexual innuendoes. Despite a strong denial of 
organisational sexuality within banking, my research suggested that not only were 
women used directly to intelligence gather (through gossip boxes), their indirect 
presence appeared to drive sexuality in sales initiatives. Through the use of 
sexually explicit mnemonics. Bank UK appeared to be implicitly encouraging its 
typically female fi*ont-line staff to have SEX v^th their customers: S-Smile, E-
Eye Contact, X-Excite. Cashiers were asked to close sales opportunities by 
making sure they 'KISSED ASS' (Keep It Short And Simple) (Research Diary, 
5/7/01). Another campaign in June 2001 encouraged staff to suggest: 
We can offer the customer a great service with some tremendous 
products to meet their needs. So remember to have an ORGASMIC 
time with them. Don't forget the customer can either v ^ k out the door 
(sic), or Come And See My Investment Champion. 
(Research Diaiy, 5/7/01). 
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My analysis of Bank UK's advertising and promotional literature suggested it too 
had become heavily sexualised. During June 2001, the Jack High account was 
heavily marketed throughout Bank UK's branch network. One o f the major 
features o f the account the offer of fiee travel insurance, and the summer 
2001 campaign chose to spotlight this benefit under a vigorous mariceting 
campaign entitled "Have You Got It Covered". Staff were instructed to put 
marketing literature relating to this campaign into leaflet dispensers built into the 
hands of two life-sized cardboard men, (delivered to every branch specifically for 
this promotion), which were placed adjacent lo the barriers delineating the 
queuing area for cashiering services. One of the cardboard models was a white 
skinned man, clad only in swimming trunks, looking very pink and hiding under a 
sunshade. His partner was a brown skinned man, who was again wearing only 
swimming trunks, yet was posed veiy provocatively on a towel within a mock 
beach scene with his legs suggestively apart, whilst his hands (holding leaflets in 
the form of a dispenser) were placed firmly on his genital region (Research Diary, 
29/6/01). The advertising slogan "Have You Got It Covered?", whilst primarily 
using sun and shade to illustrate the protective nature of travel insurance, could 
also be understood as a sexual innuendo by using hands in the form o f leaflet 
dispensers to cover genital areas. 
A later promotion featured personal loans. The campaign was entitled "Free with 
every personal loan" and portrayed the fite offer as 'expert advice'. Posters and 
their accompanying literature portrayed a member of Bank UK's staff sitting at a 
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desk talking to a customer. The rhetoric behind the campaign appeared fine, 
except that the member of bank staff was male, and the customer was female, 
with a toddler and a baby in a pram. Did this sort of advertising portray a belief 
that men were still considered experts both within the banking industry and wider 
society, and women by virtue of being placed as 'the other' (Ramazanoglu, 1989) 
were not? (Research Diary, 8/1 l/OI). 
Pointe make prizes! 
In the early part of this chapter I used interview and field data to highlight the 
variety of different ways adopted by Bank UK in its attempt to deliver various 
sales and marketing strategies throughout the branch network. Practical examples 
have illustrated how the shifting of organisational priorities from 'banking' (in its 
broadest sense), to retailing has been experienced by staff. The requirement that 
staff attend a three-day, mandatoiy sales course graphically illustrated that the 
marketisation and selling of banking, insurance and longer-term financial 
products had become a strategically important area of concern for Bank UK. 
During the course of my research. Bank UK introduced weekly sales targets 
throughout the branch network, which were expected to be met week in, week 
out. Failure, with regard to sales was no longer an option. An internal managerial 
circular warned branch managers: "...there are no prizes for pride, only points. 
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ONLY YOU (original capitals) can make the choice. It's a simple choice — do it 
or do not, there is no try" (Research Diary, 22/6/01). 
Further interview and fieldwork data will be used later in the chapter to explain 
the various strategies adopted by branches in ensuring their weekly sales targets 
were achieved. In order that the rationale underpinning such targets can be fully 
examined, the following part of this chapter explains how sales targets were 
calculated. (The following chapter will examine the concepts o f failure with 
regard to target achievement from a number of different levels [personal, branch, 
regional], and the impact the growth of fear of failure has had on respondents). 
Despite being active in the field for over two years, I found it almost impossible 
to ascertain exactly how sales targets were determined. There appeared to be a 
great deal of confusion, speculation and ignorance amongst all grades o f staff, 
including managers. 
I have no idea how it [branch sales target] is calculated (laughs). We 
have never been told. We have certainly asked. Apparently the region 
gets a target. So it is just a series of split-outs. So national sales wil l 
have a target, they split that out to regions, the regions split it out into 
areas, the areas split it out to the branches, and a lot of that is probably 
based on footflow (pause). 1 mean I don't know how it is done. They 
probably take footflow. It's probably based on opportunity. I think that 
is probably the best way to describe it. The number of people who 
actually come through the door. 
(George, Manager, West Town branch, 5/12/00). 
194 
In attempting to gather more information about the generation and setting of 
branch sales targets I asked all my respondents i f they felt able to explain how 
targets were calculated, and the amount o f additional monetary reward they could 
expect to earn when qualifying levels o f sales were achieved. Their responses 
suggested that far fix)m being clear, open and simple in delivery, the whole area of 
sales and perfomiance related pay was shrouded in mystery and confijsion. Even 
newly appointed Sales Executives, who had been charged with the task o f tuming 
all potential opportunities into sales (and whose bonuses were heavily dependent 
on branches achieving as expected)', were unclear as to exactly what was 
expected of them, and how achievement was determined: 
They tried to show us once on the most complicated (pause), 1 mean 
Einstein would have nothing on this (laughs), but I think it has 
deliberately been made that complicated... 
(Leah, Sales Executive, North Town branch, 15/2/01). 
Nothing has been fully explained. When it first came out 1 think I must 
have been on holiday or something so I didn't have it explained to me 
what it all meant. I did see a lot of stuff in the circulation but as you 
know you don't have time to read it so you tend to skim through it. 
What I gather is that obviously you are targeted on your sales and 
customer service... 
(Nina, Sales Executive, Harbour Town branch, 18/10/00). 
' Sales Executives were paid a basic salary dependent on their grading. See pages 160-161 for a 
detailed understanding of the development and internal grading of their role. 
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...It's still a mystery to me is this performance related pay. It's still a 
mystery! I know that out of the branch I am the one with the least 
points - they give you a chart of what you have achieved each 
month... 
(Britney, Cashier, South Town branch, 2 5 / 1 0 / 0 0 - six months after joining 
Bank UK). 
I think 1 know how it works. It is very sales oriented...! know roughly 
what the bonuses are. There is a bonus for your grade and a bonus for 
hitting target, and then there is another bonus for going over target. 
(Maureen, Sales Executive, West Town branch, 5 /12 /00 ) . 
1 can honestly say that 1 don't know how the system works, li is all 
about A and D ' and stufif and 1 don't know what that stands for! 
Everyone has got yellow books^ except me, so I'm like: "I've got a 
sale, where do I mark it down"? I don't know i f I'm to be doing any o f 
the things other staff are. What is an A and D? I don't even know what 
it stands for (laughs). As far as the yellow book is concerned 1 think 
it's about recording sales... 
(Crystal, Cashier, West Town branch, 5 /12 /00 - six months after joining 
Bank UK). 
' A & D - Appraisal and Development Quarterly staff review. 
^ A yellow hard backed book had been given to every member of staff for them to keep manual 
records of ihe products they had sold for a particular period. Levels of sales, and effort (i.e. where 
a lead had been generated) were used to contribute to an assessment of an individual's overall 
performance. 
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Despite the overwhelming evidence of confusion and lack of understanding 
sun'ounding sales targets and perfonmance indicators, all staff had been expected 
to lodge individual, written sales bids at the beginningof2001' . These bids were 
effectively formal agreements between the staff member and Bank UK to achieve 
a certain level of sales and generate an agreed number o f leads (introductions) to 
the regulated sales force.^ Bids were generally commensurate with responsibilities 
and experience. Individual bids were then split into weekly targets, and completed 
spreadsheets were submitted to regioneil office on a regular basis in order that 
achievements could be monitored. 
In order to make this monitoring easier, all staff were allocated a unique 6-digit 
code number which they were expected to apply to both electronically completed 
sales fonms, e.g. account opening via a computer, or on paper-based applications 
forwarded to other departments for completion. Theoretically it should not have 
mattered whether the product was sold to a South Town, North Town or Harbour 
Town customer. Whosever's sales identification number was electronically or 
manually keyed as the selling agent, that member of staff received individual 
credit for the sale. 
' The requirement to 'bid' was only extended to permanent full-time or part-lime employees who 
were eligible to receive perfomiance related pay. Those employed on various types o f 'casual 
contracts' were not required to bid, but were expected to work alongside their permanent 
colleagues in successfully achieving branch targets. More will be uritten later in the chapter about 
this. 
^ The regulated sales force consisted of Bank U K ' s professional sales staff who had gained formal 
qualifications in specialist sectors of the financial services industry. They were mostly concerned 
with the sales of life assurance, pensions, mortgages and estate planning. 
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This system of electronically tagging sales should have enabled individual 
performances to be easily monitored on a regular basis. Unfortunately this did not 
appear to be the case. The individualised system of perfonmance monitoring was 
unable to recognise instances of multiple staff involvement in the successful sale 
of a product or service. The very nature of individual targets meant that staff were 
veiy often so busy competing against each other in the competition to sell 
products, any opportunity appeared to be taken to change seller codes. For 
example, i f an individual a had discussed a product with a customer, yet could 
continue no further than offering a leaflet on which he or she had written their 
seller code, and the customer returned to buy the product at either another branch, 
or when a was unavailable, my fieldwork suggested it was common practice for b 
who later closed the sale, to delete the earlier seller code from the leaflet and 
endorse it with their own instead, ff the product was opened by another 
department, (as is the case with mortgages for example), the seller code may even 
be changed for a third time, even though all the groundwork relating to the sale 
had been carried out solely by a. The discrepancy in agent seller achievement 
would generally not be revealed until a tried to reconcile electronically compiled 
achievement to his or her own manual records. 
All staff had all been given notebooks in which to keep manual records of their 
sales achievements, which were used to convince management, where necessary, 
that errors had been made in points and product allocation. My data suggest there 
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were three problems with the reconciliation of manual figures to those generated 
electronically. The first was the theft o f sales (as discussed in the paragraph 
above), the second was a managerial concern that some sales may be gifted- i.e. 
where overachieving individuals donated sales they did not require in the 
achievement of their own bid, to other colleagues who were struggling. The final 
problem was simply the amount of time sales reconciliation took. Branch 
managers often had to make the difficult decision whether or not to pursue 
wrongfiil or missing points in view of the inordinate amount of time they had to 
spend chasing up other departments or regional office. Sometimes it appeared 
wiser to just accept the electronically produced figures and use the time they 
would have spent arguing about the miscalculation of points in actively pursuing 
new sales opportunities: 
It shouldn't take up a huge part of my day, but unfortunately we do 
seem to keep on missing points on the sales achievement figures that 
we get back fix)m region and then there is a MONUMENTAL amount 
of work to try and get back the points. It's very diflBcult to know 
where to draw the line, because i f you manage to achieve a sale you 
want the points, but i f its going to take such a huge amount of work 
you might as well forget them, say those points are gone and spend 
your time trying to achieve new sales which may be more worthwhile 
at the end of the day anyway. 
(Lionel, Manager, South Town branch, 25/10/00). 
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During 2001, it became clear that Bank UK was increasingly anxious to ensure 
that its entire branch based workforce achieved as expected, and sales were not 
just left to one or two individuals who donated their excess sales to struggling 
colleagues. After branch closing time one day in July 2001, George asked his staff 
to listen to a telephone conference call he and other managers had been asked to 
prearrange with the area manager. The audio conference contained a strong, 
verbal warning for staff that i f it could be later proven that individuals had 
changed seller codes on products either they or anybody else had sold (which 
covered gift of sales and thefl of sales), such action would now be treated as an 
act of gross misconduct, instantly making it a sackable offence, without the 
requirement for formal verbal and written conduct warnings. George tried to ask 
Lesley (Area Manager) to whom sales undertaken by 'casual' staff who did not 
have a unique seller code should be allocated', and was simply told, *this was not 
the time to discuss trivial matters such as this" (Research Diary, 6/7/01). 
Levels of product penetration were generally monitored in two distinctive ways. 
Simplistically staff merely counted the actual number of products sold, e.g. three 
personal loans, five savings accounts, one mortgage lead etc. Yet Bank UK had 
added a product weighting, which supposedly reflected the true value of the 
product to the organisation. No memoranda had ever been received which 
' During the course of my participant observation I knew that I could not be reprimanded in the 
same manner as my colleagues if I did not actively contribute to the overall branch sales target, yet 
I realised thai the continuation of my presence in the field really depended on being seen to make a 
substantial contribution to the achievements of all my research sites. I did not have a seller code, 
so often asked around who wanted my points when I sold key products. 
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explained exactly how values were allocated to products, but it was generally 
accepted amongst staff that any analysis of value must represent the net worth of 
the product, i.e. the potential for increased income generation for Bank UK. The 
higher the potential for income generation, the greater the number of points 
allocated to the product. Lending products (where income generation was much 
higher) generally attracted higher sales points than savings accounts (which 
attracted a payment of interest by Bank UK). Rate of footflow and staff 
establishment levels also appeared to be combined with the assessment of 
probabilities of income generation to determine final target levels. (As branch 
footflow was inextricably linked to establishment levels this was not unexpected). 
By whatever method Bank UK used to allocate points to its financial products, 
staff were expected to simultaneously achieve two distinctive targets on a week-
by-week basis. Not only were they expected to fulfil the expectations o f their 
-. 
individual bids, they were also required to ensure their branches achieved their 
own weekly points / product targets. In order for a branch to meet its obligations it 
had to generate x number of points, whilst at the same time ensuring that its points 
generation included benchmark achievements' for individual products. Curiously, 
Bank UK had determined benchmark expectation to be 130 per cent of target, 
thereby expecting 30 per cent excess every week. 
' Each branch had individual benchmark levels for product penetration in addition to the 
requirement to achieve the generation ofx number of points. 
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During 2001, South Town branch, with a staff establishment of 4.43, and an 
average daily footflow of approximately 200' was set the following weekly 
targets: 
Sales Points: 950pw^, 190 pd** (100%). 
I235pw.247pd (130%). 
Appointments for 'Financial MOTs' booked with Sales Executive - 12 (4 x fte)^ 
Number of drawdown^ personal loans - 10 (branch total) 
Leads to regulated sales force resultant in booked interview - 10 (branch total). 
Mortgage applications completed - 5 (branch total). 
Conversions to 'Jack High' accounts - 10 (branch total). 
Completed credit card applications — 10 (branch total). 
Telephone quotations for home and contents insurance - 9 (branch total). 
Detailed analysis of data relating to the issue of sales, targets, points and 
achievement illustrate yet another paradox. It was unclear from both fieldwork 
and interview data, whether Bank UK was more concemed with the attainment of 
an individual staff member through its system of sales bidding, or overall branch 
achievement. 
' I based my footllow figure on the average number of cash only transartions, electronically 
counted by C S A L E S s>'stem during one particular week in September 2001. This was certainly not 
representative of true footflow. 
^Per week 
^ Per day 
* fte = Full Time Employee 
^ 'Drawdown' - Personal loan agreement forms that had been signed and loan monies transferred 
between accounts. 
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In June 2001 the difBculties associated with trying to fiilfil two sales targets were 
apparent at South Town branch. During one particular week, the branch managed 
to achieve sales, whose value of product points was 356 percent higher than the 
weekly branch target. It was the first time that any branch in any part of Bank 
UK's entire nationwide network had ever achieved in excess of 350 per cent of 
target. George (Manager) thought it was "bloody marvellous" and bought each of 
his staff a bottle of (expensive) wine as a celebration. The following Monday 
however, he was subjected to a telephone discussion with Lesley (Area Manager) 
who, under Bank UK's internal appraisal rules had to formally chastise him for 
being one Jack High account short for the week, despite generating a huge sales 
excess in other product areas (Research Diary, 29/6/01). 
In light of the above, it is not surprising my data suggest that, in order for Bank 
UK to achieve its organisational desire to grow its retail banking business by £500 
million every year, "a certain level o f customer mugging" (Economist Intelligence 
Unit, 1996: 13) appeared to take place. My earlier description of the content of a 
typical Bank UK sales course highlighted how the bank had introduced a specific 
mandate for its entire branch-based staff to engage in sales opening conversations. 
Even i f a customer gave no impression they were interested in a particular product 
or service, staff were expected to keep the conversation alive by I . overcoming 
objections (to the product or service), 2.explaining the benefits o f the product or 
service, and 3. practising the art of Hostage Selling. Suggested dialogue included: 
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1. Have you met our Customer Service Team? When can I arrange a 
time for (name) to introduce him/herself and discuss the services 
we provide? 
2. Have you had the opportunity to review your current account 
recently? Things change all the time and there may have been 
some enhancements to the basic current account that you may not 
be aware o f If you have a few minutes, one o f my colleagues will 
be pleased to run through the details with you. 
3. We are reviewing the services we provide to our customers to see 
i f we can save them money. When would you like an appointment 
to see....? 
4. Is your mortgage with Bank UK? Have you got a few minutes now 
to see how much money I could save you? 
(Internal Memorandum dated 8/8/00, entitled "Top Ten Dialogue Tips). 
Opportunities to sell were no longer expected to be given up without a fight. 
Despite ongoing sales training and an acknowledgment that receipt o f any 
performance bonus pay was now wholly dependent on achieving certain levels of 
sales penetration, staff still appeared unwilling to approach customers to buy 
products, which they felt would be of little benefit to them, despite increasing 
pressures to achieve specific levels of sales penetration every week. 
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The following interview extracts suggest that Bank UK's intensely aggressive 
sales tactics had yet to be fiilly accepted by the majority of its branch-based staff. 
. . . I think that i f you are selling to a customer*s need then you are not 
doing anything vm)ng. All you have done is identified a need for that 
customer, and at the end of the day you are just doing your job. The 
only downside thing is that you get people sometimes... because of 
targets... who seem to be selling anything and everything to anybody 
to make up sales targets, as that's what the bank now appears to want 
at the end of the day. 
(Nina, Sales Executive, Harbour Town branch, 18/10/00). 
When I first started working for Bank UK, which was about 11 years 
ago now, 1 mean sales didn't come into i t . . . it is only in the last 5 
years or so... and not eveiybody had to do it then, it wasn't so 
essential, it wasn't stressed on you so much, but over the last couple of 
years it has. Before, i f you served customers and didn't sell it didn't 
matter, but now it's: "What have you got fi-om that one"? It just seems 
to me, it just seems that it's alJ selling, and they say it's customer 
service but I think i f you treat the customers right without shoving 
everything down their necks as soon as they come through the door, 
when they DO want something they might come to us. I f we keep 
bombarding them with everything, i f it was me personally I wouldn't 
come in (laughs). 
(Jane, Chief Cashier, West Town branch, 12/12/00). 
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I think basically... I don't have a lot of trouble speaking to people so I 
think that isn't the problem. The main thing is that I've got no 
confidence in the products I 'm selling. There are two messages 
coming through here. The first is that we have good products to sell 
and it will benefit the customer... But when they are linked to targets 
that we've got to achieve they become just part o f the number 
crunching, so I feel we are only selling because that's the target of the 
day, rather than it's something that the customer really wants. 
(Jean, Union Representative, North Town branch, 15/2/01). 
...you have to be able to talk to people and make them feel relaxed. I 
personally listen to other people and think: "My God! That's a hard 
sell"...people object, and they [Bank UK] say overcome the objection 
then back off, but certain people don't back of f and keep hammering 
on the door (laughs), until they break it down. ... I had a lady come 
back complaining about Jack High and I asked her why she had ever 
taken it out in the first place and she said that she was bullied into it! 
(laughs). Need I say more? (laughs). 
Leah, Sales Executive, North Town branch, 15/2/01). 
... i f you are going to flog somebody something, the first thing you 
would need to do is to gain their trust before you sell the product. We 
don't seem to worry about gaining their trust anymore as long as we 
just sell the product, which effectively means that we have to sell 'cash 
and carry' products. Cheap! And that is what will get the thing sold. A 
good interest rate and people will buy your product, and they are not 
going to buy it for any other reason. So we are going to have to accept 
low margins, so therefore high volumes, otherwise we are not going to 
succeed.. .It's the inertia you get once you've been a provider of one or 
two good products. But we don't seem to be working in that way. I 
mean look at our credit cards; we've done crap rates on them for ages, 
and were one of the last ones to get rid of fees... 
(Eric, Manager, Harbour Town branch, 18/10/00). 
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Incentives and Disincentives. 
With all stafif now expected to identify and sell financial products in the manner 
expected by Bank UK, it was often left to individual branch managers to devise a 
multitude of incentives to ensure their staff remained suflSciently motivated to 
make a substantial, individual contribution towards sales. Despite the introduction 
of perfomiance related pay, staff appeared to respond better to tangible incentives, 
i.e. bottles of wine, bunches of flowers etc. During my fieldwork at South Town 
branch in 2001, it became a sacrosanct weekly ritual for George (Manager) to buy 
staff what became known as the 'Friday Cake'. Individuals took it in tums to 
choose the cake (or cakes) on their way to work from the local Women's Institute 
market. The cakes that were chosen were always spectacular and lavish. Multi-
layered sponges with intricate icing, rich, moist fiiiit cakes with marzipan, or huge 
Danish pastries absolutely smothered in drippy white icing. The same level of 
care applied to their choice, also applied to their consumption. Unless staffing 
levels were absolutely dire, George made a drink of coffee at 10.30am. He also 
brought down from the staff room, enough plates and forks for everyone, who 
then took it in tums to spend usually ten quiet minutes away from customers, 
eating their cake and drinking their coffee in a relaxed manner. Staff at South 
Town thought this custom was " extremely civilised" (Research Diary, 27/4/01). 
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In other branches however, the provision of cakes or sweets as incentives for staff 
to meet sales targets was met with derision and scorn: "We are like bloody circus 
animals, give us a bun and we will perform" (Maureen, Sales Executive, West 
Town branch, 5/12/00). Yet at West Town branch, cakes were often shared 
between staff as apparent comforters during days of acute staff shortages: "Wanda 
brought the cashiers a huge, home-made chocolate cake. I don't know what for. 
She didn't say. Perhaps it was due to the crap day we all had yesterday" (Research 
Diary, 20/7/00). My data suggest that at West Town branch, cakes were viewed as 
necessary compensation for the stresses caused by staffing shortages, rather than 
as rewards for sales achievements. 
Time Factors. 
Selling financial products and services in the depth and manner required by Bank 
UK's senior management took an inordinate amount of time. There were many 
and varying reasons why time in its broadest sense was an extremely controversial 
issue amongst staff. Time affected both the desire and perceived justification of 
staff to sell. At West Town branch where there were constant and unending 
queues for cashiering services everyday, staff found it hard to justify spending 
time explaining the benefits of financial products to individual customers, or 
using suggested sales dialogue to generate new opportunities. Despite using sales 
training sessions to instil a revised psyche in dealing with queues (e.g. concentrate 
on the one customer you are dealing with and ignore the rest), the presence of 
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queues remained a continued source of anxiety to stafiF. This anxiety was further 
increased by the inclusion of a series of specific questions about queuing, within 
service feedback questionnaires, which were randomly sent to selected customers 
on a quarterly basis. A revised service standard had established a maximum 
queuing time of two minutes between a customer entering any of Bank UK's 
domestic banking branches and their first contact with a member o f staflF. Yet, 
sales coaching as experienced during my sales course (see pages 177-181) 
encouraged staff to introduce and explain a multitude of financial products 
without due regard for waiting customers. My research suggests this tension 
clearly created a push / pull phenomenon between sales and service: 
In some respects I suppose it is better in that we bring it to their 
attention [customers] the different things that we supply, which a lot of 
them were totally unaware of, and in a lot of cases you are genuinely 
helping them to save money, but they want to get in and out [of the 
branch] quickly, they don't want us to knobble them eveiy time they 
come in...Whenever somebody walks in through the door you are 
always thinking "What can I sell them"? It has become very black and 
white. 
(Maureen, Sales Executive, West Town branch, 5/12/00). 
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... some customers you know you can approach them about things, 
and others you know to stay well away from them, but I feel that 
sometimes it would be nice to just come in and just do your job 
without having to think about what you are going to sell them. They 
[management] are on your backs all the time. "You've got to sell Jack 
High, you've got to do this, or you've got to do that". So everyone 
who walks in the door you're thinking, "What can I sell them"? and it 
shouldn't be like that... they [customers] don't want to be hassled by 
people... 
(Wanda, Cashier, West Town branch, 5/12/00). 
For some staff, particularly those at West Town branch, having no respite 
between serving customers meant most of their day was spent literally running 
between the cashiering and customer service desks, dealing with all manner of 
enquiries and complaints, whilst remaining vigilant for sales opportunities. At the 
end of the day they were left with little free time to complete generated 
paperwork. At South Town branch, Fiona worked three days a week in a Sales 
Executive role. Often, she came into the branch on her days off, to either 
complete outstanding paperwork or to just have the time to speak to distant 
departments, e.g. mortgage services without constant interruption. She was not 
paid for these extra hours, yet did them on a regular basis to ease her own 
workload: " I might be only a part time SE and get part-time salary, but I often feel 
I work ftill-time" (Fiona, 6/12/01). 
Lack of time within the designated 8.45am - 4.45pm workday meant that it was 
common for most staff to woric additional hours, (which were often unpaid) to 
deal with outstanding tasks, mainly of a paperwork and processing nature. 
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Generally these tasks entailed transferring paper-based applications onto Bank 
UK's internal computer system in order to create an electronic record o f the 
product or service that had been sold. This was generally not done at the point of 
sales whilst the customer was still present, as stafiF thought it was often quicker 
(i.e. took less time) to ask the customer to scribble their signature onto a paper-
based application form and complete the electronic update later, rather than wait 
for Bank UK's interminably slow computer system to work its way through all 
the necessary screens in the product opening process. 
On other occasions staff were asked by their managers to work over their 
contracted hours to personalise newly delivered sales literature and application 
forms with branch identifier numbers. These worked in a similar way to 
individual identifier numbers (as discussed on pages 195/196). Once they were 
applied to leaflets etc., and subsequently entered onto electronic records it should 
have been an easy task for senior management to monitor the sales progress of 
individual branches over a range of specific products. However, once again, there 
were problems with theft of sales. I f a customer had picked up a leaflet at one 
branch, and later went into another to buy the product, it was common practice for 
the second branch to delete the branch identifier code fix)m the leaflet and insert 
their own, thereby denying the first branch any claim to the sale. This was of 
particular significance to the geographical region of my fieldwork, which was 
predominately tourist dependent. Often leaflets and advice about Bank UK's 
financial products were given to holidaymakers, and however careful staff were in 
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ensuring correct branch identifier numbers were marked on distributed stationery, 
it was clear fix)m later electronic enquiries on customers accounts they had later 
bought the product fi-om their home branch who had ensured they [the home 
branch] had received electronic credit for the sale. 
It was a time consuming exercise to personalise all sales leaflets and stationery. 
With product campaigns changing on a monthly basis, new boxes o f leaflets and 
posters arrived in branches on a regular basis. The task o f marking each and every 
leaflet and application form was generally given to the cashiers, who were 
expected to carry out the task in slack periods between customers. Cashiering 
positions were generally cramped enough spaces, without the addition of piles of 
leaflets, which commonly escaped from their inadequate elastic bands and ended 
up slipping all over the floor. The most irritating part about the exercise however, 
was not that cashiers were expected to do the task, but the poor design of the 
stationery itself Multi-folded flyers and leaflets generally had their "for bank use 
only" boxes right in the middle, which meant unfolding the leaflet or flyer, 
inserting the number, and refolding them in the correct way. Staff could not 
understand why these items could not be delivered already customised for 
individual branches, or, why stationery was not designed with the speed o f task in 
mind, thus requiring little in the way of origami skills! 
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On many occasions it was impossible for all the necessary preparation to sales 
literature to be completed before displays needed to be changed, and often staff 
were asked to woric over their contracted hours to ensure everything was finished 
before opening to the public with new sales campaign literature in situ on correct 
days. Sam (Chief cashier, South Town branch) often complained that, although 
she was only contracted to work until 4.45pm, the very nature o f her chief cashier 
duties meant she had to stay until all the cash was safely put away and 
independently checked. It was very rare for her to leave before 5.15pm (although 
she was not paid for the overtime), and she had been absolutely outraged to be 
asked to stay to stamp sales literature one particular night when she had managed 
to complete her duties and be ready to leave at 4.50pm: 
One night we [herself and Christine] managed to get away at 4.50pm, 
and George asked us to stay and do sales promotional literature. I 
haven't taken a four thousand pound drop in salary' to stay behind on 
an unpaid basis and do sales stuff. I f he [George] wants to do it that's 
fine, but he shouldn't make other people feel guilty for leaving, lets 
face it, AFTER their contracted time. 
(Research Diary, 6/12/01). 
Additional out of hours sales tasks, for example telesales evenings started to 
become part of branch selling practice during my period of fieldwork. These were 
initially undertaken by staff on a purely voluntary basis, with sympathetic 
management understanding towards individuals for whom outside working hours 
' See respondent profiles. Sam had accepted a voluntary downgrading in grading following her 
illness in 2000. 
213 
childcare responsibilities were an issue. The content of these telesales directives 
varied. Usually staff were asked to approach customers with a view to persuading 
them to change their standard bank accounts to Bank UK's premium personal 
account. Suggested opening dialogue included: 
I'm sorry to bother you Mrs (name)... This is (name) ... fix)m Bank 
UK. There is nothing to worry about, but I have been checking our 
records and I'm very sorry to see that we seem to have failed to offer 
you an upgrade to our premium current account. I can fix that now for 
you. 
(Research Diary, 12/7/01). 
No specific telephone sales training had been offered to those staff volunteering to 
undertake these additional duties. Nor were they paid at premium overtime rates. 
All Bank UK offered, as an incentive for taking part was time of f during the day 
in lieu of evening hours worked. Despite my persistence, it had been difficult to 
ascertain why stafl"volunteered to take part in such activities, other than sensing a 
general feeling of inevitability towards these activities becoming a permanent 
feature of their banking roles: 
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This telesales is the latest. Once a week they [branch managers] are 
trying to get people to stay late and sell, but we all know it won't stop 
there. At the minute I have said no... I presume it is time of f in lieu, 
although I don't know. There is no overtime anymore. We get 
customers from the competition they ran at Christmas v^ere they had 
to fill in slips and give their telephone numbers... They [management] 
have said it will take place in early evenings, but I mean it's a long day 
for the giris i f they start at eight in the morning, and are not leaving 
until seven at night, and they are pressured in their jobs all day, 
notwithstanding that 'North Town' is not the safest place to walk 
around in the dark anymore... It did go down the volunteer route, but 
he [branch manager] was disappointed at the response (laughs), and 
then it was: "Well, couldn't you just do one and see how it goes? We 
will support you i f you are nervous about doing it". But sadly i f you 
have a success like one person had last week, who had never done it 
before, I imagine the pressure would be on now for her to do as well as 
last time. But a lot of part-timers chose to work part-time hours 
because those are the hours they want to work, and not do evenings as 
well. . . At the moment it's just an 'expression ofdisappointment' that 
you don't feel able to do it. How it will be when people say: "I 'm not 
doing it anymore"? There is so much pressure from up the line now. 
(Jean, Union Representative, North Town branch, 15/2/01). 
Performance Related Pay 
As this chapter has illustrated, it is clear that Bank UK now required its staff to 
ftilly commit to a new retailing ethic. These were individual commitments which 
were considered to be integral to Bank UK's desire to increase its overall group 
income by £500 million each year. Rewards were twofold. Staff received both 
monetary bonuses (paid on a quarterly basis) and weekly incentives in the form of 
cakes, wine or flowers fix)m their line managers i f targets were met or exceeded. 
On an annual basis, the top fifty performers in each of Bank UK's nine 
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geographical regions' were formally recognised as achievers, and treated to an all 
expenses paid, overseas trip to a major European city. Data analysis suggests 
however, that many staff viewed the current levels of performance related pay as 
simply not substantial enough to compensate for the levels of effort they needed 
to expend for bonuses to be awarded: 
...last year I was very disappointed. We worked hard and we didn't 
quite make our targets, and for the amount of extra money I got at the 
end of the year I thought: "Why should I bother"? It's not worth the 
bother for the amount of extra money that I had. It was peanuts and I 
was disappointed to be honest... If you try, and are shown to be tiying 
they [management] should recognise that and shouldn't just say: 
"We've missed our targets, so bad luck"! You do need incentives, and 
i f they are not going to give them to you then I am not going to do it. 
(Wanda, cashier. West Town branch, 5/12/00). 
By linking monetary rewand to target attainment it was clear that Bank UK had 
adopted a system akin to that of performance related pay. For many years its 
annual pay awards to staff had blandly rewarded length of service and seniority 
rather than staff'worth' (as defined by income) to the Bank. Apart fiwm accuracy 
of cashiering, it was often difficult to exactly determine the contribution of an 
individual to Bank UK's performance in monetary terms. Sales changed all that. 
Now targets focused specifically on contribution, and by tagging the sale of a 
particular product or service to individual staff members, a tangible determinant 
of contribution could be now assessed and rewarded. Hence, Bank UK's revised 
' For internal monitoring purposes, Bank UK had split its nationwide coverage into nine 
geographical regions. 
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reward system moved fiom simply being job rate pay with little or no regard for 
performance (Ian Lang, President of the Board o f Trade [1986], cited in Dnicker 
and White, 2000:9) to one which clearly expressed the values o f the organisation 
and recognised the skills Bank UK was now prepared to specifically remunerate. 
Commenting on the spread of such practices in the financial services industry, 
Armstrong offers the following example: 
At NatWest a Performance Related Reward Plan was introduced to 
improve the business performance of the Bank. The scheme will 
provide a greater concentration on corporate and personal objectives. It 
will do this by clarifying at each level what the key objects are, 
relating them to specific circumstances, and rewarding managers 
according to how well they achieve them. 
(1996:247). 
Once again, issues of cost appeared to cause substantial problems with the smooth 
implementation of performance related pay incentives. These were not problems 
with actual cost, i.e. the monetary amounts paid to staff (although these would be 
later reflected within the umbrella of staff costs in Bank UK's audited accounts), 
but cost issues once again associated with decreasing staffing numbers. 
As already discussed at considerable length, the actions Bank UK had taken in 
reducing staffing levels and tightening premises-led expenditure illustrated that it 
(from an organisational perspective), had clearly decided that it was o f paramount 
importance to meet growing economic concems about the current levels of its 
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operating costs, by a sustained effort to reduce its cost / income ratios. StaflBng 
numbers were reduced to the absolute minimum needed for the day-to-day 
operation of its branch network. The shedding of 7,300 staff between June 1999 
and June 2000 meant ongoing costs associated with pension provision, maternity 
rights etc. for these employees could be capped. Where the loss of these staff had 
created establishment shortfalls within the branch network, Bank UK had plugged 
gaps by employing 'casual' workers. 
These 'casual' workers generally comprised ex-staff members who now desired a 
greater flexibility in their working arrangements for a whole variety o f reasons, or 
students who generally worked during university vacations, when footflow 
throughout the geographical location of my fieldwork grew substantially with 
holidaymakers and second home owners. These staff not only attracted lower 
houriy rates of pay than their permanent full or part-time colleagues, further cost 
savings were able to be made by virtue of their contractual agreements which 
excluded the payment of many benefits commonly associated with employment, 
e.g. maternity, pension and holiday provision. It was only following new 
legislation introduced in July 2000 (TUC, 2000: 114) that Bank UK needed to 
revise the content of its typical 'casual' contract in respect of maternity and 
holiday entitlements under certain circumstances, yet it was still able to refuse the 
payment of any performance related reward to 'casual' staflf, despite asking them 
to undertake exactly the same duties as their permanent colleagues. 
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During a regional staff meeting in October 2001, (see pages 161 - 164); I 
managed to engage Jeremy (Regional Manager) in a small group conversation 
after the main proceedings. He had walked over to the group of women I was 
talking to, and asked in a supercilious manner: "How can we make the bank better 
for you ladies next year"? I asked him why Bank UK had failed to recognise the 
contribution its 'casual' workforce made to overall sales achievement, by its 
refusal to include the provision for the payment o f performance related pay in 
'casual' workforce contracts. He appeared flummoxed by my line of questioning, 
until I reminded him that I was 'the researcher' who had participated as a cashier 
in Bank UK for various periods over the last couple of years. He replied: " I f you 
want to be flexible then you need to trade o f f flexibility for perfomiance related 
pay. If you want performance related pay, you should take up the offer of a 
permanent part-time contract." He laughed and quickly walked away when I 
suggested all that appeared to be happening within Bank UK was the creation of a 
two-tiered workforce, with those on permanent contracts eligible for bonuses and 
benefits, whilst (hose on 'casual' contracts, who did exactly the same jobs, were 
not. (Research Diary, 18/10/01). 
My findings conrespond with those of earlier research (The Institute o f 
Management, 1999; Pettinger, 1998; Dex and McCulloch, 1997; The Fabian 
Society, 1996) which suggest that it now appears to be common practice within 
organisations to invest scarce resources in a core staff of permanent employees. 
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whilst using a peripheral group of'casual' or agency workers to fill gaps for the 
lowest possible cost. 
There is clear evidence to suggest that Bank UK has also assigned its branch-
based workforce into two exclusive (with regard to remuneration and benefit 
packages), yet mutually inclusive (with regard to the achievement o f its overall 
sales target) categories of core staff (employees with permanent contracts of 
employment, rewards and benefits), and peripheral workers ('casual' employees, 
subject to short notice periods and ineligible for performance related pay 
rewards). However, despite this segmentation, by including the individual 
contributions of peripheral workers within overall branch staffing establishments 
(in terms of actual hours worked, which, together with branch footflow were key 
factors in calculating overall branch sales targets), peripheral workers were 
obviously of strategic importance in Bank UK's overall organisational sales 
philosophy. With individual branch sales targets now clearly influenced by the 
anficipated contribution of every staff member (irrespective of contractual status). 
Bank UK needed 'casual' workers to contribute as expected, despite the feet they 
had absolutely no incentive (except in personal job safisfaction) to sell. With the 
increasing use of'casual' contract workers to fill vacant permanent posts, the fine 
line Bank UK appeared to tread between its economic need to reduce operational 
expenditure and its competitive need for sustainable sales growth became 
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increasingly critical to its long term survival and improved success within a 
rampant financial services marketplace. As Pettinger comments: 
Where flexibility is based on part-time fixed-term contracts and job 
sharing type work, the approach that demeans - 'They are only part-
timers' and 'they arc only job-sharers' is unacceptable. It is absolutely 
certain that i f people are treated as 'only' something, this is how they 
will turn out. Work, profitability, productivity, effectiveness and 
customer service are all certain to suffer...High quality staff are highly 
flexible, skilled and trained; highly motivated and committed; and are 
as well paid as possible. They share in organizational profits and 
success. 
(1998:74). 
Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed the various reasons underpinning Bank UK's change 
in its core domestic retail banking business from banking to retailing. The 
deregulation of the financial services sector has meant that the entry o f new 
players (whose products were not only cheaper than those historically offered by 
the traditional retail banks, but were more consumer-friendly) had increased 
competitiveness to such an extent, that Bank UK had needed to respond ur:gently 
in order to maintain market share. 
It is clear fi*om my research that individual branches had found it progressively 
difficult to undertake sales tasks within their overall staffing levels. Selling 
financial products in the manner expected by Bank UK took an inordinate amount 
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of time, and with fewer staffing numbers this created real problems in maintaining 
a barely minimum standard of service, and sales often had to take a back seat to 
the more typically mundane banking duties of cashiering. Yet, the need to offer a 
transactional banking service remained, and staff found themselves trying to 
honour their commitments to the overall sales effort, whilst continuing to be 
responsible for substantial amounts of cash. Their dual roles (as bankers and 
retailers) often led to conflictual behaviours, which became manifested in their 
loathing of management, a refiisal to embrace new ways of working, or as 
tangible / intangible physical and mental health problems. 
The following chapter moves on to discuss the effects of reducing branch 
establishments and increasing workloads on the physical and mental health o f 
staff. 
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5. Stress and Work Intensification. 
...it's a question of how sustainable the effort involved in 
competing is. Because you will have increasing numbers of people 
going off with stress related illness. You are getting that now. 
Because there's only so much (pause)... I mean it is a very Gne line 
between walking over the edge or just walking along the edge of 
the clilT. And it can happen to ANYBODY. It's very dangerous, 
and I don't think that the bank as a corporate employer is really 
paying that much attention to it 
(George, Manager, West Town branch, 5/12/00). 
In preceding chapters, I have sought to determine the key drivers behind Bank 
UK's strategic responses to increased competitive pressures and the need to 
reduce operating costs. My research has indicated that long-established working 
practices within Bank UK have been revolutionised by the introduction ofcheaper 
and faster technologies, and the subcontracting' of mundane clerical paper 
processing to geographically remote, technology dependent operational centres 
(O'Reilly, 1992). With issues of cost now principal economic indicators of the 
financial soundness of an organisation. Bank UK appears to have adopted these 
initiatives in an attempt to decrease operating costs and increase revenue. As a 
result, staffing levels throughout Bank UK's retail banking sector^ have come 
' Pollen suggests that the motivation towards the extemalisation of processing services has been 
threefold. I . the ability to reduce indirect costs involved in the administration of these operations, 
2. the ability to replace core employees with cheaper, poorer protected labour alternatives. 3. the 
opportunity to further undermine unionised areas (cited in O'Reilly, 1992: 110). 
^ Bank UK defmes its retail banking division thus: "Retail Banking provides a wide range of 
banking, insurance and related financial services to individuals and small businesses. These 
services are delivered from a network of Bank UK branches throughout the Great Britain and 
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under intense scrutiny. As a response to severe economic criticism regarding its 
relatively high cost / income ratio, Bank UK shed 7,300 employees on a group-
wide basis between December 1999 and December 2000. This equated to cost 
saving of £72 million, and helped to reduce its total cost / income ratio fiom 59.3 
per cent in 1999 to 46.9 per cent by the end of 2001 (Bank UK fiill year results, 
December 2001). * 
'Change' in Bank UK has not just been solely concemed with the introduction of 
leaner and cheaper banking systems. Change has also focussed on what 
employees are now expected to do, and how they are supposed to do it. 
Throughout my thesis I have made multiple references to very general themes of 
stress and work intensification in Bank UK. However, the concept of stress is not 
fixed. It has many meanings and applications. The Oxford English Dictionary 
defines it as: pressure, tension, worry, anxiety, distress or trauma. The 
consequences of these "stressors" (Pearson, 2001: 106) are interpreted by The 
Health and Safety Executive (HSE) as: "The adverse reaction people have to 
through telephone call centres, ATM's [Airtomated Teller Machines] and the Internet (Bank UK 
Published Year End Results, December 2001). 
' In contrast. Nationwide Building Society*s annual report and financial accounts for the year 
ending April 2001 illustrated how the organisation had consciously increased staffing numbers 
from 12,908 to 13,563, thus increasing associated costs from £222.9 Million to £248.4 Million, in 
order to boost its share of the fmancial services market Its chairman, Charles Nunneley 
concluded: "We have gained an encouragingly large share of the savings and mortgage markets, 
while continuing to build other financial services...this continues forcibly to demonstrate the 
advantages of being a building society, which means we can focus exclusively on the interests of 
our members without having to satisfy shareholders as well (2001: 2). 
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excessive pressure or other types of demand placed on them" (Pearson, 2001: 
106). 
The lack of a conclusive and universally accepted definition o f stress may explain 
why there is currently no specific legislation to tackle the sources and 
contributory factors that accompany (and often give rise to), the many and varied 
instances of stress in the workplace. Legislative influence has so far been 
restricted to two main statutes - The Health and Safety at Woric Act 1974, which 
requires employers to have a general rather than specific duty of care towards 
ensuring the health and welfare o f their employees, and more recently The 
Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999, which require 
employers to both assess health and safety risks, and take appropriate action to 
control and eliminate them (Pearson, 2001: 113). 'Appropriate' is, however, 
undefined. 
In a similar fashion, academics and industrial commentators have yet to agree on 
a definition of work intensification. One of the difificulties appears to be the 
multiplicity of ways in which the phrase is adopted within a wide variety o f 
research. Does work intensification merit classification as a theme in its own 
right, or is it merely an issue similar to others in industrial sociology, for example 
job insecurity? Despite these unresolved debates, it appears to have become 
universal practice to associate and almost unite themes and issues o f work 
intensification with themes and issues of stress. Have the two issues become so 
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deeply entwined that it is not possible to talk about one in isolation from the 
other? 
In tangible ways, issues of work intensification are less problematic, being 
associated as they are with increasing volumes and the physical 'speed up' of 
work: 
Most of the women agreed that the pace of work had become faster 
over the years. The light was flashing quicker, more trays had to be 
done... They also claimed that the conveyor belt itself moved faster 
and jobs which used to be done by two people had gradually been 
turned into one-person jobs. 
(Cavendish, 1982:98). 
In contemporary accounts of employment, issues of work intensification have 
become associated with an escalation in the baseline expectations o f work 
volumes to be completed within specific periods, for example, data keying or 
dealing with telephone and / or face-to-face queries within the typical customer 
service centre (Foster and Hoggett, 1999; Hochschild, 1997; Garson 1988): 
226 
Midland Bank faces a bill for damages and costs of up to £56,000 aiter 
five of its former keyboard operators yesterday won compensation for 
severe cases of repetitive strain injury... Judge Birt said the 
combination of management pressure to speed up woric and a lack of 
proper breaks fiDm keyboarding had led to the injuries... Mrs Ostler, 
one of the five explained; "Work arrived in big bags and would be put 
into bundles of hundreds or thousands of cheques at a time and we just 
had to key in details until it was all finished. It was more like a fectory 
than an office. It was a bit like a production line. We only used our 
right hand to key in the details of up to 15,000 keystrokes an hour". 
(Milne, 1998: 11). 
The adoption of *Just-[n-Time' (JIT) systems of work in many divergent 
workplaces has brought issues of work intensification to the forefix)nt of 
economic and management debates. A polarised argument has emerged. 
Supporters of JIT working regimes claim the particular method of 
operationalisation simply requires employees to work smarter, rather than harder. 
Yet opponents suggest this is nothing more than a highly seductive maxim, when 
in reality, the bias is towards horizontal enlargement and intensification of labour, 
through a system which: "...completely synchronizes production with the 
demands of the market and which aims towards the complete elimination o f waste 
in production" Panford, 1999:4-5). 
With 80 per cent of UK organisations now operating some degree of flexible 
employment practices as a direct consequence of adopting JIT systems of work 
(The Institute of Management, 1999), issues of stress and work intensification 
have added to debates surrounding the growing maze of workforce flexibih'ty. 
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particularly functional flexibility (Pollert, 1991). Functional flexibility is often 
considered to be a qualitative flexibility, which has encouraged the rise o f both 
skill and task flexibility, with the subsequent emergence o f polyvalent employees 
(MacShane and Brewster 2000). Hovvever, this has often led to accusations fiom 
workers that, despite the hype surrounding polyvalence and upskilling, all they 
have experienced in reality has been an increase in their individual workloads. In 
Bank UK, this can be evidenced by data that show how staff often have to juggle 
several tasks at the same time (each with their own deadline): 
You get to the stage when the voucher processing man' is coming for 
the goods and you've got to get your bags ready with no one to take 
over from you. So you are running in and out trying to serve customers 
in between, but knovwng that work has to go, and you just think, 
"What should 1 do next? That should have gone in the post, and that 
should have gone for processing. I should have made an interview 
note, because the lending centre will need to know what is happening 
i f a customer goes overdrawn". So you do generally get a bit sort o f 
wound up as you are pulled in so many directions. 
(Nina, Sales Executive, Harbour Town branch, 18/10/00). 
Nina was referring to the courier who collects voucher processing work from branches after 
close of business each evening. With voucher processing centres (VPC's) now geographically 
remote from their feeder units (the dedicated VPC for the branches where I carried out research 
was over 200 miles away at the furthest point), and the requirement to process everything before 
Bank UK's main computers 'update' themselves in the early hours, delivery timings were critical. 
If branches delayed the departure of their courier in excess of ten minutes (for whatever reason), 
they were reported to regional management for 'obstructing business'. 
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I think that they want people to come in and do a job with minimal 
skills. To just get as many people as possible to cover different 
positions... there are so many overlaps now; you've got to jump in 
everybody's shoes, and with the reduced numbers that is the only way 
that they [Bank UK] can cope. 
(Peggy, Assistant Manager, West Town branch, 12/12/00). 
The remainder of this chapter examines how Bank UK's typical branch-based 
clerical workers met, negotiated, experienced and sometimes resisted (Knights 
and McCabe, 2000), the multitude of changes from an individual perspective. For 
ease of analysis and understanding I have ordered data into three broad categories 
- issues of health, woric intensification and workplace safety. Each wi l l be 
examined in turn, but in many instances boundaries between the categories remain 
blurred. 
Issues of Health. 
La Bier (1986: 7) contends that for adults, work performs a major role in 
determining individual development. A role that either stimulates life-afifirming 
attitudes, which support individual development, or fiiistrates and oppresses 
through the growth of regressive attitudes. Symptoms invisible on the surface are 
often exacerbated by work and career within modem, large organisations - a 
phenomenon that La Bier (1986) has termed "modem madness", [the] 
"...invisible link between careers and emotional conflict" (1986: 3). 
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My research suggests that issues of health within Bank UK (both physical and 
mental) were influenced by the physical working conditions o f individual 
branches, conditions, which, not unsurprisingly, were constrained by cost. The 
most common staff complaint was working temperature. This was hardly 
surprising considering the extreme southeriy geographical location o f my 
fieldwork, yet Bank UK appeared to do very little to ensure a comfortable 
working environment during the summer months. The age of branch buildings 
meant that in many cases air conditioning systems had been installed some 
considerable time after branches had been built (West Town and Harbour Town), 
or when existing buildings were converted into banking branches (South Town). 
\n many branches it was common for air conditioning systems to simply consist 
of grilled openings in strategically placed ceiling tiles, which circulated chilled air 
downwards onto staff. The air temperature was controlled via a remote control 
unit, which moved the thennostat either up or down. Three major problems v^th 
this method of controlling working temperatures became apparent during 
participant observation. 
The biggest problem was simply that these blowers were positioned some 
distance fi-om working areas. At West Town branch, its interior had been 
revamped and redecorated in Bank UK's corporate image during 1995. The 
banking hall had been redesigned to increase customer space and improve 
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advertising. This had meant the physical repositioning of both the cashiering and 
enquiries counters, which unfortunately meant that stafiF no longer worked in the 
vicinity of the blowers, which, following the interior overhaul, were now bizzurely 
located centrally in the banking hall, and in the ceiling of one of the two interview 
rooms that had been erected during the branch makeover. Somewhat crazily, the 
blowers themselves had not been repositioned, despite the shifting of the principal 
work sites. Although four of my respondents had worked at West Town branch 
during the period of its corporate redesign, none of them were able to offer any 
definitive conclusion to why the blowers had remained in sUu, other than referring 
disparagingly to cost. 
Additional blowers were positioned on the second floor of West Town branch, in 
vast rooms, which had once housed processing equipment prior to clerical and 
transactional work being transferred to processing centres during 1999. Some of 
the now obsolete machines had been removed fix)m the branch in the intervening 
period, with others simply pushed to one side o f the room. This had created the 
space to allow for the relocation of two business managers and their assistants 
from Central Town, to a suitable office space closer to their primary customer 
base'. Whilst they themselves were not a problem to the day-to-day operation of 
West Town branch, their presence in upper floors augmented the ongoing 
' It was practice in Bank UK for business accounts with an annual turnover in excess of £100,000 
to be controlled by ^relationship' managers. A common way to apportion qualifying accounts to 
individual managers was by geographical location. Managers generally supervised accounts within 
a ten-mile radius of their office location. This ensured quick and easy access from both sides (bank 
and customer), which supposedly instilled a greater confidence in Bank UK*s business managers, 
who wanted to be seen as an integral part of the local business community. 
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problems with the eflFectiveness of the air conditioning system, histead o f each 
area having its own thermostat to control working temperatures in different zones, 
West Town only had one thermostat, which controlled the temperature o f the 
enfire three-storied branch. 
Throughout my five-month period of participant observation during summer 
2000, there was a constant battle for control o f the thermostat between the 
cashiers at West Town (who without doubt undertook the most physically 
demanding job within the branch), and the sedentary, desk-dominated role o f the 
relationship managers. This banle confirmed that premises themselves remained 
structures of control - housing the labour process, whilst continuing to socially 
order and reproduce hierarchical relationships (Baldry et al., 1998: 164). With 
branch revamping usually being accompanied by the removal of ornately 
decorated managerial offices in the creation of universal working spaces, 
hierarchical staff demarcation had needed to move away from being determined 
by the size and decor of working spaces, to other forms of seniority distinction. In 
West Town, this had manifested itself in a battle for control of working 
temperature. Usually it was George (branch manager) who controlled internal 
working temperatures. The thermostatic controller was kept in his desk, and the 
cashiers had leamt to avoid argument by waiting until he was serving a customer 
before they altered the settings to make the air temperature cooler. As this 
impacted on temperatures throughout the entire building, it was generally 
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accompanied by vociferous complaints fit)m managers working in sedentary roles 
on upper floors: 
Anger over office temperature. Cashiering is a physical job and we get 
very warm moving cash and coin around. The same thermostat 
controls the whole of West Town. We want it cold, but others with 
desk bound jobs want it warmer. We keep turning it down, and our 
actions are followed by managerial protests to George, who now tells 
us he has hidden the controller, and we v^l l need his permission to 
alter the temperature. He also reminded us of the costs involved in 
using the cooling system for over eight hours a day. I asked him 
whether he was making it a seniority or health and safety issue? This 
has clearly been a very bitter conflict for some time, and is serving to 
drive a fiirther wedge between managers and staff. 
(Research Diary, 14/9/00). 
To an outsider, the job of a cashier may appear undemanding. Notwithstanding 
the strenuous mental effort they expended in continually undertaking numerical 
calculations, which demanded constant concentration, cashiers were also expected 
to remain vigilant for sales opportunities. Their roles were also physically as well 
as mentally exhausting. Every morning, cash in the form of notes and coin had to 
be moved a substantial distance fix)m secure storage areas into individual till 
posifions. At West Town branch this was done via a large, ancient wooden trolley, 
which had a very unsecure handle. Cash, coin and other items such as locked tin 
boxes made it very heavy. This meant steering was awkward and the trolley often 
moved in directions it was not expected to. As all cash (notes and coin) was kept 
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under dual key control* it was often difficult to find a second key holder available 
on demand during the working day, i f re-entry to the cash storage area was 
required. It had therefore become common practice to calculate the amounts of 
notes and coin thought to be sufficient for the whole day, and load up the trolley 
with muhiple bags as necessary. As West Town had a high percentage of business 
customers who ran shops, pubs and restaurants, demand for 'change' was high, 
particularly during the peak summer holiday season, and often the trolley was so 
laden with coin, it needed two staff to manoeuvre it through the safe, across the 
open office area, and behind the counter, where it only just fitted the available 
width. Not only was the trolley cumbersome and old, its locked compartments had 
been broken over the years, so its doors swung open finely as it was manoeuvred, 
which meant whoever was steering it had to make sure they didn't get full bags of 
coin (all of which weighed over five kilos) dropping on their feet as they walked. 
Two fire extinguishers had already been accidentally ripped from their wall 
mountings due to the trolley being awkwardly manhandled through the branch. 
Not only did the cashiers have to undertake this task on a daily basis, they had to 
do it quickly. With official starting times being 8.45am, and the branch opening 
just fifteen minutes later, it was a real rush trying to get the tills ready for opening, 
whilst at the same time finding time to participate in daily 'scrum' activity: 
"8.55am, daily 'scrum'. Discussed today's targets. Cashiers were really busy 
' Dual Key Control meant two keyholdeis were needed to enter restricted areas, e.g. cash safe, 
coin storage area etc. 
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trying to get ready for opening. Maureen was moaning: 'George, I have too much 
to do'" (Research Diaiy, 28/9/00). It was a constant source o f irritation to the 
cashiers that their suggestions for improving speed and delivery of cash and coin 
to the counter by the installation o f mobile tills' (which would have meant the end 
of the daily trolley run) were rejected on cost grounds. Bank UK simply failed to 
accept that the purchase of mobile t i l l units would improve quality of service and 
increase income generation. 
Branches that did operate with mobile tills experienced a diflferent set o f health 
issues. Through observation, I was able to determine that a common factor in the 
distribution of mobile till units appeared to be internal branch layouts. In branches 
where secured storage areas were located on difierent floor levels to counter areas 
(Harbour Town, South Town, North Town and Sea Town), mobile tills were used. 
Rather than load everything onto one trolley, each ti l l unit was individually 
wheeled into position, after being stored in secure areas overnight. The biggest 
problem facing these branches was simply the mechanical breakdown o f the l i f l , 
which was used to transport the tills between floors. When this happened, not 
only could till units become stuck between floors, it meant physically carrying 
heavy cash and coin dovwstairs at the end of the day, and back upstairs again the 
following morning: 
' Mobile Tills were wooden 3-drawer units, which housed notes and coin for individual till 
positions. They had wheels, so were merely locked and moved in their entirety into secure areas 
overnight. They did not need to be emptied and re-stocked on a daily basis. 
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Lift not working [at South Town] so we had to manually carry cash, 
coin and tins upstairs by hand. Lif t engineer had been last Thursday to 
carry out its annual service, and apparently it had not worked since the 
following Friday afternoon. It is now Wednesday! 
(Research Diaiy, 14/3/01). 
After experiencing a spate of breakdowns, which had left tills stranded in the lift. 
South Town branch (through brainstorming sessions akin to Kaizen activity) had 
instigated a cashiering best practice, which restricted the number of till units in 
the lift to two at any one time. This meant that in the event of l if t feilure, cashiers 
would at least be able to be semi-operational, with no perceived reduction in 
customer service. 
Other health issues symptomatic o f a cashiering role were musculo-skeletal in 
nature. In previous chapters I have indicated how issues o f cost clearly controlled 
the positioning of new cashiering hardware that accompanied the implementation 
of CSALES technology. No additional expenditure had been permitted to ensure 
workstations were comfortable for cashiers to use. This had meant that various 
items of hardware had needed to be positioned within existing spaces, despite the 
introduction of a ftill-size keyboard, bigger visual display screens and the 
necessity to accommodate a standard size laser printer by every workstation. In 
what appeared to be a direct contravention of The Health and Safety (Display 
Screen Equipment) Regulations 1992, which required employers to ensure screens 
were positioned within a twenty degree angle from line of sight, and were able to 
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be both horizontally and vertically adjusted (Pearson, 2001: 80), Bank UK had 
installed its CSALES visual display screens at an almost forty five degree angle to 
the right of eveiy cashier in order not to obstruct a clear fece-to-face interaction 
with customers (which may have impeded sales opportunities). Keyboards could 
not be positioned directly in fiont o f the cashier either, as space was needed to 
count notes and coin, and stamp vouchers etc. They had therefore been positioned 
on the right hand side o f counter spaces, which meant that cashiers either had to 
only use one hand to key data (which was slower, and held up the queue), or 
twisting heavily in order to use both. 
During interviews, staff commonly complained how cramped the new positions 
had become, and, on re-entering the field to research these health issues, I 
commented: 
Back aches after day on the tills. The computers have been positioned 
the wrong way round for me as the keyboard and screens are on the 
left. I am constantly having to Uvist, and 1 have no wheels on my stool, 
which makes it awkward to change body position to get into drawers 
or reach forward to place items in the bucket' which is released by a 
boh mechanism on my side of the counter. My t i l l drawers were also 
very heavy with bags o f coin now that I am unable to share my till 
with anyone else and it hurt my back to reach down into them. 
(Research Diary, 2/6/00). 
' The bucket' was cashiering terminology for the swinging mechanism which moves cash / 
voucheis between the cashier sitting behind their secure glass screens and their customers in the 
public space. 
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As cashiering workstations were bolted into position, individual heights were 
unable to be altered. Cashiers therefore relied solely on the height adjustment 
mechanism o f their stools in order to make working heights comfortable. Many 
footrests (w^ich relied on kicking bars for adjustment) were broken and remained 
unrepaired - a further example of cost influencing health and safety issues in the 
workplace. At South Town branch, only one out o f three footrests could be 
adjusted for height. Even here, the built-in mechanism had been broken, and any 
height adjustment had to be manually undertaken, which involved getting dovwi 
on all fours, squeezing into the foot well space, manually unscrewing the 
footplates and moving them into an altemate position before screwing them up 
again. Of the remaining two footrests, one was permanently level with the floor, 
and the other remained at its highest setting, which made the seating position 
extremely uncomfortable. 
Health issues were also compounded by the rise in incidences of'hot-desking'. 
The increase in the functional and numerical flexibility of staflFemployed in Bank 
UK had been a major factor in the growth in the phenomenon of hot-desking - a 
common working practice in organisations where desks have to be shared by a 
number of different staff during the working day (Pearson 2001:78). With Bank 
UK expecting its cashiering staff to cover for absent or busy colleagues on the 
enquiries desk (and vice versa), together wifli an expectation that its branch 
managers multi-task throughout the entire range of clerical jobs, e.g. cashiering, 
selling, and dealing with face-to-face and telephone enquires, it was common for 
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workstations to be heavily shared throughout the working day. I f asked to provide 
additional cover a busy cashiering period, stafif simply arrived at the counter and 
started serving. They just did not have the time to spend ensuring their 
workstations were ergonomically correct for their individual physical ftames. 
Customers who were anxious to be served would not have been very happy i f a 
new cashier spent five minutes or so adjusting seating, screens etc. The problem 
of hot-desking appeared to be compounded by the introduction of CSALES 
systems, which had abolished pool tills. No longer could staff^be asked to quickly 
serve on the counter. Changes of staff became particularly cumbersome and time-
consuming. Cash holdings had to be physically swapped, and associated 
computers electronically changed to reflect new operator identities. The ideology 
behind CSALES may well have been the introduction of individual responsibility 
for cash handling and reconciliation, yet the new system lessened the functional 
flexibility of staflF, who became increasingly finstrated by increasing internal 
bureaucracy. 
Work Intensification 
As discussed earlier in my thesis, Bank UK's persistent shedding o f employees 
cleariy contributed to a higher level of staflF"abuse" (Procter and Mueller, 2000: 
12). On several occasions already, I have described the difficulties facing branch 
StaflF who are contracted to start work at 8.45am, yet are expected to ensure their 
branches are operationally ready for customers at 9.00am, as well as 
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wholeheartedly participating in daily scrum activity within what was often a very 
hectic fifteen minutes. Long-serving, experienced staff in larger branches where 
staggered starting times had been introduced to try and overcome these types of 
operational problems, appeared to have reluctantly accepted that additional, 
unpaid hours were necessary, simply in order to make their working lives more 
tolerable: 
Well, my hours are 8.15am to 4.15pm. That said, i f I did come in at 
8.15am we would not fit in all we need to do [balance two automated 
cash machines located inside the banking hall]. So me and another 
woman, we usually start at 7.55am. So that means every day the bank 
is getting twenty minutes times two, and times that by five days every 
week... so the bank does quite nicely out o f it - Thank You! ... There 
have been several people from here [North Town branch] who have 
been off with stress... I mean looking at the overall picture... a lot 
more people...! mean whether they used to say that they just had the 
flu and they wouldn't say that it was stress? I think that it's affecting a 
lot of people, because there is a lot of pressure. It's like the pressure 
comes down to you and stops with you. 1 go home and scream the 
place down for ten minutes. I mean Graham's [partner] favourite 
saying is: "Tell them [Bank UK] to f^** oflF'! 
(Leah, Sales Executive, North Town branch, 15/2/01). 
During my research, in order to overcome liming problems with scrum activity it 
became common practice for managers to ask their staflf to commence work 
earlier than 8.45am. The eariier starting limes not only overcame problems with 
scrums, but also ensured branches were able to be fully operational at 9.00am: 
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I started oflFdoing 8.45ani to 4.45pm, and then Lionel [Manager] said 
he'd like me to come in a little earlier, so I came in at 8.30am and 
usually i f there are no problems with balancing I'm out by five or just 
after. [After being asked how she felt about working two and a half 
hours every week without being paid] (laughs). I don't stand up for my 
rights much do I? 
(Britney. Cashier, South Town branch, 25/10/00). 
With many staff reluctantly recognising the need to commit to frequent unpaid 
excess hours as a consequence of Bank UK's changing bank strategies, the bank 
appeared to grab an early opportunity to fiirther exploit the goodwill of its staff, 
by formally announcing a change in starting times for extended scrum sessions. 
Every Wednesday morning. Bank UK's branches opened at 9.30am to 
accommodate a longer session of staff training, sales mentoring and management 
communication. Notwithstanding the obvious problem of the absence o f many 
part-time and 'casual' staff whom Bank UK appeared reluctant to pay for these 
non-customer contact sessions, the bank drew on knowledge that the vast majority 
of staff started their working days some considerable time before their official 
starting hour in order to complete various tasks without interruption, e.g. 
balancing and restocking automated teller machines, emptying and counting the 
contents of night safe boxes', and ensuring the counter was fully operational, 
before having to deal with a never-ending flow of customers: 
' Night Safe Boxes were a facility for business customers who were able to deposit takings (in 
note form only) in a secure safe accessed from the branch exterior, once the branch had closed to 
the public. With the cost to customers being rather prohibitive (£5.00 per lodgement, and a 
quarterly ^facility' fee of £50.00), it was common for the night safes to be busy at weekends rather 
than during the week when many businesses endeavoured to ensure they deposited daily takings 
with a cashier, in the traditional manner, before branches closed. 
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The latest Staff Opinion Survey highlighted that you want more time 
to communicate with staff each week. It's vital that doing this doesn't 
affect our customer opening hours, so I have been looking at other 
ways to respond to your feedback. I know that many of you already get 
into the office at 8.45am each morning for local communication and 
'scrum' activity - I would like to build on this with a more formal 
arrangement that works right across our network and recognises the 
commitment that people are prepared to make. ...'Late Opening 
Sessions'' are central to the launch and discussion o f new initiatives. 
By sharing best practices and building teamwork, they have proved 
valuable in helping everyone to manage the changes. I believe that 
making these sessions longer is the best way of achieving our aims, so 
&om 11 July 2001, 'late opening sessions^ wi l l start at 8.45am 
ending as usual at 9 JOam. [emphasis in original]. This will mean, for 
example, we can begin Bank UK TV broadcasts at 8.50am and have 
more time to discuss programme content and progress local issues 
afterwards... Clerical team members wil l be paid extra for attending 
these Mate opening sessions'... This initiative will operate for the next 
twelve months and I will be monitoring and evaluating its 
effectiveness during this period. 
(Bank UK, Retail Banking Director Internal Memorandum to branch managers 
dated 27/6/01). 
Whilst the official starting time of these late opening sessions was only shifted 
from 9.00am to 8.45am, (which was the common starting time o f most fiiH-time 
staff" anyway), the bank knew that in order to complete pre-opening formalities 
and participate in a forty-five minute scrum, staff would need to arrive even 
earlier in order to compensate for these earlier starts. Its commitment to 
compensate clerical team members for their overtime only applied to part-time 
workers who had specific hours contracts. At South Town branch, part-timers 
Claire and Fiona had both been contracted to start work at 9.00am on Wednesday 
mornings in order to participate in Mate opening session' activity. They therefore 
Actual name changed to protect the anonymity of Bank UK. 
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qualified for an excess hours payment of fifteen minutes per week when the 
starting time was shifted to 8.45am. Full-time staff were not so lucky. They did 
not qualify for additional salary. Bank UK deemed they were not being expected 
to start work any earlier than their contracted starting times despite the fact Bank 
UK knew they would need to start work by at least 8.30am to finish everything 
expected of them before the start of extended scrum sessions. On an annual basis 
these extra, unpaid fifteen minutes on a Wednesday morning equated to thirteen 
unpaid hours (almost two days of fi^e labour) per member of staff. 
Elongating the length of the working day was not just restricted to Wednesday 
mornings, hi my interviews with staff, 1 made sure 1 specifically asked individuals 
i f they felt able to comfortably complete all the work they were expected to do 
within their contracted hours. Their responses (some of which follow) 
unambiguously endorse earlier conclusions that all grades of branch staff in Bank 
UK now appear to be working an increasing number of excess and unpaid hours 
on a regular basis: 
Inevitably it gets to a stage where it [unfinished work / filing] just 
mounts up so much that you've got to stay late or work through your 
lunch hour, or come in early, or do all three... just to keep your head 
above water. You can't keep your original promises to customers like 
sending things out when they request them. It might not be done for 
two or three days and then you let the customers down. 
(Nina, Sales Executive, Harbour Town branch, 18/10/00). 
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... I work at least half an hour to three quarters of an hour every day 
more than I am scheduled to, and sometimes I don't get all my lunch 
hour... there doesn't seem to be any spare capacity anymore. You 
can't sit down for a nice hour to work out the holiday chart (laughs). 
You've got to scrape five minutes here and five minutes there to talk 
to people... so it's a real juggling act. 
(Peggy, Assistant Manager, West Town branch, 12/12/00). 
1 am in charge of stationery. 1 was trying to fit in doing it this morning 
in between serving customers (sighs), but we are short on the counter 
anyway, so you sort o f get one thing on the machine' and then you 
have to run back and serve. I've never got time to do it, not unless I 
have an extra bod on the counter... As far as the counter work goes, 
you have to do it anyway, so we have to stay until we are balanced, so 
i f you've got a problem you have to stay until you've sorted it out. 
(Jane, Chief Cashier, West Town branch, 12/12/00). 
[asked i f she could fit her duties into her seven hour contracted day] At 
no stage, no! I f I'm on the counter, I suppose (pause) I suppose yes 1 
can leam to juggle my day, but when I'm covering the counter, and 
possibly the counting house^, AND trying to do my own role, no, no! 
This week I have left on time, but the last fortnight I've worked almost 
two hours every night to accommodate queries and sickness. I was of f 
for a few days so nobody had done anything to my job whatsoever... 
I'm old enough [53] to remember the times when you looked after 
each other. The youngsters don't. Fair play to them i f the bank is 
saying that you work the hours that you are contracted to work. But i f 
I'm on a job that I'm responsible for then I can't really get away ftom 
the fact that (pause) you know (pause) really it's down to me (laughs). 
I don't want to stop [work over]. I've had enough and I'm tired, but 1 
still do. 
(Jean, Union Representative, North Town branch, 15/2/01). 
' Jane was referring to the electronic 'on-line' ordering of stationery items. 
^ The counting house is a secure area where large deposits of cash are counted without 
interruption. 
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Most of the time I only take ten minutes for lunch - just quick enough 
to have something to eat. I start earlier than starting times at the start 
of the day, and do later times at the end of the day. So a normal day is 
probably an hour and a half, no, probably more than that, probably 
something like approaching two hours. I mean i f 1 catch my 5.30pm 
train that's going early! Most weeks I do at least one, i f not two late 
nights. This can be until at least 8pm just catching up on everyday 
stufif, 'cos that's the only time that you can do it. I prefer to do it in the 
office. So I'd rather stay late here and then as soon as 1 walk in the 
fiiont door at home I haven't got anything with me. 
(George, Manager, West Town branch, 5/12/00). 
1 don't leave before six most nights... but 1 could stay until seven or 
eight quite easily! So at six I'm off'thanks very much'. Some nights I 
take work home. I do take a lunch hour, but it's only twenty minutes. 
Time for a sandwich and a coffee, and sometimes I do walk round 
town just to get some fi^sh air, but 1 can't take an hour, it's just 
impossible! 
(Tom, Business Manager,North Town branch, 15/2/01). 
During a period of participant observation at South Town branch in August 2001, 
Sam (chief cashier) asked me to get the cash out with her one morning. It soon 
became clear that she wanted me to act as a sounding board for her latest 
complaints. For two days running earlier in the week she had arrived for work at 
8.55am due to unexpected traffic delays' (broken down tractor and overturned 
caravan). There had not been a problem with keys etc. and South Town had 
managed to open on time, yet George had taken her to one side and explained that 
she was contracted to start work at 8.45am, and she should make eveiy effort to 
' She lived approximately 10 miles away from the branch. 
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arrive on time in order for him to undertake his dictated scrum activity. They had 
parted as friends, yet when Samantha had told her husband later that evening he 
had been furious. He had enquired the actual hours she was paid for, and she had 
replied 9.00am - 5.00pm. In this case, her husband insisted, she should not be 
expected in the branch at 8.45am on an unpaid basis, ff Bank UK wanted her to 
work 8.45am until 4.45pm then they should officially change her hours. Sam 
argued the point that it was impossible for cashiers to leave at 4.45pm due to 
balancing requirements at 4.30pm and the necessity to count and secure cash 
holdings. Her husband then insisted she should be paid for her overtime, and Sam 
had tackled George about the problem the following day. He had simply shrugged 
his shoulders and said: "You know the bank doesn't pay overtime anymore. I 
don't like it any more than you do" (Research Diary, 14/8/01). 
According to Benders and Van Hootegem (2000: 54), the't ' word - teamworking 
- has become an important factor in managerial incentives to raise general 
performance levels (Watson and Rosborough, 2000: 162). However, critics of 
teamworking suggest the ' t ' word is nothing more than the imposition of self-
supervision and peer surveillance (Marchington, 2000: 61). In Bank UK, my 
research suggests that the individual attitudes towards work of long serving and 
experienced staff (whether they were now working in a managerial role, or had 
remained at the level of clerical worker), remained coloured by what had been 
expected of them in the past (Watson and Rosborough, 2000: 173), when staffing 
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numbers were higher, and roles had been effectively 'boxed o f f through tight job 
descriptions, which ensured employees tasks were strictly limited to those written 
down (MacShane and Brewster, 2000: 11). Employees worked specifically as a 
cashier, or a securities officer, or an enquires clerk etc., and were not expected to 
be fijnctionally flexible. As George later philosophised about his managerial role: 
"Purely on a selfish basis I would prefer to be the old style manager as they did 
bugger all" (5/12/00). 
My observation in Bank UK mirrored recent TUC research, which found the 
average worker (no definifion), now works seven excess and unpaid hours each 
week, which equates to over five thousand pounds offi-ee labour per employee on 
an annual basis, benefiting the economy to the tune of twenty eight billion pounds 
(BBC Radio Four News, 20/3/02). 
Evidence suggests that tensions between two types of flexibility - flexibility for 
predictability and flexibility for adaptability (Watson and Rosborough, 2000: 167) 
are very much in evidence in the day-to-day work organisation of Bank UK. 
Flexibility for predictability is symptomatic of personnel policies, which 
"...allowed labour to be taken on, dispensed or moved about to suit changing 
circumstances" in organisations where: "controlling interest emphasised the need 
for flexibility for predictability..." (Watson and Rosborough, 2000: 167-168), and 
appeared especially relevant to Bank UK's senior management, who shed 'casual' 
workers in November 2001 in order to safeguard costs (see page 132). 
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The need for greater flexibility for predictability appeared to have been the major 
influence in driving through amended working contracts, which all Bank UK staff* 
(permanent part-time and fiill-time) were expected to sign during 2001. These 
revised contracts effectively moved staff away fi^m traditional employment 
agreements where they were paid to work for stipulated periods o f time, with pay 
expressed in hourly or weekly rates (Kessler, 1995: 255 -256), and where 
overtime was compensated at premium rate as a deterrent to, and compensation 
for, work performed outside socially accepted nomial working hours (Brereton, 
1990:371). 
Bank UK's revised working contracts also introduced a new strategy termed 
operationalised hours' into the branch network for the first time. This was 
promoted as giving employees the opportunity to work in a more flexible, femily-
fiiendly way. In reality however, staff were simply expected to work for their 
agreed number o f hours per week, which were multiplied to obtain a figure for 
annualised hours. For example, the typical full-time employee working 7 hours a 
day, 35 hours a week, equated to an annualised figure of 1,820 hours. After 
subtracting a typical holiday entitlement of 25 days (175 hours), a revised 
annualised working contract of 1,645 hours was typically determined. 
See Appendix One for a detailed explanation. 
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What Bank UK appeared keen to do was spread an individuals annualised hours 
figure over six, or indeed, in some instances, seven working days*. These 
contractual changes offered the bank significant advantages in three distinctive 
ways. Firstly, and perhaps most importantly, it gave Bank UK the opportunity to 
resolve its ongoing and potentially destabilising organisational tension between 
two distinctive and competing types of flexibility - flexibility for predictability 
and flexibility for adaptability (Watson, 1995). As the wording of individual 
contracts now gave Bank UK absolute control over both an individual's location 
and hours of work, it was able to subject its permanent full-time and part-time 
workforce to a greater degree of organisational, rather than individual control. My 
ovwi contract^ for May to October 2000 gave an example of the revised 
contractual wording: 
Initially you will be required to work at our 'West Tovm'^ branch [full 
branch address quoted]. You may be transferred at the discretion o f the 
Bank to any other duties or another branch / office. A key requirement 
of this role is a need for flexibility in working hours. Your total annual 
hours will be based on 1826, (where your working day exceeds 5 
hours you will be entitled to an unpaid lunch break of I hour). Your 
precise hours of work, and in particular starting/finishing time will 
vary in line with business demands and as a consequence, standard 
working arrangements as set in 'Office Control Directory, Staff333C* 
will not apply. Instead, you will be subject to the terms of'annualised 
hours'*... 
' In a few ^experimental' branches located in the largest of the UK*s out-of-town shopping centres 
competitive pressures had forced 7-day opening, where staff were expected to work their 
annualised hours over a 7-day week. 
^ I had to be given a 'contract of employment*, despite the researcher nature of my role. The 
contract specifically covered me for industrial injury and insured me whilst 1 was in the 
workplace. 
^ Where asterisks are used, this denotes that textual changes have been made to protect the identity 
of Bank UK. 
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Secondly, these new contracts allowed Bank UK to cease its practice of paying 
staff a premium rate for contracting into Saturday working. Historically a cashier 
could have expected to earn £50,00 for just four hours woric on a Saturday 
morning, with sales executives and managers commanding incrementally more. 
Saturday attendance was not compulsory and i f insufficient volunteers came 
forward fiom the Saturday branch itself, the opportunity to undertake lucrative 
Saturday work was offered on an open market basis to local staff fi-om nearby 
branches. For many, extra income such as this had been welcome. However, 
under the new system of operafionalised hours such perks were nullified. Revised 
working contracts sought not only to control an individual's location and hours of 
work, they now included specific mandates which forced staff working in 
Saturday branches' to contract into a specific number of Saturdays on an annual 
basis. 
The absolute minimum of Saturdays staff were expected to contract into was 9 
per annum, but individuals were encouraged to do at least one in two, i.e. 26 a 
year. Not only had Bank UK now made Saturday working compulsory under 
revised contracts of employment, staff were no longer recompensed at premium 
rates. Its traditional incentive schemes for encouraging a certain degree of 
flexibility by compensating for overtime at premium rates had become too 
cumbersome, and more importantly, too costly to continue. Four hours work on a 
' At the time of my research not every branch of Bank UK opened on Saturdays. Weekend 
opening was commonly restricted to branches located in city centres / shopping centres / airports 
etc. 
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Saturday was now considered the same as four hours work at any other time of 
the week. The only choice offered to staff was whether to receive payment for 
Satuniay working as time off in lieu during the week (subject to operational 
needs), or as cash in their following month's salary'. For many staff, these 
enforced contractual revisions simply added to the stresses they encountered 
during the week: 
[re Saturday opening] Initially we were ENCOURGAED to do more 
but were told that there was an option to reduce or change. I agreed to 
do 24, was asked i f I would do 26 because they [management] were 
desperate and was told it would not be a binding document or 
agreement. It came to next year, and you put down to reduce and you 
were told: "Sorry, you can't reduce i f that's what you did before". So I 
got stuck with 26! And that's how the bank is. It's encouraging people 
to do more and more and saying really i f you don't you will be made 
redundant by some ways or means - and that threat is always around. 
(Jean, Union Representative, North Town branch, 15/2/01). 
At s^tandard* hourly rate, no longer at a premium hourly rate. 
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[talking about her choice to switch from full to part-time] My new 
contract is just for HOURS. In theory I work 4 days a week, but i f 
Barry [manager] wanted me to come in every day until 3pm, then he's 
within his rights to do that. That said, Barry does tiy and give people 
what they want and sort of fit round what fits their families etc. I f you 
were in a branch where the manager wasn't quite so understanding it 
could woric against you, and included in that i f they wanted you to 
work a lot of Saturdays then again you could be made to do that 
because you are purely HOURS, not days or times or whatever... I 
don't work many Saturdays. I was a bit crafty (laughs). I knew that I 
was thinking about going part-time and they bought Saturday contracts 
in when I was still full-time. So I signed a Saturday contract to do 6 a 
year, which has since been increased to 9, and then I went part-time. 
You were told you could choose what you liked and then it would be 
negotiated for next year. Then after we signed our new contracts we 
were told there was no negotiation about next year, so i f you had 
signed up for a lot like 26 a year you were stuck. As I say, I signed up 
for the minimum, which was 6, since increased to 9. So I signed that 
contract then went part-time, and when I signed my part-time contract 
this had to fit undemeath i f you like, my Saturday contract. So I went 
part-time and when you go part-time he [Barry, Manager] tries to get 
you to do about 26 Saturdays a year, but he couldn't do that with me 
because I'd already signed the Saturday contract (laughs). I stitched 
him up slightly... 
(Leah, Sales Executive, North Town branch, 15/2/01). 
By intrc)ducing these new employment contracts not only did Bank UK manage to 
obtain greater control over the location and hours flexibility o f individual 
employees, it also was able to introduce the concept of performance related pay 
for all permanent full and part-time staff for the first time' - a move which sought 
to link individual and organisational performance with individual and corporate 
productivity (Mabey et al., 1998: 7-8). 
' Bank UK*s managerial staff, including branch managers, and professional sales force staff were 
already subject to varying performance related pay schemes. 
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Issues surrounding the introduction, implementation and experience o f sales 
targets have already been discussed in earlier chapters, where I used field and 
interview data to describe the varying ways in which the assignment and theft of 
sales had created huge problems with reconciling achievement. The following 
interview extracts are indicative of the general feeling of hopelessness, which 
seemed to pervade many of my more intimate conversations with staff about sales 
and the stresses caused by the imposition of targets: 
[explaining why she finds the job of manager so stressful] ... it is so 
stressfijl. I f you don't hit target you're fiightened to make that 
telephone call to Lesley [area manager]'. I worry about it and I think, 
"Weil I've done my best". I f you do your best and its not good enough 
I don't know what the answer is... I'm having sleepless nights and 
worrying at weekends... 
(Sally, Deputy Manager, Harbour Town branch, 18/10/00). 
Everybody expects you to do everything and you just can't. To start 
with I found it very, very stressful... 1 felt really upset and thought 
really don't want to work like this". Everybody else has the same 
problem. They [Bank UK] are expecting too much. They don't do 
anything to help you reach these expectations (laughs)... 
(Lauren, Cashier, West Town branch, 5/12/00). 
Every Friday afternoon at 4.30pm, every branch manager or deputy had to telephone their area 
manager with a complete list of sales achieved during the week, staling how fer above or below 
target their branch had faired. If a branch had failed to meet their targets, managers could expect a 
one-to-one telephone call from their regional manager the following Monday, where they would 
be expected to discuss their plans to make up the shortfall during the forthcoming week. Three 
failures in a month meant managers could be subjected to formal warning procedures. 
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So now you are in a situation where you not only have to deliver a 
sales and service target, you are going to get a kick up the arse i f you 
fall short on your statutoiy obligations...[talking specifically about 
stress as a general issue]... people are individuals and they react 
differently to different forms of stress. Some people thrive on it, most 
don't. So you can easily end up with the dreadfiji situation where they 
just dread coming in . . . Staff are asked to bid in [to the sales targets]. 
To establish a bind yes. It's now an established v^y of doing it. 
Because I mean you can easily have a situation where the business is 
managed by fear at a local level, and that to me (pause) as a branch 
manager is, you know an APPALLING state of affairs, i f you can only 
manage by fear. I mean I've worked for enough dinosaurs, and I know 
what it's like working under that regime. But collectively that is what 
the bank seems to be doing. So you have the managers as all the 
absorbers of all the hassle and the aggravation. So 1 have to try and 
filter that out before it gets down to the troops... The emphasis all 
along is fi-om the bank wearing their righteous employer hat and 
insisting we sell to a need. Well OK, i f you have a week o f bad results 
and you get a 'phone call saying, "What the hell went wrong"? I f you 
were lucky you could argue you were selling to a need and there 
weren't many needs that week (laughs), but you've got to be pretty 
brave to argue that one... You've just got lots and lots of people 
fighting desperately to keep their heads above water... for whatever 
reasons expectations don't come up to the bank's expectations of 
footflow then you come under scrutiny, you come under close scrutiny 
and that puts more pressure on you and you end up spiralling 
downwards into a pit of despond. 
(George, Manager, West Town branch, 5/12/00). 
Accompanying the fear of the weekly sales telephone call, branch managers were 
also subject to covert assessments of their leadership and communication skills. 
Where managers had been instructed to cascade specific information to their staff, 
it was common for regional management to make random telephone calls to 
branches in order to ensure important announcements had been explained and 
understood. In June 2000, Bank UK launched its Ongoing Customer Initiative 
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Programme (OCIP)', which sought: "To deliver Shareholder Value through a 
series o f initiatives to double productivity and to deliver targets by 2003..." 
(Intemal staff memorandum dated 22/6/00). Regional management were keen to 
ensure that staff fully understood the key objectives, and it was announced that 
branches would be subjected to random checks in order to ensure the OCIP had 
been fijlly understood by all staff. George appeared desperate to ensure none of 
his staff would have any problems in answering questions i f West Town was 
randomly chosen for checking, and resorted to sticking crib sheets (on which he 
had written the expected answers) to all the telephones within West Town branch 
so that it wouldn't matter who answered which extension, everyone would be able 
to answer as expected (Research Diary, 23/6/00). Further warned that branch staff 
would be randomly selected to stand up and explain the OCIP in front o f dieir 
peers at the next annual staff meeting, George printed the core ideals and values 
of the OCIP onto individual 10cm x 8cm crib sheets, which he suggested were 
"secreted somewhere" in case of need. (Research Diary, 18/10/01). 
' Pseudon>Tn used in order to protect the identity of Bank UK. 
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Safety Issues 
Many issues of safety in Bank UK appear to be directly attributable to issues of 
cost. Fieldwork undertaken in various branches highlighted that a general problem 
with safety can be illustrated by the poor state of internal branch staircases. The 
process of converting buildings to operational branches over many years had 
resulted in the installation of a multitude of different staircases, both between 
floors and in the creation of access to modem mezzanine working areas. In what 
appears to have been a conscious decision to locate staff amenities as far away as 
possible fium working areas in order to discourage stoppages, staff rest rooms 
were generally located on the top floors of branch buildings (generally third or 
fourth floor), with toilets either adjacent, or located at subterranean level, one or 
two levels undemeath woricing areas. A nationwide energy (cost?) saving 
initiative had previously urged staff to turn off lighting in infrequently used areas, 
and this had served to render stairwells and toilets dark and dingy. Compliance 
with various acts of legislation had seen the installation of a multitude of heavy, 
self-closing fire doors at various floor levels, but in order to accommodate them 
within what were very often narrow stairwell confines, they often opened 
outwards rather than inwards, making it very difficult not to fall backwards down 
the stairs. Trying to juggle trays o f hot drinks down what were generally three 
flights of narrow, steep stairs was an absolute nightmare. On many occasions: "1 
felt I was going to faU backwards arse over tit!" (Leah, 15/2/01). During my 
fieldwork at West Town branch, which had a particulariy steep staircase, I asked 
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George why we couldn't bring the kettle downstairs. He said that he didn't have a 
problem with the request fiom an operational point of view, but it would not just 
be the kettle that came downstairs. It would mean bringing down coflfee, tea, 
sugar, milk and mugs, and this would create mess where: "I cannot afford to have 
mess" i.e. in the office areas (Research Diaiy, 20/6/00). 
During the early days of my participant observation at West Town branch, I 
realised that the cashiers had clearly resigned themselves to bringing v«th them all 
the refreshments and food they felt they would need for their varying number of 
working hours. Instead of putting them (usually bakery bought filled sandv^ches 
and cartons / cans of drink) in the fridge on the third floor, from where they would 
find it difficult to graze throughout their day, their food was placed in the little 
room directly behind the cashiering counter, which was hidden from public gaze. 
The necessity to leave their cashiering positions to use the V D T on a regular basis 
(to check balances etc before the installation of C S A L E S hardware and software) 
meant they often took a bite of food, or a swig of liquid whilst carrying out 
customer requests: 
One C S A L E S machine not working, so we had to operate with just 
two operable units on the first day of the school holidays! Felt a rising 
sense of panic. No drink / loo from opening, to having lunch at 
12.30pm. Claire worked an extra unpaid half an hour to cover Sam's 
lunch break. Henry ate his sandwiches at his desk, and Lionel didn't 
have a lunch break at all. 
(Research Diaiy, 24/7/00). 
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Not only did Bank U K appear to make it as awkward as possible for staff to take a 
break as a result of decreasing staflSng numbers, it also appeared to closely 
monitor the usage of the facilities it provided for staff: "Our cups of coffee / tea 
are now being restricted to two a day, one in the morning and one in the 
afternoon, as we [South Town branch] are using more than the permitted one pint 
of milk a day, and there is not further money in our tea fund at present'" 
(Research Diary, 2/8/00). Even visits to the toilet had to be carefully pre-planned 
to fit in with operational staffing levels. It was common to hear staff making plans 
to 'go' at specific times in order to ensure that, barring 'emergencies', they were 
fully able to cover traditionally busy times such as lunch breaks and the hour 
before 3.30pm^: "I'll go to the loo now, before you go to lunch, as I won't have 
any opportunity after that" (Research Diary, 2/1/01). 
The toilets themselves were also a source of irritation to staff. Notwithstanding 
the lack of hot water due to broken water heaters^, toilet paper appeared to 
become covertly rationed. Instead of each cubicle having a spare roil, it was 
' Bank UK provided tea / coffee/ sugar / milk and orange squash through a central tea fiind. The 
amounts each branch were allowed to order was dictated by staff establishment. 
^ Although the majority of Bank UK's domestic banking branches remained open to the public 
until 4.30pm (larger branches in city centres opened until 5.30pm), any transactions undertaken 
after 3.30pm were not processed until the next working day. This meant thai it was still common 
to have a *rush* of customers between 230pm and 330pm who needed to ensure their banking 
was processed without a delay. 
See Chapter Three for a detailed explanation of how internal branch maintenance programmes 
had been suspended due to cost issues. 
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common at West Town branch for the cleaners' to only put out one spare roll to 
be shared between both cubicles in the 'ladies'. When all female staff and summer 
'casuals' were working in the branch this meant ten women sharing two toilets. 
Often toilet paper in one ran out altogether, which meant shouting to colleagues to 
'throw some paper over', or having to use the scraps that were left. When staff 
complained, George said it was to do with "controlling costs" (Research Diary, 
27/7/00). Maureen sarcastically retorted: "Can we assume that from now on you 
will give us four sheets of loo paper and two sugar cubes [referring to the cutting 
back of coffee supplies] as we arrive each morning, and that will be our ration for 
the day? If it is I'll start a black market and bring in things from home" (Research 
Diary, 27/7/00). 
Other potential health hazards appeared to become intensified by issues of cost. In 
August 2000, the plastic sanitary disposal bins in the ladies toilet cubicles at West 
Town branch were full of waste. Maureen complained to George that they had not 
been emptied for some while, and with the heat of the summer, she thought they 
now constituted a potential health hazard. George replied that following the 
renegotiation of cleaning contracts early in the year; responsibility for emptying 
them had been removed from the jurisdiction of his daily cleaning staff^ and he 
was now required to arrange a special collection with an outside contractor. 
Before he made the telephone call to arrange disposal, Maureen watched him go 
' All cleaning products, equipment and toilet requisites were locked away in what was known as 
'ihe cleaners cupboard'. If toilet paper ran out completely during the day, staff had to buy some in 
order to tide them over until the cleaners arrived later in the evening to restock as required. 
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into the ladies toilets and check for himself that what she had said was true 
(Research Diary, 8/8/00). It was a source of amusement to the female cashiers at 
West Town branch that whilst they were cajoled every day into emptying the 
A T M receipt bin' (a job which was most unpopular), the bank did not think that 
overflowing sanitaiy disposal bins were a priority - simply just another irritating 
stafi'expense. 
As simply part of doing their job staff met other potential health hazards, yet 
Bank U K appeared increasingly reluctant to spend money in order to make certain 
tasks more tolerable. This was highlighted by a charitable coin collection 
deposited at West Town branch in June 2000. A well-known U K cancer charity 
(who did not actually hold an account with Bank U K ) , had decided to empty and 
drain its wishing wells^ in time for the approaching holiday season, and 
immediately after opening one Monday morning, its local treasurer approached 
the cashiers with a request they count the retrieved coins and apply the total as a 
credit to the main cancer charity account. The coins had been haphazardly thrown 
in cloth coin bags, which filled the medium sized cardboard box the treasurer had 
used for transportation. Maureen, (who was undertaking duties of chief cashier 
that day) immediately went to obtain clarification fix)m George whether or not she 
' An overflowing ATM receipt bin had been deemed by regional management to be sloppy 
practice, which seriously undermined the professional image Bank UK wished to portray. 
Emptying the bin was not a nice job. Not only did the bin contain paper receipts from the ATM, 
the public appeared to take great delight in using the bin as a common litter receptacle. Used 
chewing gum, pieces of congealed food, and plastic chip forks were everyday fmds. 
^ The wishing wells were receptacles for donations in the form of coins, which were thrown into 
the well by donors who were then encouraged to *make a wish'. 
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should agree to the request. George replied we had little choice fix)m a public 
relations perspective to count the coins as requested, despite his acceptance oflhe 
time it would take to separate, weigh and count the deposit. It soon became clear 
that the task would be extremely time consuming. The treasurer appeared to take 
great delight in telling Maureen that the wells had not been emptied for over five 
years, and apologised in advance for the state of the money. When Maureen and I 
investigated the contents, we found that the majority of the coins were completely 
unidentifiable. Their long immersion in water had rendered most of them covered 
in verdigris and slime. Maureen returned to George to inform him of the problems 
we had uncovered, and told him that she was unhappy handling the coins without 
the protection of plastic gloves. According to Maureen, George simply laughed 
and told hen 'that was out of the quesfion". However, when Rachel* later went to 
ask George to cover on the counter, he was able to see for himself the problems 
Maureen and I were encountering. Due to the poor physical state of the coins it 
was impossible to weigh them, and we had found many of them to be foreign. It 
was simply a matter of fipping the contents of the cloth bags onto the counter and 
trying to sort and count them within their individual denominations. Whilst 
Maureen and I were busy counting, we were aware of George coming to serve the 
queue and then we realised he was standing behind us holding two pairs of 
surgical plastic gloves. He had been out the chemist immediately opposite West 
Town branch, and had bought us each a pair with his own money rather than 
submit a staff expenses claim to regional management (Research Diaiy 20/6/00). 
* Part-lime cashier 
261 
My research has indicated how decreased staff establishments within Bank U K 
have impacted on health and safety issues in the most unexpected of ways. In 
order to ensure that routine office duties were both carried out on time, and with 
due periodicity. Bank U K had historically implemented a paper based diary 
system of action prompt cards', which were distributed to specific staff for 
actioning. At West Town branch it was one of the duties of the chief cashier to 
distribute these cards on a daily basis, and keep the diary system operating 
smoothly. Many of the action prompts were reminders for the branch manager to 
undertake a whole variety of checking and monitoring procedures, for example 
completing sickness record charts, randomly checking the contents of tills etc. 
Time pressures had meant that successive managers had been keen to delegate as 
many of these checking requirements to other staff as possible. Two important 
health and safety checks had been made the responsibility of the cashiers at West 
Town - the weekly testing of intemal fire warning bells and the maintenance of 
the First Aid box. 
During times of extreme working pressures it had clearly become common 
practice for the fire alarm weekly test to be skipped. Often, whoever was 
undertaking the responsibilities of chief cashier simply inifialled the action 
prompt card, and the official log book without testing the alarm system, or 
making a physical inspection of the designated fire routes for potential hazards as 
expected. Only when a representative of the regional management team was 
Pseudonym used to protect the identity of Bank UK. 
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visiting the branch did the cashiers make an effort to test the system as instructed, 
and appeared to take a great delight in leaving the piercing bells ringing for as 
long as possible (Research Diary, 10/8/00)'. 
Responsibility for the First Aid box had also been delegated to the cashiers at 
West Town branch. A monthly action prompt card required that its contents be 
checked and replaced where necessary. Many of the contents had remained 
unused for many years, and instead of checking that the quota of bandages were 
still sealed within their sterile wrappings, or that the expiry date on bottles of 
eyewash^ had not been breached, the cashiers tended just to make sure there was 
still an adequate supply of plasters in the box, which they used heavily, due to the 
fiequency of paper cuts to fingers and hands - a common hazard of cashiering. 
Again, an initial on the action prompt card suflBced. Managers, who should not 
have been delegating these duties, simply did not have the time to ensure their 
staff had actually carried out the vaiying tasks they had been asked to do, rather 
than simply indicating they had done so. 
Chemical substances encountered by staff in the course of their normal duties also 
contributed towards ill health. Fed up with the costs of sanctioning frequent 
engineers visits to remove jammed notes from South Town's ancient A T M 
' Worker deviance will be discussed in the following chapter. 
^ One of the biggest threats to the cashiers was the spraying of poisonous substances during an 
armed raid, and each workstation was supposed to have its own sterile *eyewash' bottle within 
easy reach. 
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machine, regional management sent Sam* a supply of new industrial cleaning 
solution, which she was asked to spray into the A T M internal machinery during 
balancing and restocking. The new spray was supposed to provide a more resilient 
lubrication, thereby helping to stop notes fix)m sticking and subsequently jamming 
the mechanism. Sam, who already suffered from asthma, found that the new spray 
made her condition much worse and wheezed and coughed every time she inhaled 
its vapours. One day she experienced such a bad asthma attack after work, her 
husband was on the verge of taking her to hospital (Research Diary 16/11/01). 
Despite voicing her concerns to Geoiige, he simply arranged for another staff 
member to use the spray instead of Sam, rather than making a record of her 
complaint about the potential toxicity of the product in an official manner. Was 
the new chemical simply cheaper than the costs of engineer's visits, despite its 
clear health risk? 
Conclusion 
This chapter has assessed issues of stress, work intensification and safety in the 
Bank UK. In particular, I have used field and interview data to demonstrate how 
staff have experienced such issues on a practical day-to day level. What my 
research has made clear is that all these issues are inexorably bound up with the 
themes of earlier chapters - the management of the organisation, the ascension of 
sales to Bank UK's primary organisational concern, and most importantly, issues 
Chief cashier. 
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of cost. This is not a new phenomenon symptomatic of the financial services 
industry in isolation. In similar circumstances to Leah's reluctant choice to start 
work earlier than her starting time to ensure she had finished all that was required 
of her before North Town branch opened to the public (page 238), Linhart had 
experienced a similar phenomenon during his research at the Citroen car plant 
some twenty years earlier 
Two minutes stolen doesn't seem much, but it means halfa C V fiee of 
charge every day writhout anyone realizing it. Every two days a 
finished car manufactured outside official working time, between two 
minutes to seven and seven o'clock. Not bad is it? 
(Linhart, 1981: 146). 
Whilst work intensification via line speed-up is not a fector in the banking 
industry (except perhaps in voucher processing centres), the significant loss of 
staff as a consequence of lean production systems has left fewer branch staff 
needing to complete increasing workloads. Critics may argue with the shifting of 
processing work away fi^om branches to designated processing centres fewer 
branch staff are needed. However, whilst volumes of processing work may have 
fallen as a result of this strategy, other tasks, such as selling, have clearly taken 
the place of processing within overall branch workloads. Staffing levels in some 
of my fieldwork sites became so critical that an increasing number of potentially 
damaging short cuts were being taken by staff simply to do their Jobs in the time 
now permitted under new work regimes. 
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6, Summary and Discussion, 
There is little doubt that employees of Bank U K have experienced a multitude of 
profound changes to their working roles over the last few years. Not since the first 
banking revolution - where the mechanisation and computerisation of routine 
processing tasks and data storage media both transformed and feminised the 
industiy (Anderson, 1988:6) have jobs changed so dramatically. Along with other 
service occupations that have embraced mass production techniques, bank work 
appears to have become repetitive, scripted and machine paced by expert systems 
(Batt 2002). This has not been a second technological revolution however, but an 
ideological shift ftom banking to retailing. What staff are now expected to do in 
Bank UK has been radically changed by the promotion of selling to the bank's 
primary operational concern in an intentional bid to expand market share as a 
means of increasing profitability. 
In the process, the majority of Bank UK's revised working strategies appear to 
have been concemed with reducing costs and improving production quality. My 
data suggest that many changes have been influenced by management techniques 
akin to those considered 'Japanese-style' such as H R M , JIT, T Q M etc, that 
demand improved quality control, leaner and more efficient working systems and 
a heightened awareness of cost. Yet, my research suggests that these new 
strategies have created a multitude of operational tensions Bank U K - in particular 
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between service and selling and between cost control and maintenance of service. 
For example, in Chapter Three, I examined the operational difficulties created by 
the launch of a new strategy called 'Service Options'. This initiative sought to 
introduce customere to a different number of (mostly electronic) choices in the 
deliveiy of everyday banking services, which were intended to make transactional 
banking both easier for the consumer, and cheaper for Bank U K to administer. 
The delivery of 'Service Options' entailed a member of staff interacting with 
customers in branches and explairungthe wide range of options available. Clearly 
the scheme necessitated additional, protracted interaction with customers in order 
to be successful. However, the timing of this strategy appeared contradictory. At 
the same time it was rolled out across Bank UK's branch network, the 
employment of 'casual' contract workers was temporarily suspended on cost 
grounds. This meant that it became increasingly diflBcult for managers to release 
staff fi-om their normal duties to deliver the programme in the manner expected by 
senior management. The operational difficulties created by the implementation of 
'Service Options' by the deliberate reduction of staffing levels, suggests that in 
detailed terms Bank UK's operational shift from banking to retailing had created a 
multitude of tensions between its organisational desire to increase sales in orxierto 
strengthen market share and improve income streams, whilst at the same time 
needing to maintain a satisfactory level of customer service in order to protect 
core operations. The operational problems that have arisen from these tensions 
suggest that service and sales do involve contradictory demands and whether they 
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can ever be jointly optimised remains a central question (Batt, 1999: 540). 
Retailing appears to have become simply another element of banking tagged onto, 
but not separate fi-om, existing roles. Here, certain taxonomies of management 
practices, particularly those considered 'Japanese-style' appear not to be readily 
applicable to the banking industry by virtue of its: ".. . more complicated social 
reality..." (Benson 1986, cited in Frenkel et al., 1999:199). The tensions between 
service and selling appear to have become Bank U K ' s principal problem in tiying 
to incorporate 'Japanese-style' management philosophies that tend to make 
mechanistic assumptions about organisations (Knights and McCabe 2002) into its 
own, very different, organisational structure. 
Unlike the manufacturing sector for which many of these Japanese-style strategies 
of working were developed. Bank UK no longer deals exclusively with the 
inanimate processing of transactions. Its success as a retail organisation now 
depends on positive, fluid and dynamic relationships between its management, 
staff and customers - an alliance which necessitates fece-to-face interactions of a 
more personal, emotional, and therefore, less controllable nature. Thus branch 
staffing levels, which have become 'scientifically' measured against the average 
number of customers and the volume of transactions generated, make 'coping' 
harder to achieve. 
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Despite the contradictory nature of many of Bank U K ' s revised strategies, which 
have become the focus of my research, the organisation as a vAxole has managed 
to grow income in line with internally set targets. Its financial results for the year 
ending December 2001 show a grov^h in the number of personal current 
accounts, up 0.7 milUon, (7 per cent), to 10.3 million, a grov^ in the number of 
credit card accounts, up 1.7 million, (22 per cent), to 9.6 million, a growth in the 
number of private motor policies, up 0.8 million, (25 per cent), to 4 million, a 
growth in mortgage lending of £4.4 billion, (13 per cent), to £37 billion, and an 
increase in small business customers of 26,000, (3 per cent), to 931,000 (Bank 
UK, year end results, December 2001:4). 
These financial results suggest that however contradictory Bank UK's revised 
strategies might appear fiiom an operational perspective, they are certainly capable 
of delivering improved financial results. It has been diflficult to conclude whether 
the active and ongoing cooperation of employees in helping to deliver these 
results was a clear outcome of new reward strategies, which may have motivated 
eligible staff to meet predefined numeric targets, or the lingering legacy of a 
strong occupational socialisation, which had continued to impel all employees, 
whatever their contractual status to perform as a team, despite the sometimes 
contradictory ways in which new operational strategies were experienced at 
branch level. This conundmm needs to be theorised in the same way as the many 
other contradictions that have been a feature of my thesis, i.e. in the context or 
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contexts in which it has occurred. For example, is there a key agent of change 
present in branches able to mitigate the contradictory nature of Bank UK's revised 
operational strategies, or has success in the context of improved financial results 
simply been achieved by nothing more than luck? 
If the tenets of H R M are to be believed, then it may be argued that Bank UK's 
ongoing, and up to now successful, shifl from banking to retailing has been 
achieved through the deliberate deployment of a highly committed and capable 
workforce. Literature suggests that under the rubric of H R M employees become 
proactive rather than passive inputs into the production process through their 
commitment, adaptability and high quality skills (Storey, 1995: 5). Yet, as my 
research has continually indicated, as branch establishments have fallen in Bank 
U K as a consequence of the adoption of lean production systems and 
resignations', gaps in staffing numbers have been filled by a wide variety of 
'casual' or flexible workers, who are simply cheaper for the organisation to 
employ. A distinctive two-tiered workforce determined by contractual division 
has emerged. Permanent, full or part-time employees continue to enjoy the 
benefits of greater employment stability including profit sharing, sickness pay, a 
non-contributory final salary pension scheme, mortgage subsidies and paid public 
holidays, whilst a growing peripheral or 'casual' workforce (who undertake the 
' Over the two and a half year duration of my fieldwork, 8 per cent of respondents had requested a 
reduction in full time hours, accepting either permanent part-time or *casual' contracts, \02 per 
cent had resigned at their own volition, \02 per cent had accepted early retirement padcages and 
one (full-time) respondent had been sacked for a consistently poor sales performance 
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same roles as their permanent colleagues), receive incrementally lower wages and 
few associated benefits. However, as existing literature shows, this finding is not 
just representative of the financial services industry. The number of people 
employed on non-standard work contracts throughout all industrial sectors has 
increased in Britain during recent years. In the late 1990s, over 5.5 million women 
and 3.4 million men of working age held non-standard jobs (Dexand McCulloch, 
1997: 173). In my own research over a quarter of my thirty nine respondents were 
employed on non-standard 'casual' contracts. Of these, seven had chosen to 
switch to 'casual' contracts for a variety of personal reasons, which included the 
birth of children, or by accepting retirement packages at too early an age to 
receive their pensions immediately. 
The research discovery which has been the most problematical to theorise, has 
been the extent to which individuals located within this secondary, or 'casual' 
workforce have embraced aw^/contributed to Bank UK's new culture of selling, 
despite their lack of entitlement to performance related pay. My data suggest this 
commitment must be attributed to the unique composition of this workforce. The 
vast majority of Bank UK's 'casual', or secondary workers I encountered during 
my research were usually female, ex-permanent staff members who had desired a 
greater degree of working-time flexibility than could now be offered to them 
through permanent employment: 
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. . . there are a lot of people in the bank who don't want a career and 
are quite happy. It's not a career anymore, it's a job. . . you turn up 
and do your hours and then go home and 'thanks very much'. It's not 
a politically correct thing to say, but a lot of the bank is staffed by 
ladies who are either approaching thirty, or are thirty plus with 
families and are not interested in careers anymore... 
(Tom, Manger, North Town Branch, 15/2/01). 
These individuals were generally very experienced workers who were able to 
offer Bank U K both numerical flexibility by agreeing to work at peak business 
times, or fiinctional flexibility by using their experience to cover a wide range of 
clerical roles. Although most discussions of flexibility imply that part-timers are 
usually an irregular and unstable part of companies' labour forces, 'casual' 
contract workers in Bank U K generally experienced almost year-round 
employment'. In practical terms, they worked no differently to their colleagues 
who held permanent, part-time contracts. These employees were not agency 
workers in the true sense of an agency worker, employed via a third party. Very 
few had worked for any organisation other than Bank U K during their working 
lives. It is worth reiterating at this stage that ahhough gender has not hitherto been 
the primary analytical focus of my research, the contributions of women returnees 
to Bank UK's success would appear to be relevant to my central theme of 
contradiction, and in the remainder of this discussion this is explained further. 
' Except where budgets were exceeded. Pages 132-133 describe the extent to which the annual 
loss of casual staff impacted on day-to-day branch operations. It must be pointed out that the loss 
of casual staff from branches due to budgetary restraints generally occurred during November and 
December (al the end of Bank UK's financial year). Although these were busy times of year for 
branches, increased family responsibilities meant that casual staff appeared content to lose or 
substantially reduce their hours over the Christmas period. 
272 
The difficulties commonly associated with the rationalisation of staff into core 
and peripheral workers - lack of loyalty, dedication and commitment, had been 
mitigated by Bank UK to a large extent by what appeared to be deliberate 
strategies to recruit ex-staflf to fill 'casual' vacancies'. By knowing whom it was 
engaging as 'casual' workers in terms of previous employment histoiy. Bank UK 
also managed to overcome particularly sensitive operational difficulties. As my 
fieldwork progressed, it became clear that falling staffing numbers began to create 
a problem with the security of premises in smaller branches. For example, at Sea 
Town branch, the minimum number of keyholdere the branch was required to 
have for security and operational reasons was four. With a staff establishment of 
only four, including 'casual' staff, it meant that whoever was employed as 
'casual' staff had to accept the responsibilities of being a keyholder, despite the 
secondary nature of their contractual status. 
I f Bank UK's successful shift fi-om banking to retailing is to be mainly attributed 
to the competitive advantage that a highly committed workforce gives an 
organisation, the theoretical problem remains: Why have staff continued to 
embrace change in the manner ray data suggest, when so many paradoxes and 
contradictions in operational strategies are evident? This question appears 
especially pertinent to remuneration. 
Pages 130 - 131 describe the content of typical recruitment literature. 
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Earlier chapters have described the revised system of pay and reward rolled out in 
Bank UK during my fieldworic, which shifted remuneration away fix)m traditional 
principles of pay and reward based on stipulated periods of working time, 
towards: ".. . financial rewards in the form of increases in basic pay or cash 
bonuses which are linked with an assessment of performance, usually in relation 
to agreed objectives." (Annstrong, 1996: 239). Two major problems were 
immediately identifiable. Firstly, as has been reiterated many times already, this 
new strategy was aimed solely at Bank UK staflF who held permanent contracts of 
employment. 'Casual' or secondary workers were not eligible to receive any 
bonus payments, yet were expected to work just as hard as their permanent 
colleagues in selling financial products. With Bank UK managing (o fu l f i l its 
targets for income and growth at the same time that a greater proportion of its 
workforce became peripheral, the assumption must be that secondary or 'casual' 
contract workers actively contributed towards organisational achievement. The 
reasons for this must be relevant to my sustained argument of contradiction, 
particularly in relation to motivation. 
Motivational incentives can be examined ftom a number o f different angles. At a 
personal level, 'casual' contract work may simply have been accepted by 
individuals to provide additional household income, or to gain increased working 
hours flexibility, e.g. term-time employment only. Issues surrounding flexibility 
became especially significant when Bank UK introduced new working time 
contracts incorporating a strategy called 'operationalised hours' during 2001. On 
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pages 247-252 I discussed how these revised contracts, which all permanent full 
or part-time employees were expected to sign, effectively moved away from 
traditional employment contracts based on stipulated periods of working time 
towards more fluid agreements, where working hours could be spread over six or 
seven days. On the surface 'operationalised hours' appeared to exemplify a 
*femily friendly' policy. Employees were told they would be able to fit their hours 
around what best suited their individual circumstances. Yet, as the implications o f 
the contractual revision unfolded, staff came to view the term 'flexible hours' as 
simply a smokescreen for elongating their working week - in particular the 
requirement for staff in larger branches to now work on Saturdays. Jean, a 
permanent part-time staff member at North Town branch, occupying what she 
called a "gopher role"' explained: "1 do 32 hours [a week] and 26 Saturdays. I 
don't work Mondays so I do an 8-hour day with half an hour break Tuesday 
through Friday, then 26 Saturdays, which feels like a lot" (15/2/01). 
This shift towards more fluid, but increasingly controlled working time appears to 
fit with most of the conclusions of existing literature on Just-In-Time (JIT) 
working as discussed earlier on pages 48-50. In the literature, opponents of JIT 
working strategies suggest that the organisational philosophy of reducing 
organisational slack, by increasing the functional and numerical flexibility of 
labour by delivering staff to the workplace only at the very point at which they are 
' Jean described her gopher role thus: "I cover the counter when needed. It includes a lot of the 
admin t>pe work, which they lost when the admin role went but is creeping back. At the moment 
the bank is not recognising it as a job. It is recognising it as a role and is asking me to do it within 
the overall manning of the branch." (15/2/01). 
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required, is simply a crude capitalist tool, serving little purpose other than 
subordinating labour to increased management control (Delbridge 1998, 1995). 
Through the strategy of *operationalised hours' Bank UK became better able to 
deploy stafif in its branch network at times when customer demand was the 
greatest. Although managers did their best to accommodate individual demands, 
such as working to 3.30pm without a lunch hour to fit work around school hours, 
it was necessary for the successful implementation of'operationalised hours', that 
any such requests fitted with branch operational requirements in the first instance: 
[talking about her choice to syvitch from full to part-time hours].. I 
changed fcom full-time to a part-time [contract]. My new contract is 
for hours, but in theory i f Barry [manager] wanted me to work 
(pause). I mean I work four days a week, but i f Barry wanted you to 
come in every day until 3 o' clock then he's within his rights to do 
that. That said, at this branch [North Town] Bany does try and give 
people what they want and sort of fit round what fits their families 
etc. If you were in a branch where the manager wasn't quite so 
understanding it could work against you, and included in that, i f they 
wanted you to work a lot of Saturdays then again you could be made 
to do that because you are now purely hours, not days or times or 
whatever... 
(Leah, North Town Branch, 15/2/01). 
It is clear fitjm my research that the implementation of'operational ised hours' in 
Bank UK brought issues surrounding working hours flexibility to the forefiont of 
employee concerns. This was of particular significance to women who had family 
and other responsibilities outside the workplace. Through *operationalised hours', 
full and part-time workers holding permanent contracts of employment 
experienced a significant decrease in flexibility of working hours. Whilst staff 
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employed on permanent part-time contracts were still able to choose the number 
of hours they wished to work in a week, choice of specific times - for example, 
school hours only, was no longer permitted. The following interview extract with 
'Wanda' highlights the practical difficulties arising from the implementation of 
'operationalised hours' and its associated decrease in flexibility of working 
hours': 
I'm a part-time cashier covering core hours,.. My hours, right. 
Mondays and Fridays I do 9.45 till 4.45, Tuesdays I do 12.45 to 4.45 
and Thursdays I do 11.30 to 2.30. They have just been changed this 
week [first week of'operationalised hours']. So now I do that and i 
have Wednesdays off. . . I mean Katie [daughter] has got to walk 
home fi-om school ON HER OWN. I mean Katie, she is eight you 
know and I HATE THAT.. . I need to leave right on time, as 1 don't 
want her too long on her own. Another thing is that Harry [son] has 
just started playgroup. Fine. Someone was picking him up for me 
and I was dropping him ofl; but that's not working as I now have to 
work lunch hours so I now have to find someone who can drop him 
off. It's my choice. I chose to have children, but sometimes I feel 
they [management] don't give you enough flexibility... 
(Wanda, West Town Branch, 5/12/00). 
This loss of working hours flexibility may be one o f flie core reasons why so 
many respondents began to move away fix>m permanent part-lime contracts, 
which offered greater security of contractual tenure. In many cases these 
employees appeared content to oflfeet the loss of potential rewards available 
through performance related pay and other employment benefits against 
* Prior to the introduction of 'operalionalised hours', Wanda had a contract of employment to 
work specific hours over 4 days a week. On Mondays and Fridays she had worked 9.30 until 4 JO 
(with a lunch break of an hour) and on Tuesdays and Thursdays 10 JO until 3.30 (with a lunch 
break of half an hour). 
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continued woricing time flexibility. It may be suggested these individuals chose to 
gamble their increased contractual disposabiiity against their perceived worth to 
Bank UK (in terms of knowledge, mature steadying socialising influences, and 
fiinctional and numerical flexibility). In doing so, they appeared to rely on a 
pervading, yet unwritten, understanding that they were far too beneficial to the 
ongoing aims of Bank UK to be made redundant. Given the experiences of 
women returnees reflected in existing literature, which suggest that casual 
contract workers often exhibit decreased organisafional loyalty: (MacShane and 
Brewster, 2000; Fraser, 1999; Beechey and Perkins, 1987), what is diflScult to 
theorise fix)m my research is why should the informality of a 'casual' contract in 
Bank UK apparently do the opposite and increase motivation to achieve sales 
targets, when the opposite would logically be expected: 
... the approach that demeans - 'They are only part-timers' and 
'They are only job-sharers' - is unacceptable. It is absolutely certain 
that i f people are treated as 'only' something, this is how they wi!I 
turn out. Woric, profitability, productivity, effectiveness and 
customer service are all certain to suffer. 
(Pettinger, 1998:74). 
My data suggest that maintaining 'control' over working rime is one of the 
pivotal considerations in the calculations o f gains and losses that employees 
consider, when debating whether to offset the increasingly imposed flexibility of a 
permanent, (albeit part-time) contract against the controlled, (fi-om an employee 
perspective) flexibility of a casual contract. By theoretically gaining greater 
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control of their working hours by accepting a less beneficial (in monetary terms) 
'casual' contract, employees appeared to exhibit both greater motivation for their 
work and increased organisational loyalty. 
On the face of it, this conclusion would appear to support Hakim's Preference 
Theory (2000)', and perhaps runs counter to Halford et al., (1997) who suggest 
that it is the willingness of an individual to work overtime which must be 
considered to be the primary indicator of commitment. Yet, by accepting work 
with less security of tenure, it remains unclear whether the position of women in 
the labour market can be defined as superior to that of men in the liberated way 
that Hakim proposes. If it is accepted that women who seek casual contract work 
do so for the primary reason of maintaining control over working hours to fit with 
family and childcare responsibilities, these same femily responsibilities must 
mean that in most cases, women who chose casual work, must be relying on a 
primary income earner in order to simply secure a mortgage or sustain household 
income at acceptable levels (MacShane and Brewster, 2000: 13). Thus, Ginn et 
al., (1996, cited in Walsh, 1999: 199) may be correct in their argument that the 
attraction of part-time work can only be understood in the context o f total 
household income and collective familial contributions towards childcare. It is the 
See page 37. 
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sum total of a muhitude of considerations, which influence labour market choices, 
so any 'choice' must, by definition, be constrained*. 
Whilst Bank UK has clearly benefited from the organisational advantage these 
'casual' employees offer the organisation in terms o f personal commitment, 
diligence and team spirit, their continued exclusion from performance related pay 
awards demonstrates that their contributions to retail success have yet to be 
formally acknowledged. This might suggest that despite Bank UK embracing 
contemporary management philosophies, it still retains old-fashioned, patriarchal 
attitudes towards the employment of 'casual' workers, particularly women, 
viewing them as merely secondary income earners, in the same way that existing 
literature would suggest (Spencer and Taylor, 1994; Cockbum, 1991). This 
tension between reward and flexibility was nicely summed up by 'Jeremy', one of 
Bank UK's Regional Managers at one of its 2001 regional conferences when I 
asked him why 'casual' staff continued to be excluded from performance related 
pay rewards. He replied: " I f you want to be flexible then you need to trade off 
flexibility for performance related pay. If you want performance related pay, you 
should take up the offer of a permanent part-time contract" (18/10/01). 
However, through their enthusiasm to maintain choice and flexibility in the labour 
market, many women returnees appeared to be exposing themselves to increasing 
incidences of exploitation other than those considered simply remunerative. 
' 'Choice' is being discussed here only in the context of my central argument of contradiction. It is 
not an attempt to condense the complex argument about women's choice in the labour market into 
a couple of paragraphs. 
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Throughout my fieldwork it was clear that Bank UK had recognised the enormous 
benefits that returnees oflFercd the organisation and appeared keen to extract 
maximum value fit»m their deployment in terms of cost, experience and 
flexibility. Many had years of experience of working in the financial services 
industry and as growing numbers o f revised working strategies were rolled out 
across Bank UK's branch network, were increasingly expected to utilise their 
existing banking knowledge in different ways. This became especially significant 
during Bank UK's organisational restructuring, which rendered many traditional 
branch management positions obsolete. As pivotal branch roles changed fi-om 
being simply in charge of the workplace to the individual responsible for 
implementing management decisions, but with limited opportunity to influence 
decisions (Mason, 2000: 627), many casual retumees, as well as experienced 
permanent employees, by virtue o f their previous banking experience, found 
themselves being asked to operate informally as managers, whilst receiving 
salaries akin to those of either unskilled or easily disposable workers: 
...because we haven't got a manager as such now I'm having to do 
that as well which I must say I'm finding quite hard as I've never 
been trained to be a manager... So my role at the moment isn't how I 
would want it to be. I 'm happy as second officer supporting the 
manager but 1 don't want the responsibility of management... I just 
don't want to do it. I find the job so stressful... 
(Sally, Harbour Town Branch, 18/10/00). 
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Despite the benefit of experience that women on both permanent part-time and 
casual contracts offered Bank UK, the formal appointment of women to fiill-time 
branch management positions continued to be relatively uncommon. Apart fixjm 
my brief period of fieldwork at Sea Town branch, where two women job-shared 
the branch managerial position on a week in, week out basis, the main bulk of my 
research was undertaken in branches where a male manger was 'the norm'. 
Traditionally, men have been viewed as better suited than women to management 
posifions due, it was believed, to their more competitive personalities. Yet recent 
trends in organisational theory, such as HRM have shifted the debate about 
management qualities away fiom competition and control. New orthodoxy 
dictates that effective managers under revised working regimes now require a 
softer edge, and need be more qualitative and people oriented. As women have 
historically been thought to demonstrate a natural proclivity for this style, so 
Wajcman suggests their success in management should flourish (1998:55). 
This can also be linked to my earlier discussion of Hakim's preference theory. 
Literature suggests that many highly qualified women choose to stay at home to 
look after pre-school age children (Crompton and Biricelund, 2000; McDowell 
and Court, 1994; Figes, 1994). Over a third of working mothers leave full-time 
jobs altogether, or lake up part-time work of a more flexible nature within two 
years following the birth o f their firet child (Wilson, 2000: 7). This is not a fi^e 
choice in the manner that Hakim suggests, but a choice made within a set of 
constraints. With many employers resisting the demands of workers for variability 
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in working hours and greater job share opportunities, many women are feced with 
little choice but to make less use o f their formal educational and professional 
qualifications by accepting employment roles with less professional status than 
would be expected from their level o f qualification: 
Five years ago I was a Manager's Assistant. I used to take work 
home after working ti l l 6pm, worked through my lunch hours and 
then 1 got pregnant by mistake, had my third child and I thought 
'this is ridiculous'. I don't know any life except with 'Bank UK' , so . 
I decided to go back part-time as a customer services officer... 
(Pam, South Town Branch, 25/10/00). 
Yet at the same time fomial qualifications appear to have become sidelined in 
order to secure more flexible work arrangements, my research suggests that in 
Bank UK, returnees were certainly being expected to make increased use o f their 
informal workplace qualifications - intangible qualifications in the form o f 
organisational and workplace familiarity, experience and maturity. This became 
especially significant in situations where the seepage o f specialist, traditional 
banking knowledge had started to create heightened operational difficulties: 
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We all know a bit about this and a bit about that. That's another 
thing - the training on the job. There was a time when you sat down 
with someone before starting a new job. You watched them do it for 
a week. They would watch you do it for a couple o f weeks and they 
would take you right through it. You would always have someone 
vA\o knew the answers to everything and it does worry me that we 
are telling people things we know virtually nothing about. It's 
important to know how a cheque works and how the clearing system 
works and how one bit fits into something else, and I do think that 
basic knowledge isn't being passed on anymore... 
(Jean, North Town Branch, 15/2/01). 
But how far is the situation 'Jean' describes above simply a short-term operational 
difiSculty arising from the transitional stage between banking and retailing in 
which Bank IJK now finds itself? It might not matter in the longer term whether 
or not new entrants have any idea about traditional banking functions. Do sellers 
really need to know about how the clearing system works in order to promote a 
mortgage or offer a life insurance quotation? But, on the other hand, because 
Bank UK is at the moment dependent upon its existing cohort of flinctionally 
flexible staff (both casual and permanent) to protect its core operations, the 
question remains whether the gradual seepage o f traditional banking knowledge 
will be sustainable for Bank UK in the longer term as experienced workers retire. 
This conundrum was nicely summed up by 'Leah' with twenty years o f banking 
experience) in the following interview extract: 
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So it's [lending application] given to some CASUAL worker who's 
probably been in the bank about two months to make a decision on. I 
mean there's times vAiQn you might look at an account and i f you 
don't know that they've got another account or various bits and bobs 
[such as shares, land etc.], they decline things that really (pause) 
because they have such limited experience they don't see the overall 
picture (pause) and there have been occasions where things have got 
a bit heated shall we say between us and the lending centre. They are 
saying no, and they just haven't got the experience to see the ftiller 
picture. 
(Leah, North Town Branch, 15/2/01). 
From the perspective of cost, what could be better for Bank UK than using 
experienced female staff in key branch roles for the lowest possible levels o f 
remuneration? Yet, as my earlier quotation from 'Sally' on page 282 
demonstrates, many women returnees in Bank UK were unhappy with the extra 
responsibilities they were now expected to undertake in their revised roles. Once 
again, this finding links with my theory, that labour market choices are not 
unconstrained in the free manner that Hakim (2000) may suggest. In Bank UK the 
continued enthusiasm of peripheral workers to their jobs may not simply be the 
outcome of greater organisational commitment as previously theorised, but 
perhaps the influence of lack of alternative choice within a greater calculus of 
gains and losses (Nichols, 1986; Nolan, 1988; Metcalf, 1989). 
The calculus between opportunity and constraint and between flexibility and 
control must be considered in the context o f local labour market conditions and 
opportunities. This may have been especially so in the geographical area of my 
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main tranche o f fieldwork, where there were additional levels o f constraint.* At 
face value, the sacrifice of stability o f employment tenure, holiday entitlement^, 
statutory sickness pay and pension provision for enhanced working time 
flexibility would appear decidedly one-sided. However, with similar outcomes 
being observed in field sites where greater alternative choices were available (for 
example, North Town), the choice o f workers to return to Bank UK on casual 
contracts o f employment would not appear to be simply an outcome o f restriction, 
but a complex contradiction of individual restraint and choice. 
The tone of quiet complicity to revised bank strategies which appears to pervade 
my research findings may suggest, quite incorrectly, that Bank UK employees, 
whatever their contractual status, have simply accepted new ways of working 
without fiiss or dispute^. However, data analysis has exposed some evidence o f 
resistance to new work regimes in Bank UK, although they cannot be considered 
to be particularly pernicious or destabilising. Coliinson (1994: 25) suggests there 
are two types o f resistance** in the modem workplace - resistance through distance 
' The area is nationally recognised as economically deprived. Key industries have recently been 
lost 
^ During 2002, casual contract employees did start to receive holiday pay as a result of a review of 
all flexible employmait workers' paid hours since 1 October 1998. However, back pay continues 
to remain an issue. 
' At this level, fuss or dispute is used to imply formal disputes involving Staff Associations or 
Trades Unions. !t does not refer to internal disputes of petty and informal natures. 
* The word Resistance' is often used as convenient shorthand to describe a range of deviations 
from official policy. The debate about the prevalence of resistance is hamstrung from the outset by 
the assumption that all apparently non-compliant acts, whether intentional or not, are to be counted 
as acts of resistance (Mason et al., 2002: 555). In my research it has been difficult to determine 
whether certain behaviours were deliberately oppositional or not. Some acts may be seen as 
manifest resistances to official policy such as the refusal of cashiers to wear jockey caps during 
*Jack High' campaigns, yet some were little more than role-distancing. In addition, some acts were 
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and resistance through persistence, both of wliich can be determined to be 
responses to various practices of managerial control. 
It may be suggested that an example of collective resistance through distance by 
Bank UK employees was the incorrect wearing of, or outright refiisal to wear, its 
corporate uniform - a kind of symbolic distancing or statement of disaffection 
(Delbridge, 1995: 813). Whilst not compulsory, agreement to wear corporate 
dress had been encouraged by senior management'. For example, at West Town 
branch, cashiers often wore white cotton t-shirts instead o f their regulation 
patterned nylon blouses in order to keep cool, when the use of the branch air-
conditioning system was restricted on cost grounds during 2000 / 2001. Branch 
managers did not appear to mind these displays of resistance on a day-to-day 
basis, but were anxious to ensure no signs of worker deviance could be detected 
during higher-level management visits: 
Regional Manager and Regional Personnel Manager at the branch 
[West Town] to discuss staflRng levels... Whilst they were here 
George told us not to have any drinks visible on the t i l l , to ensure 
keyholders kept their keys under strict control, to clean and empty the 
ATM bin and ensure we were all wearing the correct version o f 
corporate dress 
(Research Diary, 19/9/00). 
simply about creating levels of personal comfort necessary to do a job, for example wearing cotton 
t-shirts instead of regulation nylon blouses in branches where air-conditioning systems were poor. 
' It is interesting to note that ^casual' staff did not quality for corporate dress as part of their 
contract, yet instead of wearing their own clothes, were expected to literally scavenge around for 
garments which had been returned to branches through the resignations of permanent staff. 
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My data suggest that other examples of resistance through distance in Bank UK 
may have taken the fomi of employee refiisals to fully embrace sales incentives, 
particularly those, which, in their opinion would only open them to ridicule in 
fix)nt of customers. In these instances, tensions and contradictions were created 
between continued employee commitment to operational goals, and resistance to 
sales initiatives, which, in the minds of staff, were perhaps not central to these 
goals. At best these schemes were seen as silly, and at worst only served to 
disrupt relationships with customers in a manner counterproductive to 
management aims. For example, wearing jockey caps, dressing completely in one 
colour and asking sales questions which were considered to be too abrupt, 
impersonal and totally at odds with typical cashier/customer banter: "And to be a 
cashier and have to ask 'are you buying a dishwasher'? it's just so bizarre isn't 
it?" (Eric, Manager, Harbour Town, 18/10/00)*. 
At face value these refusals might be considered to be simply examples of 
resistance through distance, yet at a deeper level of analysis they may exemplify 
attempts by staff to preserve both their own, and Bank UK's professional 
reputation. Lankshear et al., (2001) suggest that professionalism can be examined 
from a number of different perspectives. In the first instance professional status 
might be preserved by restricting entry to the higher levels of the profession to 
those holding qualifications in the form of internally ratified examinations. This 
' One of the benefits of Bank UK's 'Jack High' account was a promise to offer 10% discount on 
the purchase of 'white goods' from its home shopping catalogue. As a 'conversation opener', 
cashiers were asked to open customer dialogue with: "Do you have a dishwasher" (Research 
Diary, 4/9/00). 
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had certainly been the historic path to career advancement in Bank UK, but as its 
primary oi^ganisational concern shifted away from traditional banking operations, 
so the content, and thus the relevance of its professional examinations had started 
to become increasingly obsolete*. During one of my interview sessions, 'Lionel' 
explained why he had converted his banking qualifications into a degree, which 
he thought would be more widely acceptable in the external labour market: 
... I finished my banking exams in 1993, and in 1996 I converted 
them into a degree [in economics] by taking two extra papers... 
lOB^ exams are not worth anything now to an employer... I f anyone 
came in now and said they wanted to do a degree I would encourage 
them to do one in say economics or maths, not necessarily related to 
the financial services. 
(Lionel, Manager, South Town Branch, 25/10/00). 
Secondly, it is suggested that employees often develop their own definition of 
professional service through deliberate strategies ofresistance through persistence 
as defined by Collinson (1994: 25): " . . . i n 'resistance through persistence' 
subordinates seek to demand greater involvement in the organisation and to 
render management more accountable by extracting information, monitoring 
practices and challenging decision-making processes." The definition of 
'professional' clearly has diflferent connotations within different industries. 
Throughout my thesis, data have shown the difierent ways in which employees of 
Bank UK have struggled to continue to offer a professional service to customers 
' This returns to the discussion of the relevance of knowledge as discussed on pages 284-285. Is it 
necessary that branch staff understand complex lending and securities issues in order to sell a 
'Jack High' account? 
^ The Chartered Institute of Bankers. 
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during the imposition of new, and at times contradictory working practices. In the 
preceding paragraph, 'Eric' expressed his concerns at having to instruct his staff 
to wear jockey caps and ask questions that he considered to be at odds with the 
professional image o f Bank UK that both he and his customers expected. In 
Chapter Four, I examined at great length the content o f sales training courses that 
Bank UK staff (of whatever their contractual status) were mandated to attend 
during 2000. Analysis of this training suggests that issues o f professionalism 
appeared to be no longer an integral part of the bank / customer relationship. The 
overriding training objective had been to remove what the course convenor 
described as: "the pervading mentality of staff shyness" to selling. It is clear from 
my research that staff did appear reluctant to overcome customer objections to 
potential sales, but felt that what Bank UK now expected them to do in 
continuously pushing products and not backing away once the customer had 
declined to buy, was at odds with both their own professional pride and their 
concept of Bank UK's professional image: 
... I can't stitch people up! I can't do that! Having said that, i f there 
was something really good that would benefit somebody then I 
would sell it, but I can't just stitch people up! I can't do that... 
'Barry' [Manager] said we've got to be dirty and I can't do that... i f 
they [customers] want something they've got a mouth they can open 
and ask for i l . . . l listen to other people and think: 'My God, that's a 
hard sell!'... I had a lady come back complaining about 'Jack High' 
and 1 asked her why she had ever taken it out in the first place and 
she said she was bullied into it! Need I say more? 
(Leah, North Town Branch, 15/2/01). 
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Clearly both Bank UK as a professional, forward-looking organisarion and its 
employees in their new roles as front-line sales agents perceived the maintenance 
of a positive and professional customer relationship as crucial to building a 
platform from which sales opportunities might be increased. But, in striving to 
enhance maiketing opportunities, both sides appeared to have different agendas as 
to how this relationship should be developed. As my research has shown many 
times already, Bank UK encouraged staff to engage the interest of customers in 
financial products through the use of props. Both cashiers and Sales Executives 
were often expected to wear jockey caps or dress completely in one colour to 
draw customers into discussions about the merits of Jack High accounts, or use a 
pile of bricks on the counter to encourage conversations about property, which 
might lead to quotations for lucrative financial products, for example mortgages, 
home insurance etc. Yet staff appeared to continue to believe that the only way to 
build the confidence of the consumer to entice them to buy, was by offering a 
professional banking service, not one built around the strategic deployment of 
props and scripted conversations: 
... it just seems to me that it's all selling and they [management] say 
it's customer service. But I think i f you treat the customers right 
without shoving everything down their neck as soon as they get in 
through the door, then when they do want something they wil l come 
to us. If we keep bombarding them with everything (pause), i f it was 
me personally I wouldn't come in [to the branch]. 
(Jane, West Town Branch, 12/12/00). 
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StafiFclearly believed that the ways in which their speech, particularly in the form 
of scripted sales dialogue, had become hijacked by increasing management 
control, demonstrated that their roles were in fact regressing towards an ever-
increasing proletarianisation of labour, and by definition, weakening their 
professionalism. Earlier in my thesis I have already described how 'Eric' 
(Manager, Sea Town Branch) now viewed his sales role: " . . . I feel a bit like a 
bloke in a sheepskin coat tiying to flog a motor..." (18/10/00). It is clear fix>m my 
data that Bank UK staff continued to endeavour to overcome the many tensions 
created between service and selling by both developing and defending their own 
definitions of professionalism in striking a delicate balance between the 
organisation and the customer, whilst acting with a sense of ethical autonomy 
(Lankshear et al., 2001: 605). Whatever the outcome of the debate about 
professionalism, my conclusion must be that in its most simple and uncomplicated 
fomi, the introduction of individual sales targets seems to have returned bank 
work (once considered the aristocracy of clerical labour), into a contemporaiy 
version of piecework, with staff being simply rewarded for every product sold, 
histead of employees being asked to use their physical labour to manufacture 
tangible products in the ways that existing industrial monographs graphically 
animated (Westwood, 1984; Cavendish, 1982; Linhart, 1981; Beynon, 1978), as 
Bank UK has shifted its primary operational concern from banking to retailing, its 
staff have been expected to exert more mental and emotional labour to build 
inanimate, yet increasingly important relationships with customers as platforms 
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from which increased sales opportunities might be generated. Yet, paradoxically, 
the same operational strategies that have been used by Bank UK to build these 
platforms appear to have little regard for the professional status o f its staff. This 
outcome appears hardly surprising when it is remembered that many 'changes' in 
Bank UK have mainly been concerned to reduce costs and improve production 
quality through the implementation of a range of different operational strategies, 
many of which were specifically developed for the manufecturing sector, where 
relationships between management, staff and customers are very different to those 
found in the financial services industry. Thus Bank UK's continued success as a 
retail organisation, which now depends on more fluid and dynamic relationships 
between management, staff and customers, must require dedicated operational 
strategies which wholeheartedly reflect its individual need, rather than 
implementing a plethora of different techniques and taxonomies of management 
practices developed for a different industrial sector considered to have a less 
complicated "social reality" (Benson, 1986, cited in Frenkel et al., 1999: 199). 
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Paradox and Contradiction - Final Thoughts. 
What started out as a research proposal concerned with assessing the impact of 
the introduction of working practices akin to those considered 'Japanese'- style in 
the banking industry has, in common with most sociological research, uncovered 
a multiplicity of truths, which have at times been difficult to theorise. A simplistic 
overview would suggest that as bank strategies have become riddled with 
paradoxes and contradictions, so too have employee responses. 
As 1 have reiterated many times already throughout my thesis, most contradictions 
simply reflect the operational difficulties that have arisen irom Bank UK shifting 
its primary operational strategy fi'om banking to retailing, whilst at the same time 
continuing to offer a more traditional, transactional based service. Organisational 
'unfamiliarity' appears to have become a key issue: ". . . I joined the bank to be a 
banker and all of a sudden they changed my job description and said i f you don't 
want to sell you are in the wrong job" (Leah, North Town Branch, 15/2/01) Yet, 
somewhat paradoxically, continuing familiarity with 'the organisation' as an 
employer appears to be the one of the key reasons why staff, particularly those 
returning on 'casual' contracts of employment continue to exhibit strong 
organisational loyalty. Such loyalty is, however, tempered by their own labour 
market requirements of flexibility: ". . . because I've been here so long my salary 
is not bad for what 1 do... J don*t want the responsibility, I just want lo come in 
and do my job and go home... I'm quite happy to sit on the counter for the rest of 
my days" (Wanda, West Town Branch, 5/12/00), and begs the question how far 
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these displays of allegiance to Bank UK can be considered to be unswervingly 
loyal, or simply the best choice for an individual in a complicated set of 
constraints. 
My research has not only uncovered what is happening now in Bank UK in terms 
of changing bank strategies, but has exposed many questions for further research -
research that will not only be rewarding to industrial sociologists, but to 
management consultants and practitioners eager to find a solution to the many 
unresolved tensions between cost / profit / teamworking / conmiitment and 
loyalty. Cost control has undoubtedly been viewed as the panacea for Bank UK in 
its desire to strengthen and increase market share. Yet, at times, its blinkered 
pursuit o f cost reduction has clearly generated multiple examples o f counter costs 
for both the bank and its employees, which have been the principal foci of my 
research. It remains impossible to say with conviction whether such counter costs 
are an unavoidable feature of the market situation o f modem banks, or the 
deliberate (and therefore avoidable) exploitation of staff in vulnerable positioris, 
faced with their own contradictions and objectives in making difficult choices. 
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Appendix One> 
Definitions & Pseudonyms, 
ACAS Advisoiy, Conciliation and Arbitration Service. 
Action Prompt Cards Paper based diary card reminder system. 
A T M Automated Teller Machine. 
BIFU Banking, Insurance & Finance Union. Now UniFi. 
CSALES Cashiering software & hardware package. 
ESRC Economic & Social Research Council. 
High Square Intemal service standard. 
Hostage Selling Deliberate stalling of customer in branch for sales 
purposes. 
Jack High Bank UK's premier current account. 
JIWIS Job Insecurity and Work Organisation Survey. 
Late Opening Sessions Wednesday morning opening at 9.30am. 
Ongoing Customer Initiative Improvements to customer service. 
Operationaiised Hours Flexible working hours. 
Sales Executive (SE) Staff member with primary duty of selling. 
Scrums Daily 8.45am staff meeting. 
STAFF Footflow and Workflow figures. 
UniFi Largest specialist finance union in Europe. 
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Appendix Two. 
Field Sites. 
1. Central Town branch - This was the largest branch within the main 
geographical area of my fieldworic. Located in a prime, city centre 
location, the 3-storied building not only housed a typical banking branch, 
it was also the domicile of local business and corporate managers. The 
only branch in the area to open on Saturdays following the implementation 
of'operationalised hours', the size of its banking hall was small compared 
to footflow, and queues for the ill-sited enquiries desk often merged with 
those waiting for the cashiers. Total number of staff in banking branch 
( sn )= l7 ' 
2, Harbour Town branch - Located in the centre of a busy seasonal 'tourist 
town', the rear wall of Harbour Town branch directly abutted the sea. The 
3-storey building had once been the key branch in the locality. Its banking 
hall was huge, yet following interior redesign in the 1990s; the counter 
area was now squashed up against one wall. In the old and unused office 
space, large picture windows looked directly over the harbour and beyond 
to the open sea. The huge unused space on the second floor housed 
Staff numbers quoted in these descriptions of fieldwork sites are approximate. I have based them 
on the numbers of staff present in individual branches during periods of fieldwork. Where 
absences were obvious, managers were asked to confirm individual branch establishments. For 
simplicity I have not demarcated full-time from part-time staff, or broken down individual 
establishments into staffing numbers by different internal gradings. 
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obsoleted processing equipment. Floor 3 could only be reached via a 
steep, narrow wooden staircase, yet here could be found staff amenities 
such as the toilets and a small staff room. The windows of the staff room 
were unable to be opened for security reasons, and the whole room 
appeared dark and unwelcoming. The manager o f Harbour Town resigned 
during September 2000 and a replacement had been diflicult to find. 
During my fieldwork, a recently retired manager was employed on a 
'casual' contract to fill the vacancy on a short-term basis (sn = 5). 
3. Mine Town branch - Small town centre branch, managed by larger 
branch 4 miles distant. Decreasing staff levels had increased Its 
vulnerability and it had been raided twice during the last two years. 
During 2001, regional management were known to be deliberating its 
ongoing operational viability, (sn = 3). 
4. North Town branch - Located over 300 miles away fiDm principal sites 
of fieldwork. Used primarily to test hypotheses emergent fiDm early stages 
of fieldwork. Prime city centre branch within a large metropolitan 
conurbation. Subjected to Saturday opening. Vast, omately decorated 
banking hall with domed, gilded ceilings and large horseshoe shaped 
counter area with 20 cashiering positions. To the far end was a separate 
enquiries area complete with comfortable solas; fi^e beverage vending 
machines and children's play area. Despite the huge size o f the building, 
staff recreational facilities were compressed into a 3m x 3m subterranean 
298 
and chilly, stone floored space in part of the vast cavernous area, which 
had historically been the city's primary underground air raid shelter during 
Worid War II , and which was now used by Bank UK for its long-term 
voucher storage. Four unused floors above the banking hall had been the 
trial sites for Bank UK's dedicated telephony, processing and securities 
centres during the late 1980s, each of which had long since been 
amalgamated with their larger successors, (sn = 33). 
5. Sea Town branch - Located in the centre o f a 'holiday' town. The 
seasonality of its footflow meant that fi*om October 2000, the branch 
halved its opening hours during the winter 'season'. It was a unique site, 
with something of a 'time warp' factor. It was staffed entirely by women, 
and its managerial position was covered on a job-share basis. It was the 
only branch in the UK not to have not been either intemally orextemally 
re-modelled with Bank UK's new corporate branding in the 1990s (sn = 
4). 
6. South Town branch - This was a Grade 11 listed building in the centre of 
a historic marlcet town. Originally a Georgian house, its conversion to a 
bank in the 1920s had created a 'rabbit warren' of floors both above and 
below ground level. The layout of staircases meant staff had to firstly go 
downstairs in order to reach upper floors via separate staircases. Vouchers 
were stored in the original 'below stairs' area of the house, alongside meat 
hooks and whitewashed brick shelving. Working areas were typically 
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housed in what had been different domestic rooms. The original 
manager's office (which had not been changed in any way) was sited in 
the old parlour, which was still decorated in gilding and heavy oak 
panelling. Three flights of stairs had to be negotiated in order to reach the 
staff room (once a bedroom), which still housed a servant's bell. The 
original 'call system' had been overhauled and was now capable of 
sunmioning 'help' fix)m different areas of the branch during busy periods. 
However, the banking hall itself was small and the 'office' area consisted 
of four desks squashed together in the remaining 'above' stairs space. 
Mezzanine floors housed obsolete processing machines. The upper floor 
had been converted into a flat rented on the open market. Its kitchen was 
directly over the banking hall and often the ceiling vibrated when its 
occupants were using their washing machine! Another wall abutted the 
jukebox of the adjoining pub, so was not a quiet space in which to work. 
Archaic heating and ventilation systems also meant that South Town 
branch was a very hot place to work in the summer. Most of the staff had 
all worked in the branch for a long time (2 since joining Bank UK in the 
early 1980s), and 3 lived within the locality. For them, work appeared an 
extension to their social lives and often customers merely 'dropped in ' for 
achat, (sn = 5). 
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7. West Town branch - This was situated at the head of a very steep hill , 
just away from the centre of town, adjacent to a busy fishing and 
commercial port. It was a tall; yet narrow 3-storied building, which had 
been a bank of various sorts since the late 1800s. A large banking hall hid 
a very small working area. The counter had inadequate cashiering 
positions (4), to cope with a very demanding footflow. It was extremely 
busy branch, which had gained a reputation o f being a 'hell-hole' in which 
to work. Resignations were commonplace, compounding the problem of 
replacements. Even when the counter was fully staffed with competent, 
experienced stafi" it was not uncommon for queues to stretch out o f the 
door and into the street. The pace o f work was unrelenting, and continued 
staflT sickness absences caused tremendous problems in delivering a 
quality service. Located at the extreme geographical edge of Bank UK's 
southernmost region, its staff* were extremely insular in outlook and often 
used their colloquial tongue to demarcate 'outsiders', (sn = 8). 
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Appendix Three. 
Respondent Profiles' 
[The following profiles may appear subjective, yet the animation of an 
individual's character cannot avoid the use of a certain degree of descriptive 
narration]. 
Principal Gatekeeper and Key Informant, 
George: (44, single). George remained a central figure throughout the entire 
period of fieldwork. He offered open access into Bank UK in return for me 
agreeing to cover an unfilled vacancy in his branch. Studying for an Open 
University degree himself, he understood the academic side to my presence. With 
his branch ofien called upon to provide relief to other local branches, he was able 
to offer me an unprecedented opportunity to cover absences in other sites, which 
served to broaden my field. By the end of my first extended period of fieldwork 
we had developed such a good working relationship that he agreed to undertake a 
series of one-to-one interviews in order broaden my data, and provide 
backgrounds to key themes emerging fi^om early data analysis. In January 2001, 
following a complete overhaul o f staffing contracts he was once again able to 
offer me the opportunity to undertake a fiirther extended period of research whilst 
a permanent replacement for a vacant part-time cashiering position was found. 
Not only did he 'trade' access for *help', he continued to ensure that during my 
' Names of ail respondents have been changed, and their locations of work not revealed in order to 
protect identity. Ages and job descriptions remain true. 
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absences fix)m the field I received copies o f management circulars and staff 
correspondence, 
Anna (34, married with children) - Anna was employed as a cashier covering 
long-term absences throughout the local area. Initially a permanent full-time 
cashier, she had switched to 'casual' contracts following the birth of her thini 
child. A loud, forceful individual with a commanding presence, her moods 
appeared to change fi^quently. Sometimes the 'model' cashier, identifying and 
closing sales in the maimer desired by bank UK, and at other times surly and 
obstinate. Had a habit of agreeing to work, then simply not turning up as 
arranged. 
Annie (18. single) - Annie joined Bank UK as a college leaver in 2000, 
answering a job centre advertisement for temporaiy staff. A combination of late 
arrivals, substantial cash errors and her general defiant demeanour meant George 
did not renew her initial three-month contract on expiry. 
Barry (38, married with children) - Branch Manager. A large, loud man with a 
commanding presence married to one of his part-time cashiers. He had spent 
much of his career at the same branch, rising through the ranks and had been 
appointed Manager over five years ago. At his own admission he was 'one of the 
lads' who enjoyed lunchtime drinking sessions and often appeared to delegate 
responsibilities to his Assistant Manager. 
Bob (SO, single) - Originally occupying a position as an Assistant Manager, Bob 
accepted an early retirement package early in 2000. For the remainder o f the year 
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he worked as a 'casual' contract cashier covering lunch-hours at West and South 
Town branches. Early in 2001, he accepted a part-time accoimtancy position with 
a local business and resigned fit>m Bank UK's casual contract register. 
Bradley (34, married with children) - A 'favourite' of Lesley (Area Manager), 
he was offered the position as West Town's Branch Manager in 2001 without the 
usual interview formalities. Previously a Business Manager, Bradley had no 
recent branch experience. After his appointment to West Town branch, he 
appeared to spend an inordinate amount of time organising branch storage and 
information systems. New A4 colour coded files were purchased, and more 
shelving installed. Whilst very impressive, his staff were desperate for a Manager 
fiiom whom they could seek guidance and leadership in their veiy busy branch. 
With Bradley needing to be almost retrained fi-om scratch, he was unable to 
immediately become a fully fijnctioning part of the team, thus adding to staff 
fiustrations. An easy-going individual, who tried to be a fiiend rather than a 
manager, he found the relentless pace of branch work demanding, and began to 
suffer fiom stress related illness necessitating prolonged periods o f sickness 
absence. During 2001, resignations and retirements meant that by the end of the 
year, with the exception of Wanda, he was nmning his branch entirely with casual 
staff. 
Britney (18, single) - A new entrant in 2000, Britney joined Bank UK as a 
trainee cashier immediately following her ' A ' levels. A competent, yet nervous 
individual, she initially found the unrelenting pace of work difficult. Unsure of 
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her abilities at mental arithmetic she relentlessly practiced checking and 
dispensing cash. Her 'model' looks attracted a great deal of (sometimes 
unwarranted) attention from elderly male customers, and despite asking her to 
remove visible signs of body piercing whilst at work, Lionel twice had to help 
extricate her from suggestive advances. After passing her 4-month probation, she 
was transferred to Harbour Town Branch as chief cashier. 
Chrissie (29, married, small baby) - An experienced ex - cashier, Chrissie had 
resigned from the employment of Bank UK following the birth of her first child. 
She had been persuaded to accept a temporary 'casual' contract to train staff 
within the region to use the new CSALES system during 2001. 
Christine (20, single) - Answered a job centre advertisement for staff in 2001, 
and was placed in West Town Branch as a 'margin' member of staff to cover staff 
absences. The roving nature of her role meant she had to quickly learn lo 
undertake both cashiering and enquiries roles. A quiet, unassuming individual, 
she appeared overawed with her role at first, yet developed into a competent 
member of staff. Unhappy at her career prospects, she was openly looking around 
for a change of job during 2002. 
Claire (37, married with children) - Claire had worked at South Town branch 
throughout the 20 years of her banking career. Following the birth of her children, 
she had retumed to the branch as a part-time, permanent cashier. Knowing 
absolutely everything about Bank UK, its systems and South Town's customers 
she was an invaluable part of the branch team, yet was the only one of my 
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respondents who categorically refused to participate in team-working initiatives. 
As a left-hander, her cashiering position was sacrosanct and anyone who moved 
any of her equipment in her absence was subjected to *cold-shoulder' treatment. 
As the organiser of branch social events, it was clear that she tried very hard to 
exclude anyone she did not like. Sister of Tiona' (see page 308). 
Crystal (IS^ingle) - Daughter of'Pam's' (see pages 313-314) neighbours and 
waiting to start at University, Crystal was trained as a cashier to cover the main 
holiday season in 2001. Having signed a 4-month 'casual' contract, she 
complained her work was boring and monotonous. Sam (Chief Cashier, West 
Town branch) tried to give her extra responsibilities that she thought would break 
up the repetitive nature o f her job, but Crystal hated doing anything other than 
cashier. She detested being asked to undertake typical 'junior' roles, for example 
assembling cardboard sales literature stands, making drinks, walking post etc. 
Dave (35, married with children) - Branch Manager. 
Diane {42, part-time cashier, married with children) - Permanent, part-lime 
cashier who covered lunch hours at West Town Branch. Originally a qualified 
secretary, she had chosen to accept to be retrained as a cashier following the 
withdrawal of her secretarial role. An out-spoken individual, she was not afraid to 
engage management in bitter arguments. She resigned during July 2000 over yet 
another freeze in her hourly remuneration, preferring to take a substantial cut in 
salary to become a playground supervisor at her local primary school. 
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Eric (48, married with children) - An experienced Manager who was on Bank 
UK's surplus list following the downgrading of his previous job. In 2000 he was 
undertaking a management role at Harbour Town branch on a 'casual' contract 
basis, and at his own admission was simply 'going through the motions' waiting 
for Bank UK to finalise his retirement package. 
Fiona {35, divorced with children) - Sister of 'Claire' (see pages 306-307), 
Fiona volunteered for a part-time Sales Executive position in 2001. Well-known 
in the locality of South Town Branch she appeared thrive in her focussed sales 
role. 
Harriet (21, living with partner, no children) - Answered a local press 
advertisement for permanent cashiers in Summer 2001. Having just graduated 
from a local higher education college she was principally employed with the idea 
of becoming a 'margin' - i.e. covering absences across three branches. Veiy 
ambitious, she often commented she felt her job was not worthy of her academic 
achievements. Reftised to wear corporate uniform, preferring her own clothes. 
Henry (52, married with children) - Manoeuvred into taking a retirement 
package from his branch managerial position in 2000, Henry felt he was too 
young to retire, and continued to work for Bank UK on a 'casual' contract basis, 
providing cashiering and enquiries cover throughout the geographical area of my 
field work. During 2001, he was reinstated to fiill employment status in order to 
cover a vacant sales executive role. 
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Imogen. (50-^, married with children) - Sister o f Sally (see pages 314-
315), Imogen worked as a 'casual' contract cashier at Harbour Town bmnch 
covering the busy summer season. A veiy chatty individual, she admitted working 
with the sole aim of receiving *pocket money' to fund her 'cruising habit*. Not 
overly concerned with sales, she had on more than one occasion threatened to 
resign over sales initiatives which she thought demeaned her age, for example 
wearing a jockey cap to promote 'Jack High' accounts. 
Jane (27, unmarried, living with partner, no children) - Occupying a Chief 
Cashier's role, she had been unwillingly transferred between South and West 
Town branches at the beginning of 2000. Quiet and shy, she appeared to revel in 
the challenge of running a busy counter, yet her outwardly calm appearance 
masked inner feelings of panic, which often manifested themselves in stress-
related illnesses necessitating substantial periods of sickness absence. She did not 
appear to have flilly come to terms with her move, and was always the first to 
offer to cover unexpected absences at her old branch. Not being able to face a 
return to work after a particularly extended sickness absence, she resigned in 2001 
to train as a nursery nurse. 
Jean (52, married with children) - Jean had been employed by Bank UK on a 
wide variety of contractual agreements for over 35 years. A Union representative, 
she was currently used in a diversity of roles. An outspoken individual who knew 
every piece o f employment legislation, she ofien stalled the implementation o f 
new working regimes and systems, which she felt did not satisfy staff needs. 
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Despite her nickname of'Red Robbo' she was extremely conscientious and often 
undertook duties other than her own to maintain a smooth flow o f woric, which 
she justified by saying she was doing it for the staff', rather than any sense of 
loyalty to Bank UK. Desperate to leave, but mindful of her long service benefits, 
Jean volunteered to reduce her hours during 2001. 
Jeremy (28, married) - Regional Manager with overall responsibility for branch 
sales achievement in the geographical area of my fieldwork. A graduate with little 
branch woricing experience branch, local managers did not regard him with great 
esteem. 
Julia (35. married) - Cashier at Mine Town branch. 
Kathleen (SO, single) - A long serving staff member at West Town Branch, 
Kathleen was seemingly coerced into accepting an early retirement package in 
January 2000. Unhappy at the nature of her departure, which she felt had been 
forced upon her, she made sure that her regular customers knew she had been 
unwillingly forced out. Affectionately known as the 'Queen Bee', the 
ramifications of her departure penneated throughout West Town Branch for a 
very long time. She easily found another job with one o f Bank UK's local 
business customers, which meant visiting her old branch on a daily basis to 
undertake financial transactions. Her arrival was eageriy awaited by other cashiers 
who often took the opportunity to loudly moan about what had been happening in 
the branch that day. By remaining friends with her old colleagues she continued 
to attend branch social events throughout my research period. 
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Kvlie (19, single, university student) -Kylie was employed over the 2000 
summer period on a casual contract basis to provide extra cashiering cover at 
West Town Branch. Training to be a teacher, she applied her calm, umtiffled 
manner to the counter. Contracted to work 10.30 - 3.30, yet relying on a lift to 
and from work with her mother who worked in the locality; she oflen worked full 
days with no extra remuneration. 
Lauren {18, living with partner, no children) - Joining Bank UK as a trainee 
cashier in 2000, Lauren soon developed a reputation for dependability. An 
independent individual, she quickly learnt her job, and became an integral part of 
the cashiering team. Always willing to learn, she was bitterly disappointed not to 
be offered Maureen's job on her retirement, despite signalling her willingness to 
embrace higher-level duties. Her deepening dissatisfaction with her career 
prospects appeared to trigger her resignation in January 2002. 
Leah (39, Inking with partner) - Now undertaking a Sales Executive role, Leah 
had worked for Bank UK for 20 years. Over time she had become expert in the 
whole range of clerical jobs, and had risen to the level of senior lending officer 
prior to her duties being stripped out of branch control in the mid 1990s, She 
appeared very bitter that her undoubted experience was no longer recognised by 
Bank UK, and was sceptical about the use of impersonal technologies in 
sanctioning all lending decisions. An outspoken individual, she was an integral 
part of the branch team, but had found the necessity to work Saturday's too much. 
At her own instigation she reduced her hours to part-time status during 2001. 
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Lesley (42, married with children) - Local Area Manager. Lesley lived as close 
as she could to the regional border and did little to disguise the dislike of the 
geographical area under her jurisdiction. A small, bustling woman, w4io was 
reading for an MBA, she seemed more concerned with trivial matters such as the 
cleanliness of automated cash machines, (which she insisted were cleaned every 
day), than the problems of acute staff shortages. Capable of being extremely 
friendly one minute and 'back-stabbing' the next, she remained the main the focus 
of staff discontent. 
Lionel (40, married with children) - Initially undertaking a branch managerial 
role he was moved to other duties early in 2001. A quiet, unassuming individual, 
he was happy to allow his staff to govern themselves and avoid conflict. A fully 
qualified professional banker he had converted his banking qualifications into an 
economics degree. Remained good friends with his ex-staff and continued to 
attend social events during 2001. 
Mary (25, single) - Promoted to Assistant Manager in her role as Regional 
Mortgage Sales Manager in the locality of North Town Branch, Maiy wanted a 
return to regular branch hours, rather than those demanded by her peripatetic 
mortgage seller role, and had applied to become a Sales Executive. A small, 
attractive individual, she had failed the height requirement to achieve her long-
standing ambition to train as an air hostess. However, many of her colleagues 
appeared to feel that her Assistant Manager status had been achieved through 'the 
back door of sales' and not by proving her competence in a 'proper' banking role. 
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Maureen (52, divorced with children) - A bustling, hard working 'jack-of-all-
trades', she had been employed by Bank UK for over 12 years. Equally at home 
on the counter, or as a sales executive, she was used in a 'fire-fighting' role, 
working wherever need was greatest at West Town Branch. Her ability to cope 
under the most extreme pressures meant she often asked to undertake extra 
responsibilities, which she v^llingly executed. Affectionately known as 'Mother' 
she often openly challenged managerial initiatives, which she thought did not 
enhance service or created extra (unnecessary) woik. Retired in December 2001. 
Nina (38, married) - Having worked as a secretary for Bank UK since leaving 
school, Nina accepted a redundancy package in 1990 when her secretarial role 
was terminated. She immediately accepted an invitation to train as a Sales 
Executive at Harbour Town Branch, on a 'casual' contract basis, which meant that 
she was ineligible for any sales related bonus payments her branch achieved, yet 
she was undertaking the primary sales role. 
Pam (39, married with children) - Sales Executive and 'number two' at South 
Town Branch, Pam had overcome cancer to return to fUll-lime work in 2001. A 
long-serving staff member, and resident o f the local community she was well 
known both inside and outside Bank UK. Her easy-going personality suited her 
sales job, and she was the key player in her branch achieving outstanding sales 
results during 2001. Frequently working over her contracted hours, and rarely 
taking a lunch break, she was scathing o f others who refused to work excess 
hours. 
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Pes^V (40, married with children) - 'Number two' at West Town Branch and 
occupying a role as a Sales Executive, she was a diminutive figure who did not 
appear to cope well under pressure. It was no secret that she only continued to 
work to ftind private school fees for her very academically talented daughter. 
Rachel (30, part-^ime cashier, married, with children) - Cashiered for 8 hours 
a week on a permanent part-time contract. Obsessively concerned with her 
appearance, she refijsed to wear Bank UK's standard uniform, substituting 
corporate garments for something similar, yet 'designer'. Pregnant for the second 
time, she refiised to do anything that involved any physical exertion. Appeared to 
spend an inordinate amount of time making drinks, eadng sandwiches and 
telephoning fiiends. Latter stages of pregnancy spent on sickness leave. 
Sally (42, living with partner, no children) - Forced to move fix)m Central to 
Harbour Town Branch against her will in 2001 to cover a vacant managerial role, 
Sally bitterly resented having to undertake such responsibility on her existing 
salary. Vociferous in her unhappiness, yet loath to resign and lose her substantial 
benefit package, she continued to operate as a branch manager for over a year 
without the appropriate level of remuneration. 
Samantha (42, married with children) - Occupying the role o f Chief Cashier at 
South Town Branch, Sam had retumed to work in 2001 after a twelve-month 
absence following a nervous breakdown. Recognising her fi^l health, she 
volunteered for a downgrading ftom being 'branch number two', to Chief 
Cashier, thinking this would shield her fiom the worst o f sales expectations. 
313 
Remaining veiy embittered about her experiences, she flatly refused to undertake 
any duties other than cashiering and insisted on being paid for any excess hours 
she was forced to undertake. 
Tint (32, married with children) - Resigned as the Manager of Harbour Town 
Branch during 2000 due to stress-related illness. Now running a convenience store 
in his home village. 
Tom (30, married with children) - Business Manager. 
Wanda (38, part-time cashier, married with children) - Originally joining Bank 
UK as a qualified secretary in 1982, Wanda had worked at West TOWTI Branch 
throughout her whole working life. Having made the choice in 1995 to retrain as a 
cashier, and not accept redundancy following the gradual decline in secretarial 
roles, she was a continuous presence on the counter. Her constant talking both to 
customers and other staff was a major irritation to other cashiers. She had little 
regard for 'George' who had unknowingly reduced her hours the same week her 
husband had been made redundant. 
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